crete
o
wee ore cae ye
a
REDT
meee NE
.
eeeregE ego re MOATaE ey PN Rm
epee
WR erg ae
Or amespeng
cn nea?
Sr
rn ie cee
ic
A Cecm
Wore
a“
the project officers in overseas operational and logistic problems .nd to
obtain more complete information from them for planning purposes.
Fortunately a few
fell by the wayside;
few later expans{ons
grams, summarized
By April 1955,
f the shakier projects discussed at that meeting
but ihe bulk of them, augmented by a compavitively
and additions, became the Redwing experimesttl proin Chapter 2.
the ready date for the first shot had been changed to
April 15, 1956, and by June it had beenjdelayed until May 1, 1936.
In duly
it was decided to fire the 1-point shots. in Nevada in the late fall and winter
of 1955, and to delete them from the Redwing program.
In order to make the maximum use of the limited land available and
of instrument stations already in existence, three shots were sceduled on
the Eheriru complex plus one of Rujoru, three on Runit and one in the air
above Runit, and six on barges near the Yurochi complex. When weather
for large shots proved more favorable at Eniwetok than Bikini, and comple-
tion of the Bikini program lagged, thet
barges were
shifted to the Mike crater at Eniwetok, Because of ‘the s\%e off
the fact that it had to be fired early inthe program, them
"
Runit towers were not~built until after
.
:
La
pad
“Was detonated.
—
2
3.4.2
Determination of Requirements
As shown in the preceding section, a list of probable Redwing shots
prepared in December 1954 indicated an opeyation similar in scope to Castle,
greliminary estimates of military support requirements submitted at thc’
tine were based accordingly. Unfortunately, the DOD system for planning
the support of cverseas nuclear tests entails estimates of requirements long
‘before the shot schedule (which governs all of the planning of the Svientific
Task Group) is in any way firm. The resuit is that preliminary estimates
of requirements must be based to a degree on the preceding operation, and
change substantially as planning progresses,
Except for motor vehicles, Table 3.3 lists the principal items of military support of both direct and indirect interest to TG 7.1, and shows how
requirements changed during the planning phase of the operation.
Nu dis-
tinction is drawn in the table between items of direct interest to TG 7.1,
such as a command and firing ship, and effects ships and aircraft, and
items resulting from TG 7.1’s requirements for services such as base facilities, transportation, and communications, which generate material requirements in the task groups which have to provide those services.
Preliminary estimates of Redwing motor vehicle requirements, made in
January 1955, were based on experience gained during Castle and totaled
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e