Subcommittee, consisting largely of SFO contractor personnel, made two major recommendations inthe interest of reduced security costs without weakening national se-~curity: (1) Recognition that no security is involved in approximate yield of nuclear be aon detonations in Nevada; and, (2) application of the reactor field's "black box" idea to those items of nuclear weapons which are clearly of a military and not AEC nature. A field classification board was established at Sandia in addition to the one at LASL. Declassification Declassification is necessarily highly centralized and is performed for SFO by an Assistant Director, LASL, advised by Senior and Responsible Reviewers (the latter at LASL and Sandia) and by field classification boards. The normal tendency to overclassify has been materially reduced and a continuing program to review classified material for downgrading or declassification has been continued. Formal declassification was accomplished during the three years on 585 items from LASL and 16 from Sandia. Publication of "The Effects of Atomic Weapons" and release of information in the Rosenberg-Greenglass cases opened a fairly large field of information which could be considered for declassification. Security Considerable program stabilization was achieved while planning and activating "crash" basis expansion. To provide coordinated service over awide geographic area, security offices were established in New York and in Los Angeles. As of July 1953, SFOO had security responsibility in 423 security facilities, 25 per cent of the entire bh opbys bose W re AEC's facilities. A key achievement was segregation of staff and operating functions, with the Office of Security providing over-all direction and with SFOO Field Offices tending more toward local administration and less toward operations. For instance, installation guarding was being performed by contractor employees (or the Military) at all points except Los Alamos. Particular SFOO emphasis was placed on continuous review, evaluation, and coordination of security programs and measures throughout SFO. Careful analysis and action made possible a reduction of more than 50 per cent in ratio of guards to total Q-cleared work force at major SFO installations, the 1950 figure having been one to seven and the mid-1953 figure one to seventeen. Reductions in size of limited access areas and institution of various personnel security safeguards permitted a 3, 750 reduction in number of Q-clearances processed in fiscal 1953 as compared with 1952. Two permanent panels of Personnel Security Board members were set up in 1950 to assist in administrative review of personnel clearance cases. Document control measures were intensified. Classified documents on hand June 30, 1953, totaled 53,000, 000 with unaccounted-for documentstotaling 840. Information j? There was a heavy, continuing output of classified reports, primarily by LASL ar and Sandia, with efforts being made to prepare them in a form not containing critical weapon data and so permitting wider classified distribution. LASL formed a Weapons Test Report section to replace special groups previously organized for each test series and to provide centralized and uniform handling, with 275 such reports issued prior to mid-1953. In addition to the requirement for technical reports, Sandia also had a heavy requirement for preparation of training manuals for the Military.ALGO LASL and Sandia issued 493 formal, nonclassified reports on scientific and tech- nological subjects during the period. PL gAty There was a continuing flow of unclassified re- search material, particularly from UCLA's medical school. ee y