VII muster, position, and fallout reports reducud the len:;th of these frequently recurring messages over woice circuit. o2 the flagship, the primary tactical ad aninistrutivs voice cireuits torninated in Flac :lot, um:er the control of the staff watch officer, sad were irmediately accessible to the Task Group ‘ormsander. Considersble use of visual corrainicutions was made during the hours when the ships remained in formation, on station outside the legoon. However, traffic on the task group Gf Comion became seriously backlogged. ho meseaces of roubine precedence or below were passed for appraximately 48 houre, and priority treffic wes delayed for several houra, 16. Comaunications for eubsejuent shots in ceneral followed the pattern established during BR:¥O. ‘There was no necessity for further pre-shot drills end rehearsals of tins broodcast and other special alenaless the freaient sorties provided sufficient drill. Activation of shot time cireuita was deferred ontil O70O on ainus one day. This shortened the periat from 70 to eppraximately 36 hours when moat ships were forced to maintain a watch-in-two among comnaticators, CUETISS, now the flagship, met all the comsmuniastion require- ments imoosed by CTO 7.3, bat the nuxber of control lines between Kain Camm and Radio IJ (4 audio smi 5 Cv) was 0 limiting factor in activating any additional cireaite. 17. & considerable decrease in treffic during the later shots was evidemt. In part this ws attributable to the teammrk within the task group prior to these shots, ai to previous resolution of problers and promilgation of directives. AFWLIHO re (Originators were directed