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question,

Nevertheless one thing seems clear:

no one has any doubt but that

each state has the power to make certain of what is going on within its own
borders in the production and use of fissionable materials,

If that is true

for every state, then it necessarily follows that global control is not impossible

from a technical standpoint, since means could be found for making use of the
various national systems as the basis for international control.
political rather than a scientific problem,
commission may well find it worth their while

But this is a

The members of the atomic energy
to explore it thoroughly.

What all this comes down to is the following:

There is no reason to believe

that the treaty mechanism is inherently incapable of bearing the load which would

be associated with the international control of atomic weapons,

Nevertheless ;

this load would necessarily be very great indeed, and there is no likelihood
that nations would willingly narrow their freedom of action in relation to
atomic energy merely on the naked promise of other states to do likewise.

The

potential advantages to be gained by a successful evasion of such a treaty are
apparently so stupendous that very powerful safeguards would have to be provided
against possible violations,

None of the ordinary types of safeguards seem

strong enough to provide this assurance,
-

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One possible way of meeting this problem would.betg/eliminate all existing
atomic weapons, destroy all means of production and prohibit all future -steps

toward production.

This idea has wide public support and is in fact set forth

in the Truman-Attlee-King declaration and the Moscow resolution as one of the

ultimate aims of the work of the atomic energy commission,

But in moving in this

direction, one is met by a third dilemma of imposing proportions,

On

the one

hand, having no bombs in existence would seem to remove any opportunity to embark
on an adventure in atomic warfare,

On the other hand, if no bombs are in

existence, then any state which successfully evades the agreement and produces
bombs would have a complete monopoly of them.

Under such conditions the

SO

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