\ \ -129And if such precautions are taken to insurc the Council's control in the mere planning phase, it may be taken for granted that any administrative agency set up as aresult of the planning will be completcly subordinated to that body. The Council will delegate to the General Assembly or to agencies responsible to the Assembly only matters bearing exclusively on the peaceful uses of atomic energy. In view of the nature of the matter in hand, and of the division of functions under. the San Francisco Charter, this policy is appropriate and even inevitable. The present cormission is not an agency to control atomic armaments. function is solely to devise a plan of control. Itmay conccivably cnd in failure. Its That is likely to be a long task, At the best, we probably have before us a fairly prolonged period in which all nations remain free to invent and producc—— though not to use--any kind or quantity of atomic weapons within thcir sovcral What are the probable cffccts on internationalorg Aye COMO, oo ¢ capacitics,. \ [ . Szation of the cxist- ence of atomic weapons in this indefinite -period before a systom of control can come into operation? The United Nations Organization has become a reality. It is already at work trying to dispose without violence cf a complex of lmotty problems in world politics. All its members arc legally bound to settle their international disputcs by peaceful means and not to resort to the threat or usc of force in any way inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, 7 That woulda be a fairly good beginning even for an organization specifically designed to prevent the aggressive use of atomic weapons. Ft has the advantage of prohibiting all forns of force--something not to be overlooked in ovr present preoccupation with a Single new forn, The prohibition is subject, however, to an exccption. Article 51 lays dowm the principle that "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent 13.6 Sce the Charter, Art. 2, paras, 3 and h.