-~153-
Amidst the welter of assertion and counter-assor zOn regarding the feasi-
Zp
hers
bility of this or that of any system of inspection (ood only one fact
stands out clearly. The social scientist working on the
‘en/eontrol does not
have the scientific or engineering data necessary for him to make an intelligent
forecast about the feasibility of inspection amd control.
Nor do many of the
physical scientists have the data necessary for such a forecast.
All that
any physicist or cngineer has been permitted to know about atomic energy development is that segment of knowledge which was indispensable for the performance
of his own job.
of Chicago,
As a result, according to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
"Because of the secrecy of and compartmentation limitations in the
Manhattan Project, it has been impossible for experts in cach branch to consider
any problem which involved a detailed lmnowledge of the infcrmation availubie in
any other branch.
This not only slows dowm the development of atomic energy,
but also prevents an integrated study of the technical feasibility of inspec.
tion.”
Once it is possible for the scientists and enginecrs to state more fully the
facts upon which their conclusions have been based, the social and political
implications and the problems of public policy can be sketched out in greater
detail,
Meanwhile, the social analyst has at his disposal only a serics of vig-
orous asscrtions of the necessity of inspection and control made by certain
physical scientists.
These scientists have displayed a high and admirable sense
of civic responsibility, but they are not under present security regulations in
footnote continued from page 152.
chemical and pharmacological research lest such prohibition should prevent the
growth of human knowledge and the prospects of overcoming the forces of nature
and of combating the scourge of disease (p. 456)."
"We must therefore have the
courage to acknowledge that, if leaving on one side the question of its moral
value, we only consider the purely technical value of the prohibition to prepare
chemical warfare, we must conclude that this prohibition is not of much
practical effect (p. 59)."
99. Vol. I, No. 3, January 10, 196, p. 2.