So
_
-
_
-
.
Headquarters Task Group 7.
Joint Task Force SEVEN
APO 187 c/o Postmaster
-
San Francisco, California
22 December 1953
Annex G to CTG 7,2, Operation Plan No. 3-53
,
HOSTILE ACTION ALERT PLAN
Definitions:
Force,
The following alert conditions are for use by the Task
WHITE Alert, as employed in this plan, indicates that hostile action
or attack on forward area installations is imminent or will occur within
a period of time specified by CJTF SEVEN,
RED Alert, indicates that any one or ‘all of the forward area posi~
tions are being subjected to hostile reconnaissance or attack,
1.
GENERAL CONCEPT:
Upon arrival of the Task Force Headquarters in the forward area
Commander Joint Task Force SEVEN (CJTF SEVEN)
assumes responsibility to
CINCPAC for security of the ENIWETOK-aIKINE area as ATCOM ENIWETOX,
In the event of an outbreak of genoral war during'the on~site
operational phase, the Task Force will continue toward the execution of
its mission within the capability of the forces remaining available unless
instructions to the contrary are received from the AEC and DOD. The
premise upon which this plan is’ based is that any actual attack by an
enemy would, in all probability, occur when the entire Task Force has becn
established in the forward area. Short of such an actual attack, hostile
action would in all LUkelihood be limited to missions of reconnaissance
nature,
The Task Group will be placed on WHITE and RED alerts in atcordance with instructions from CJTF SEVEN.’ When on WHITE alert status, all
unit commanders will prepare for RED alert conditions to the maximum
extent possible in view of their primary tasks and missions,
ENIVETOK ATOLL: This plan is based on the premise that a
minimum of outposts ami stations will be manned upon assumption of overt
action by enemy forces, The buik of the units of this command will form
in their unit areas, under arms, to bc employed as required to counter the
enemy ection ‘when the place, direction, and schome of maneuver of the
enemy has been determined, No attempt will be made to defend the entirc
beach line nor concentrate: forces at any single point until enemy inten~
tions are knovm, One unit, a composite combat company, is organized‘as
a combat ready unit capable of rapid employment as a mobile striking force,
This unit will be capable of rapid employment as a mobile unit not only
on ENIWETOK Island but to other islands of ENIWETOK Atoll by surface vessel
as well as to BIKINI Atoll by air and/or surface transportation. TG 7.2
has the capability of air dropping a small parachute element on most islands of the atoll to counter any small cnemy lodgement that may be effected as well as on BIKINI Atoll.
.
This plan requires that the observation post (OP) atop the wator
tank tower on ENIWETOK bo manned on a 24, hour basis to keep the area
surrounding ENIWETOK Island under constant observation. Also, daily flights
of liaison planes. helicopters. and other aircraft havo tho "COPY
reporting unusuassigwingse
~~ BEST AVAILABLE C
A scries of Sccondary observation posts are established upon
sounding of the alert. Reports from the primary and secondary OPs, as
well as observations from airereft réquested to be launched for this
specific purposo, will furnish CTG 7,2 with information he requires for
the proper employment of his forces on ENIWETOK Atoll at the critical
points,
G-1
Sl