.
=
minfwum of 90 days, and usually 120 days, CTO 7,3 decided, with con-
enrrence by CTY SEVEN, to waive the “Queen” clearance requirenents
for pereonnel of these unite,
Secret clearances were iasued, end for
those who qualified ené required badges, interim or de facto Top
Secret clearances were granted,
Ko attempt was nade te procees then
for "Queen" clearances,
7.
After the operetion was well under way, OJTF S4UVE® requested
that Task Group Commanders osuee atill pending "Queen* elearnace requests from their pereonnel be reviewed with a view to possiblecaneallation, om the possible presise ‘that 1¢ might now heave Beoone evident
that some of the individuals 414 not require “Queen” clearances,
The
Task Group was canvaseea and sone twenty-five such persons were looanted,
Yovever, before akrecing to cancellation of their requests, 613 7.3
.etipalated that the initial investigation, consisting of the agency
record check, first be completed in exch case, ané the individual's
command notified of the result, If this were not done the cancsllation weuld leave the intividual present in the area in violation of
the Task Force requirenent that all personnel be cleared at least
through Secret.
His Commanding Officer gould not heave a fawrable
Bational Agency Cheek on which to base the required Secret clearance.
suguntry
6.
Ae clearance requests which were still pending when their
wabjecte arrived in the forward area were nroesesed, a exall number
cf perecanel considered to be potential security risks vere discovered
and transferred from the Task Force,
An unfortunate and important
instance of this type cccurred in the onse of the Comeanding Officer
Arial HO
o
185