\
-97The whole idea of an offensive use of the bomb during the period of our
monopoly can therefore safely be laid aside as utterly impractical.
Since there
is also little danger of our having to use it defensively in the years ahead, it
would seem as if our sole possession of the atomic weapons was not going to be
of much service to us or the worid.
There may be another way, however, of putting
the monopoly to use while it lasts.
We are today in a position to give away
what others regard as a great privilege.
monopoly.
We can, if we desire, offer tp end our
The question is whether something substantial for our security or the
peace of the world could be gained by bargaining away the advantages which we now
hold but must expect to lose in the near future anyhow.
There could certainly be
‘
it
\2
3
we
eliminate the threat of atomic warfare,
Arey. a
S
o
aN
no moral objection to such a deal, since we would generausly be seeking to
.
\
The term “bargaining away" as applied here sholi@_no
be understood to mean
bilateral negotiations by which this country would make direct concessions to the
Soviet Union,
Such a procedure was ruled out when the problem of the atomic
weapon was put into the hands of the United Nations Organization.
Any "bargaining
away" of American advantages, if it occurs, will ‘take the form of the United
States accepting international agreements arising from deliberations of the
security Council or, what is practically the same thing, the United Nations
Commission on Atomic Energy Control. &
It is not necessary to discuss in detail here the advantages of such international procedure over bilateral Soviet—American negotiations,
The last chapter
will be devoted entirely to the services which can or cannot be derived from
international efforts in respect to atomic power,
relations in several ways.
They bear on Soviet~American
Quite obviously it would be more difficult to obtain
the consent of this country to sacrifices made cirectly to the Soviet Union than
to American contributions to the common peace efforts of the United Nations.
9.
See pb. 160 below.