a
been given to field office programs for P-approval (security approval for access to controlled areas but not to Restricted Data). A formal SF Bulletin on P-approval processing,
including a much-needed set of criteria for determining eligibility, is now being developed
for issuance at an early date.
In addition to the basic clearance function, the SFO personnel security program provides controls over various other functions involving the individual employee. These include handling of security violation cases, and the security processing involved in foreign
travel and military assignment of employees who have had access to Restricted Data.
Document Control and Security Education
As indicated in the 1950 report, document control problems inherited from MED
days were considerable, and in 1950 the major effort was to assure that minimum AEC
controls were placed in effective operation at all facilities. During the continuing expansion in the last three years document control measures in SFO have been increased. Present controls at Sandia, Kansas City, and Rocky Flats, in particular, exceed minimum
standards by providing for accountability controls down through the Confidential and, in
some cases, the Restricted classifications. An idea of the magnitude of this program may
be gained from estimated data developed recently as follows:
Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Total
Classified Documents Currently
on Hand in SFO
21, 069
5, 245,083
12, 878, 239
34,900,681
53, 045, 072
Yearly Production
of Documents
7,470
1, 451, 355
2, 731, 625
11, 422, 638
15, 613, 088
The extensive accountability controls in effect at the larger installations have provided a relatively accurate check on unaccounted-for documents, which as of mid-1953
were as follows:
Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Total
2
580
258
0
840
With respect to the above, it should be explained that reporting requirements are
such that a document is reported as "unaccounted-for" in any circumstances whereinit
cannot be located immediately, and documents so listed are generally misplaced within
security areas, rather than missing in the sense that the information contained is exposed
to compromise. Even though unaccounted-for documents are few as compared to the num-
ber existing, intensive effort has been directed to locating or accounting for them.
Re-
cent studies of the over-all document situation, disclosing the tremendous volume of classified paperwork in our operation, has indicated the need for a re-examination and revision of the Classification and control systems, with goals of eliminating an apparent
widespread tendency to overclassify, and assuringthat accountability and control prac-
tices are realistic and economical as well as effective.
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em
ste Ne?
Security education programs designed to insure knowledge and awareness of security
requirements by all personnel have been extended throughout SFO. All employees at all
major installations are given special security indoctrination upon entrance, at intervals
i3/