% \ -113— The question of what chances the United States and the Soviet Union may have in the future of deterring each other, should that ever become necessary, can be answered only if we have some idea of what a war between them would be dike, The risks of destruction and defeat which the two countrics would face if they engaged in hostilities with cach other depends on the character of the war. The outlook for determent will be brighter if these risks are extensive and apparent. TN, | It is not a happy task to try to visualizé! awar, the outbreak of which would mark a tragedy exceeding in horroraxyethat man has experienced. Some. Teould have us abstain from attempting it lest we arouse the sleeping demons of war, Their apprehensions, however, are not justified by history. Or the many writers who have discussed the causes of the two world wars none has suggested that the Western Powers talked themselves into them or brought them about by an excess of early thought about their probable nature. likely true. The opposite is more Obviously any attempt to imagine such a future war, even in its roughest outlines, must at this time be highly speculative and tentative. The Jules Vernes of the atomic age may come to look foolish very quickly! it needs few words to dispose of the idea that our present superiority in atomic production need give us marked advantages far into the period of dual possession of the bomb. In an earlier chapter it was pointed out that a stage may be reached by both countries beyond which the advantage of possessing larger stockpiles and better atomic weapons would decline rapidly. ! This does not mean that in a protracted war our impressive and possibly lasting technical and industrial superiority would not pay high military dividends, The later dis- cussion of the non-atomic aspects of a war in an atomic age should bring this out more clearly. In respect to alliances there might be a tendency to cverestimate the value 1+ see above Po. 36-38; p. 65.