. = minfwum of 90 days, and usually 120 days, CTO 7,3 decided, with con- enrrence by CTY SEVEN, to waive the “Queen” clearance requirenents for pereonnel of these unite, Secret clearances were iasued, end for those who qualified ené required badges, interim or de facto Top Secret clearances were granted, Ko attempt was nade te procees then for "Queen" clearances, 7. After the operetion was well under way, OJTF S4UVE® requested that Task Group Commanders osuee atill pending "Queen* elearnace requests from their pereonnel be reviewed with a view to possiblecaneallation, om the possible presise ‘that 1¢ might now heave Beoone evident that some of the individuals 414 not require “Queen” clearances, The Task Group was canvaseea and sone twenty-five such persons were looanted, Yovever, before akrecing to cancellation of their requests, 613 7.3 .etipalated that the initial investigation, consisting of the agency record check, first be completed in exch case, ané the individual's command notified of the result, If this were not done the cancsllation weuld leave the intividual present in the area in violation of the Task Force requirenent that all personnel be cleared at least through Secret. His Commanding Officer gould not heave a fawrable Bational Agency Cheek on which to base the required Secret clearance. suguntry 6. Ae clearance requests which were still pending when their wabjecte arrived in the forward area were nroesesed, a exall number cf perecanel considered to be potential security risks vere discovered and transferred from the Task Force, An unfortunate and important instance of this type cccurred in the onse of the Comeanding Officer Arial HO o 185