island, some of which read as high as 40 mr/hr,
These areas were
marked with danger signs and personnel were? not allowed to enter,
An intensity of 10 mr/hr persisted at ENIWETOK ISLAND until R plus
5 days.
Since KOON was scheduled to occur so shortly after ROMEO,
it was decided to leave the same film badges out for both shots.
Detachment fadsafe officers were briefed, and couriers
were instructed on K minus 1 for shot KOON.
scribed for BRaVO and ROMEO was repeated.
The entire process de=
Observation of the shot
was poor due to weather conditions and the yield of KOON.
No "fali-
out" was experienced following KOON.
The second mission was to provide 50 "Q' cleared radio-
logical safety backup monitors for emergency monitor support of TG
7.1 if required,
In the second installment of this history, it was
pointed out that due to probability of usage of these monitors and
the short period of time these monitors would be utilized if needed,
it was considered uneconomical to "Q" ێlear personnel for the sole
purpose of being utilized as backup monitors.
Therefore, the personnel
from which backup monitors were selected were those who already had
a "Q" clearance, and were filling key enlisted positions throughout
the command,
1953.
These monitors completed their training tn October
A refresher course was given to them in February 1954 and
they were designated as backup monitors,
The Radsafe Officer, JTF
SEVEN stated that he felt a requirement would exist for approximately seven backup monitors per shot.
Just prior to BRAVO, a require
ment was placed on CTG 7.2 to furnish seven monitors for about five
18-Tab P
BNA
18
ay
19