\ -112— We shall have far less ground for anxiety, therefore, if we can feel confident that the Russians will not expect victory to come from the sacrifice of their cities, Hitler might have gone to war even if he had not believed that Gernany would escape wholesale destruction from the air; it is hard to believe that he could have overcome the opposition of his generals to a war in which they would have seen no chance of victory. oN Oviously, if the Russians fear that wewightattack them some day, they too will seek to deter us not merely by holding themselves ready for retaliation in kind but by depriving us ci the hope of ultimate victory. Efforts by both countries along this same line, if equally successful, would bring about a situation in which a war ending in stalemate would appear most likely. Nothing could be less tempting to a government, provided it were in possession of its senses, than a war of mutual destruction ending in a stalemate, It would not be surprising, therefore, if a high degree of Soviet-American "equality in deterring power" would prove the best guarantee of peace and tend more than anything else to approximate the views and interests of the two countries, Suc- cessful efforts by both countries along the "third line of defense" might thus help to bolster the first and second lines which were discussed previously, There are some who despair of our ability to deter the Russians, They take the view that once the Soviet Union succeeds in producing the bomb she will hold all the trumps, Others assume, on the contrary, that our head start ‘ain atomic production coupled with our general technological superiority guarantees us immunity from Russian atomic power, It should be evident that no intelligent and far-sighted American policy in regard to the Soviet Union and the atomic bomb, least of all an adequate military policy can be formulated unless some light can be thrown on this matter. Extreme views might lead either to a defcatist attitude littic conducive to vigorous protective efforts or to a spirit of complacency, the unhappy results of which are sufficiently known, 4