Headquarters Task Group 7.2
Joint Task Foros SEVEN
APO 187 o/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California
22 Deoembor 1953.
Annox © to CPG 762, Operation Plan Noe 3053
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INTELLIGENCS, SECURITY AND HIBLIC INFORMATION
Map teforencas:
ae
Azimuthal Squidistant Projootion Map, No. 6709,
bs
Naval Survey Hap, Marshall Islands, Eniwotok Atoll,
Nos» 5413, 5205 and 6033, Hydrographic Offics,
Washington, D.C.
Ge
Naval Survey Map, Marshall Islands, Bikini Atoll,
No. 6032, Hydrogsrapaioc Cffies, Washington, D.C.
dydrographic Office, Washington, D.C.
d. Eniwotok Suilding Layout, 1":400', 6 Mar 53.
Ge
Seaadir Rascuc Map for Uniwotok Atoll, 4 Jan 53.
f, SeasAir Rosouc Map for Bikini Atoll, 3 Jul 53.
1.
IUTSLLIGZUCE = GENERAL:
.
Q. No interforence is cxpoctod from an overt onomy during Oporation CASTILS since the use of force or dircot open observation from a
point well within the BNIWSTOK-BIKINI danger area would involve sonsocucngc
out of proportion to the valua of the results to be obtained from such
action.
be The country having the greatest sapability of compromising
the security of Operation CASTLE ig the Soviet Union.
Oe
In tho cvent of an outbreak of war the entire concept of
the operation would bo changed matcriallys
2~
SUMMARY OF SUEMY CAPATILITISS:
|
Qe
It is considorod tiat interference with the mission or com»
promise of its activities could ‘s cflccted by espionage, sabotage, ovart
action by vessel or aircraft, raids, obsorvation, unauthorized instrumentation and ddolaration of war.
be Naval Capabiliti.s.
The USSA has 19 occan patrol and 37
medium range t,)pe submarines in tho cacifio arcas It is estimated that
at least 4 to 5 oogan patrol submarines could ba maintained in tho
BNIVETOKeBININI operational arca indefinitely and for short periods this
number could be increased. Unotsorved submarine approach within one milo
of important islands of these atolls is possiblo.
Ge
air Capabilitios.
(1)
BEST AVAILABLE COPY
Aerial photo and radiological reconnaissance of the
BNIWEPOK-BIXINI arca from Far Zast bases (SAKHALIN or the Wallas) aro
within Soviet capabilities. ‘“tith prior access to CASTLE plans, roconnaissanoc flights could be properly timed to pdrmit airoraft to romain in
wne target arca tora brivs posiude
Tho TUat, modified for long range
reconnaissance, could accomplish this without rofucling.
assuming that
tho Soviets avo dovolopod rofuoling teohniquos cqual to those of tho UwgW-.,
one outbound refucling would oxtond tho time ovor target to ovor four
hourse Thore is no ovidenoe, hovover, that tho Sovicts have dovolozod
refucling capabilities. The Third Long tange Air Army, stationed in the
Far Zast, is presently ostimatod to have a TO/S strongth of 220 Tun4s.
No airoraft of this type is kmown to be modifiod for long range rcoonnais—
sance,