The Radsafe Officer, JTF SEVEN, and the Staff Surgeon,
JTF SEVEN, desired to receive reports on the "fall-out" at ENIWETOK
ISLAND promptly,
This was to enable them to advise CJTF SEVEN immedi-=
ately if a decision became necessary as to whether or not to evacuate
ENIWETOK.
At the same time, a desire was evidenced to receive reports
on the "fall-out" on PARRY ISLAND (ELMER) and ROJOA ISLAND (URSULA).
It was decided to funnel all this information through the Radsafe
Officer, Task Group 7.2 and require him to report the amount of "fall-
out" to Headquarters, JTF SEVEN,
Communications were arranged through
the ANC, Task Group Teh in order that this information could be sent
rapid'y.
On B minus 1, Radsafe Officer, TG 7.2 instructed officers
detailed from TG 7.2 and TG 7.4 as couriers.
This instruction in-
cluded operation of radiac instruments, use of film badges, and a gen-
eral orientation in dosage, dose rate, tolerance dosages, and monitoring of loaded aircraft.
On the evening of B minus 1 the forecast air and surface
radexes were received and plotted.
It appeared as though ENIWETOK
ISLAND would be in the "fall-out" pattern.
Therefore the radiological
defense organization was instructed to begin monitoring of ENIWETOK
ISLAND at H plus 6 hours,
ENIWETOK ISLAND.
At H hour the explosion was observed at
The entire area was illuminated with an intensity
equal to that of the sun.
Approximately17minuteslater, the shock
wave was heard, a faint rumble in the distance,
,
DA
No radiation was observed until a light rain fell at
1630 bringing down with it a small amount of "fall-out",
16
oa
The intensity
17