‘ -63— opportunities for achieving world security agreements of a worth-—while sort. That is an important proviso and may become a markedly restraining one. Some means of international protection for those states which cannot protect themselves will remain as necessary in the future as it has been in the past 27 Upon the security of such states our own security must ultimately depend, But only a great state which has taken the necessary steps to reduce its own direct vulnerability to atomic bomb attack is in a position to offer the necessary support. Reducing vulnerability is at least one way of reducing temptation to potential aggressors. And if the technological realities make reduction of vulnerability largely synonymous with preservation of striking power, that is a fact which must be faced, Under those circumstances any domestic measures which effectively guaranteed such preservation of striking power under attack would contribute to a more solid basis for the operation of an international security ay x % So �� es ’ fo Aryeh system, } ee It is necessary therefore to explore all conceivable situations where the ageressor's fear of retaliation will be at a minimumand to seek to eliminate them, The first and most obvious such situation is that in which the aggressor aT. The argument has been made that once the middle or small powers have atomic bombs they will have restored to them the ability to resist effectively the aggressions of their great power neighbors--an ability which otherwise has well- nigh disappeared, This is of course an interesting speculation on which no final answor is forthcoming. It is true that a small power, while admitting that it could not win a war against a great neighbor, could nevertheless threaten to use the bomb as a penalizing instrument if it were invaded, But it is also true that the greate-power aggressor could make counter threats conccrning its conduct while occupying the country which had used atomic bombs against it. It seems to this writer highly unlikely that a small power would dare threaten use of the bomb against a great neighbor which was sure to overrun it quickly once hostilities began, especially since such a threat could serve as a justification, if one were needed, for the use of the bomb by the grceat-power aggressor, LY