IV. Cece TAres — 1G Nie 74 As is described earlier, the atmospheric operation planned for early 1962 411560 was set in motion by the president's decision that the mkkkkaxx Department of Defense and AEC should prepare for an operation that might begin as early as February or March 1962. Basis for the president's decision rested with the effects test pleaded for by the DOD to investigate those phenomena that had to do with the ABM problem, that is, with high altitude detonations while the AEC wished to do a number of large yield nuclear tests in the atmosphere and various branches of the armed forces wished to do some systems tests. IT was the high altitude tests that actually led to the decision to return to atmospheric testing or to prepare for atmospheric testing. As long as those tests were to be conducted, then the AEC experiments and the DOD systems tests could also be allowed. Two planning limits were placed on the operation: one, fission the total amount of/yield to be allowed, a number that was actually not settled for some time eran(wi | duration of the operation. have to look up the actual number) and scone the The duration of the operation was to aoeby the time necessary to conduct a high altitude portion of the operation and other tests would be allowed within that window. ~y After initial discussions go with the proponents of various high altitude carrier systems and with the experimental agencies that had to carry out the measurements, * it appeared that © the high altitude portions could be ready for a first certification shot in 2 % Qa | I = ZN April or May of 1962. These debates had gone on in the period before October fF. 2.% 1961. !tet's say that it would take approximately six months So, in essence, to get ready for the first high altitude calibration shot. Teak and Orange of 1958 had shown us that Johnston high altitude appropriate site for such/detonations. PF yt The experience of go “ ay Island was probably the < = The 1958 high altitude detonations had been moved from Bikini Ato! to Johnston Island during the operation when it was recognized that the hazard of eye, burn and hence blinding was too large okHe ae. to accept with the great number of maesir~teaves- natives that might view the shot. i : 4 SF