~ C ian higher toga ramets wate ‘ So, eee TTtre Sree tae . Soy - ~ 8 Le « . -37- (1) It 4s realized that the main mission is now anti-~eir force, e.g. destruction of aircraft on the ground, and not industrial destruction All else is secondary, (2) There is great interest in large weapons, yd (3) The weapone which now exist oan essentially fulfil their needs, * The carriers leave much to be desired, 4 (4) They are very interested in contact fuzing, and unhappy that this is not receiving more attention, ; - . (5) Ballistic missiles may become very important, but they will not supplant aircraft. needed, At least one more heavy plane past the B-52 is Nuclear propulsion is very much desired; it is considered more important than bomb development, (6) The dispersion ideal would be about five planes«on an air field, Considerable dispersion may be expected |in the next 2-3 years. (7) Speed may not be decisive in a heavy plane. High altitude may be more important. There was a lengthy discussion on the proper attitude for the GAC to take with respect to nuclear aircraft develcpment and its organizational arrangements. Most of the members were prepared to endorse the great urgency of this development. Mr, Murphree » Dr. Rabi, and Dr, ven Neumann were particularly inclined to this view. Mr. Whitman, on the other hand, tended to take a more cautious position. He said he was in favor of a nuclear powered plane but was not convinced it shouldheweiiw first priority. pon ABY"