1.6 Technical Assumptions and Limitations 1.6.1 Participation of Project 6.4 in Operation CASTIE will provide an op»vortunity to proof-test ship countermeasures fromthe point of view of rediological hazard reduction for certain Aii attack situations of importc:noe to the Navy. Within the technical limitations set forth in this pararraph, participation in CASTIE will result in informtion directly applicable to the military situation involving the detonation of super- weapons in harbors during amphibious operations and in shallow coastal waters. The information may also be applicable, by suitable extrapolation, to the following situations: (1) Surface or shallow water attacks with moderate yeild fission weapons. (2) Certain offensive uses of fission weapons involving surface ship delivery. 1.6.2 It is desirable not only to test the performance of existing protective equipment and systems, but also toestablish firmly the military need for additional ship countermeasures which PPE ar to be recuired. 1.6.5 The nature of the conditions of interest and the countermeasures to be tested makes it necessary that steam-driven vessels be exposed to the contaminating event. 1.6.4 The nature of the event is such that these vessels must be exposed to contamination in the rvegion of military interest rather than on the periphery ofthe event. Theregion of interest is that area beyond immobilizing shock ranges and where incapacitating or serious radiation hazards exist. Thisrequirement makes radio-controlled operation of the test vessels necessary. 1.6.5 Although the primary interest of the experiment is the modern combatant ship, radio-controlled operation of such vessels is virtually impossible. It isassumed the measurements made on the modified LIBERTY ship can be successfully applied to combatant ships. 1.6.6 ‘ Seto es . ST. LOUIS FE A technical limitation on the interpretation éP the Grrective- ness of some countermeasures may be the presence of an atypical contamin- ant. (i.e. For shots fired from land composed primarily of calcium deposits atolls or veers) the contaminant may be composed primarily of cal- cium hydroxide (Ca(OZ),) and calcium carbonate (caco ). It was shown at Operati on Ivy that suck material, in the presence of sea water, forms particularly tenacious bonds with surfaces. Since most land of interest to the military is not composed of calcium deposits, results based on such tenacious deposits must be extrapolated to more representative contaminants. This may require laboratory correlations with field data. 009521