The large number (202) of personnel of this Task Group holdin:
only "Interim" clearances created no operational handicap, but was
highly undesirable from a security standpoint.
Interim clearances are
based on nothing more substantial than an examination of available
personnel records and, at best, represent a calculated security risk.
A recommendation that all personnel ordered to the PPG in the future
hold final clearances at least for SECRET has been made by separate
correspondence to CJTF SEVEN.
3.
Badge Identificatiom System:
No problems have existed in the implementation of the
Badge Identification System within Task Group 7.2 during this period,
Administration of the system consisted of replacement of damaged
badges and the establishment of positive procedures to insure tucn-in
prior t. departure from the PPG.
4.
Counterintelligence:
Security representatives at the beginning of this period
were located at ENIWETOK ISLAND, PARRY ISLAND and Sites TARE, NAN, and
URSULA.
Following BRAVO, the officers in the BIKINI ATOLL were con~
solidated and moved aboard the USNS FRED C. AINSWORTH.
The detachment continued their security poster program;
continued to provide advice and assistance to unit security officers;
and to issue Limited Area permits to transient personnel.
DNA.
In addition, the detachment boarded twelve ships to
ascertain if they had complied with security regulations, and condicted
security surveys of the POL farm, ENIWETOK: the storage of arms and
ammunition; and the water distillation and electrical generating
8