Vil
the fact that UNF communications were impaired both by unfeniliarity
of sone unite with task force calls and the loestien of cortein ships
beyond UF rae at the tims.
These ships were anployed in continued
preparations for the actual event, ani simulated participetion in the
rehearsal by trmamlitting necessary reportea,
As a rosult of this ree
hearsal the ahot-time positioning of ships wos reaxamined with a view
towards improving comuiniestions where possihle.
Ships that had to be
cuteide of WF rance during actual shot operations ware directed to
maintain voloe comnunicetions on the ship~-abore HF voice frequemy.
Dally cirmit crille on all voice-circuits rere ccntucted for several
daya,
13.
<dhok time conditions involved the rapid delivery of high
precedence traffic, the reduction of traffie to the absolute ginisam
required to execute the erent, sai the provision of maxima flexi-
bility in case of equipment failure or unexpected deployment of task
group unite. Ia addition, eperations required that the Task Group
Commander maintain direct control of individual units end ships rather
than exercise control through task anit coomsndersa.
Rapid and direct
somannicstions with logistics and itinerant ships withia range of fallout was also easential.
To mect these rejnirenst 6, eupplensntery
communications instructions ware izsusd before each shot.
The BRAVO
instructions directeds
a
All ships to test all ewipment ct least 3% hours price
23h