~106-\ occurs in the future, it is far more likely to originate in the Soviet Union than here. As a consequence the choice between defending the status quo or pursuing a policy of appeasement will, if it occurs at all, present itself to us rather than to the Russians. Fortunately the experience of the thirties contains 2 warning not only to any would=-be appeasers and defenders of the established order but equally to any country which might believe it could change the status quo by force without thereby incurring the risk of war, Hitler deceived himself, with disastrous con- sequences to his country, when he assumed that British fear of bombardment and reluctance to become involved in a war over Central Europe would outlast any , provocation. Evenif the Soviet leaders should some future date feel strongly melee oN about the need for further Russian expansion =Nazi experience with the English- speaking countries coupled with Japanese experiance’at Hiroshima and Nagasali could hardly fail to exercise on them a restraining or cautioning influence. When speculating about the change of psychology which dual possession of the bomb may bring about, some hold the hopeful view that the two countries, to- gether with the rest of the world, will be dravm closer together by the common danger, They believe that a sense of solidarity may develop in the face of the unprecedented threat which the atomic weapon represents to civilization. would be rash to discard this possibility. It The Russians and we, concerned about our cities and industries, might be led to combine in a vigorous common effort to bring atomic power under control, However, it would be a mistake to overlook the other possibility, if not probability, that our fear of Russian bombs and their fear of American bombs will prove more powerful than our common anxiety about the atomic bomb in general, If that should turn out to be the case, the new Weapon will tend to strain the relations between the two countries rather than to associate them in a common enterprise. Those who take this second and more pessimistic view incline toward the belief that Russiats possession of the bomb will unleash a dangerous and tS