value, the United States must assign a value to the benefit tc
nmetional security; of the testing program, however debatable that
benefit may be in and of itself.
|
The cost of the direct benefits in this program for the
Enewetak people, such as housing, community development, etc.,
«-@ a very small fraction of the total,
about $5,000,000.
And
even that portion of the total funding is directly attributable
to their forced removal by the United States to make way for the
testingprogram.
‘And as we have said before, the United States undertook
trusteeship of the Micronesian Islands of its own free will
(without consent of the Micronesians)
and put Enewetak Atoll, the
property of the trust, to its own use for the very nuclear testing
which deposited the radioactivity.
.
This is the only perspective by which to consider and decide
uron the outside cost limits of this program.
The costs of the
radiological and engineering cleanup of the Atoll are properly to
be considered ordinary and necessary costs of the testing program.
Indeed, the cleanup should have been planned from the beginning
-and funded and done at the end of the testing program about 1958.
The Enewetak People do not want money in any amount, they
want and are entitled to their land, in safe and habitable condition.
In the presentation of future requests to the United States
Congress, this general approach should be taken and the leadership
of the people themselves should be called to testify.
"Case 3", outlined in Section 5.4.3, Vol. I of the DEIS, is
offered as the preferred plan for cleanup and resettlementof the
-20-
>"