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Annex ¢ te CTG
(2)
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The only Soviet aircraft known to have a greater range
potentiality than the TU is the Type 31 prototype heavy bember, which
was observed in flight for the first time to date in the July 1951 Aviation
Day air show in MOSCOW.
If equipped with the JU-~022 turboprop engine, the
Type 31 would have a combat radius of abeut 3500 nautical mikes and con-
siderably in excess of this if the combat load were replaced with fuel.
A few aircraft are prebably available having range capabilities cemparable
te the Type 31. It is mtirely possible, however, that the Sovists might
equip an early model of the Type 31 forphoto and radiolegical reconnais~
sance if a sufficiently high priority exists for this requirement.
3.
CONCLUSIONS:
Espionage, sabotage, observation and unauthorized
4.
SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY:
instrumentation are considered most likely to occur under conditions existing today. The declaration of war, overt aotion by vessel or aircraft and
raids are less likely pussibilities which could take place in the event
:
of epen hostilities betneen the U5. and the USSR,
J
a. Security of classified information is the normal responsi~
bility of any commander but this responsibility must be reevaluated in <
Operation CASTLE where the operation is dealing with atanic energy, a,
development which played an important part in terminating World War IT.
and which constitutes such importance that it has been
trelled and protected by Feders] l.",
regulated, con~
The responsibility ef each indl~
vidual in properly safeguarding classified information concerning atonic
energy and in preventing its compromise sy careless talk or correspondence
must be understood by all. military ranks and civilians.|
b.
CTG 7.2 1s responsible for proper security | within TG 7.2and
for security of classified information and areas, including mtry, within the forward area as directed by CJIF SEVEN. The Intelligence Officer
(S2) TG 7.2 discharges for the Commander the functions of security planning,
coordination, and policy, and the maintenance of security planning, coera~
ination , and policy, and the maintenance of necessary security records,
and maintains liaison with other appropriate seourity sections and agencies,
The Provost Marshal, TG 7.2, discharges for the Commander the function of
enforcement of security measures and control, exercising operational con~
trol of all Military Police units assigned to TG 7.2 for thie purpose.
Military Police Posts will be established as listed in Appendix I.
5. GENBRAL CONCEPT: The general conception of the measures to
provide security is as follows:
i
a.
The ENIWETOK-BIKINI srea of operations will be closed to all
b.
Personnel participating in the operation will be cleared for
vessels, aircraft and personnel except those participating in CASTLE.
Access to this area will be in accordance with regulations established by
CINCPAC Sertal 020, dated 1 April 1952, All areas within the ENIWETOK~
BIKINI operational area will be designated in accordance with the degrees
of security required.
loyalty and security in accordance with the varying degrees of responsibility
ce The ENIWETOK~BIKINI area of operations is under ‘the general
protection of CINCPAC.
d. Regulations governing security -~uwllichc4 “ the Department of |
Defense and Atomic Energy Commission contime to apply to members of Joint
Task Force SEVEN.
(1) AR 380-5 and SR 380-5-1
For appropriate units
OPNAV Instructions 551.1 |
AFR 205-1
GM Security Pulletine
(2) Fo JTF SEVEN Memoranda
BEST AVAILASL ES O27 9%
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