

~~REF ID: A6512~~

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ATTACHMENT FIVE - MEMORANDUM FOR

Authority MR. J. D. SARTORIUS
By cc. 11/16/1968

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Dear Mr. President:

In my letter of this day, I fully appreciate the great consideration that you have given to the problem of weapons testing and the lack of progress reported in this field of investigation on these difficult problems over the course of the year and the past year.

The most important point to be considered in this regard is the

(1) The United Nations Resolution of the United Nations
on the ban of the nuclear weapons.

(2) Removal of all nuclear weapons from our country.

On November 11, 1968, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom, signed a resolution in the United Nations General Assembly which called for the removal of all nuclear weapons from our country. This resolution was passed by a vote of 110 to 1, with 1 abstention.

The following are some points for consideration before we can finally decide on the methods which we expect to use to rid our country of all nuclear weapons. These points will be further developed in the following paragraphs and will be discussed in detail.

(1) The first point is the removal of all nuclear weapons from our country. This is the most important point because it is the most difficult. We must consider the following factors: (a) The cost of removing all nuclear weapons from our country. (b) The time required to remove all nuclear weapons from our country. (c) The safety of the removal process. (d) The political stability of our country during the removal process. (e) The international reaction to the removal process. (f) The impact of the removal process on our economy. (g) The impact of the removal process on our society. (h) The impact of the removal process on our environment. (i) The impact of the removal process on our neighbors. (j) The impact of the removal process on our allies. (k) The impact of the removal process on our enemies. (l) The impact of the removal process on our friends. (m) The impact of the removal process on our foes. (n) The impact of the removal process on our neutrals. (o) The impact of the removal process on our neutrals. (p) The impact of the removal process on our neutrals. (q) The impact of the removal process on our neutrals. (r) The impact of the removal process on our neutrals. (s) The impact of the removal process on our neutrals. (t) The impact of the removal process on our neutrals. (u) The impact of the removal process on our neutrals. (v) The impact of the removal process on our neutrals. (w) The impact of the removal process on our neutrals. (x) The impact of the removal process on our neutrals. (y) The impact of the removal process on our neutrals. (z) The impact of the removal process on our neutrals.

The second point is the removal of all nuclear weapons from our country. This is the most difficult. We must consider the following factors: (a) The cost of removing all nuclear weapons from our country. (b) The time required to remove all nuclear weapons from our country. (c) The safety of the removal process. (d) The political stability of our country during the removal process. (e) The international reaction to the removal process. (f) The impact of the removal process on our economy. (g) The impact of the removal process on our society. (h) The impact of the removal process on our environment. (i) The impact of the removal process on our neighbors. (j) The impact of the removal process on our allies. (k) The impact of the removal process on our enemies. (l) The impact of the removal process on our friends. (m) The impact of the removal process on our foes. (n) The impact of the removal process on our neutrals. (o) The impact of the removal process on our neutrals. (p) The impact of the removal process on our neutrals. (q) The impact of the removal process on our neutrals. (r) The impact of the removal process on our neutrals. (s) The impact of the removal process on our neutrals. (t) The impact of the removal process on our neutrals. (u) The impact of the removal process on our neutrals. (v) The impact of the removal process on our neutrals. (w) The impact of the removal process on our neutrals. (x) The impact of the removal process on our neutrals. (y) The impact of the removal process on our neutrals. (z) The impact of the removal process on our neutrals.

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the absence of such tests would be progress to an appreciable degree.

It is my deep conviction that a moratorium on the testing of large thermonuclear weapons would lengthen the time during which the United States would maintain its advantage over the U.S.S.R. Our experience is so much more extensive than that of our Soviets that we could use tests of small explosive yield to greatest advantage than they.

Then again, the United States does not plan to develop large thermonuclear weapons for over a year from now. It is conceivable to detect of the Soviet tests, so that they may have to wait a series to take place this fall. Thus, if a year-long moratorium on the tests of large thermonuclear weapons is made now, the Soviets would be the first to be affected by the moratorium since they are the moratorium and their size will be reduced by one year, so that they would be unchanged. On the other hand, if the Soviets do not accept their agreement, our sizeable thermonuclear weapons would be reduced as the time for them increased. In my opinion, it would be better to consider this problem and make sufficient provision for all possible viewpoints.

It has been suggested that the effect of the proposed test ban to limit tests to weapons with yields below a hundred megatons would simply bring forth another proposal to raise the yield limit to the upper limit of 500. This is described as "pigging." The United States on a telegram stated, "we do not feel that any such arrangement would be acceptable, however, if the Soviets insisted at a disarmament conference,"

Another reason for a limit on tests is that it is felt that it is that due to advances based on past history, the Soviets, as well as ourselves, will eventually have the most powerful weapons. Since the most powerful weapons are rapidly increasing, the present general threat to world peace is obvious. A maximum limit on the size of weapons would tend to freeze the development of weapons for the countries now having them.

It is envisaged that a limitation of the size of weapons would include prior size of the weapons, developed by the United States.

I consider it to be a sine qua non of any good disarmament studies in the nuclear field to decide the right disarmament procedure. If preparations for tests could possibly have to be discontinued as at present, the vigor as at present, will have to be maintained with the continuing program of weapons development.

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In conclusion, the information available to me supports the view that, with appropriate safeguards, a moratorium on the testing of large thermonuclear weapons would act to maintain and advance our weapons superiority over the Soviets, and thus would be in the interests of the United States. This, too, it would be a forward step looking toward ultimate disarmament.

Knowing of your strong personal and professional interest that relates to world peace, I have taken this occasion to express my views known to you. I have already apprised Chairman Gruening and Commissioner Libby with my intention to do so, and I hope your earnest and prayerful thoughts will help them to give you their assistance to you in guiding your important task in this regard. On the ever mounting threat of nuclear war, let us all pray.

With best regards,

John F. Kennedy

President John F. Kennedy
October 19, 1962

The First Man
The White House

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