as . of stantard procedures for the handling of routine task group opere ations, enabled the headquarters and afloet communications centers to carry the rapidly increasing volume of traffic priar to BRAVO. 4e Kesential to CiG 7.3 was continuous CH contact with all units afloat, including those with a limited number of communications personnel omit equinsent, Kormal flest operations did not provide Navy operators with the experience they needed to operate ant contrel successfully, high speed OW cirouites like the Task Group Gi Common, with from 15 to 23 etztions on the net. Dispersal of task group mits — betweea atolls, which precluied extensive use of visual ani voice oormmumications, and o reluctance te utilise fully joint ship-ehore teletype facilities, resulted in m overload on Of circuits which threatened to bresk dom effective communications between CTG 7.3 and units outside of visual and UNF range. Marked improvement in opar~ star proficienay as a result of experience on the circuits, ccatined with strict circuik discipline exercised by net control, pooling of the best qualified cperctors on large ships, and inidoctrinstica of ecomunication officers upon arrival of ships in the area, greatly inereased the efficiency of Navy Ci circuits, 5. Task GQoup 7.3 personnel, eceaustomed to Navy teletype and radio telegraph procedures, encountered some difficulty in using th, facilities of other task groups, ani with the joint teletype procedures prescribed by CJTF SEVEN. Basie differences in service operating prectices, such ae the use of predetermined routing ami transfer ef traffie from OF to teletype cireuits by the Navy, or the use of codress 229 BPWpy