

682-Eniwetok

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ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

POST SANDSTONE REQUIREMENTS AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ENIWETOK PROVING GROUND

Note by the Acting Secretary

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1. The attached is a study prepared for the Joint Chiefs of Staff by Joint Task Force Seven. The three services have approved the report, and concurrence of the Atomic Energy Commission has been requested, upon receipt of which the plan outlined will be implemented.

2. The General Manager has requested that this report be circulated in order that it may be discussed by the Commission at its meeting at 10:30 a.m. April 28, 1948.

T. O. JONES

Acting Secretary

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ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

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POST SANDSTONE REQUIREMENTS AND RESPONSIBILITY
FOR THE ENIWETOK PROVING GROUND

Report by Commander, Joint Task Force 7

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine the post SANDSTONE military requirements and responsibilities for the Eniwetok proving ground.

BACKGROUND AND DISCUSSION

2. In a memorandum of 24 December 1947 the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Mr. Lilienthal) suggested that AEC and JTF 7 work out the details relative to the establishment of Eniwetok as a permanent proving ground. By memorandum of 20 February 1948 the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the Commander JTF 7 to implement the suggestion of the Chairman, AEC.

3. Inasmuch as the nature of any future test is undetermined, other than Mr. Lilienthal's statement that a two year interval between tests may meet urgent requirements, it appears that only limited preparations are justified. It is believed that construction or other tasks performed in preparation for future tests should be only those which presently can be foreseen as meeting reasonably firm requirements.

4. It is assumed that the Eniwetok Atoll will remain closed and that the United States must appropriately secure the area in the interests of safeguarding restricted data.

5. After the SANDSTONE tests have been completed, all islands on which bombs have been detonated will present a radiological hazard for a period of time which can be determined only by periodic surveys following the tests. Since these contaminated

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areas will present a health hazard, proper supervision and control of the areas must be established. The following precautionary measures will be undertaken by JTF 7:

a. After each shot is fired, the used island will be posted as a dangerous area by appropriate signs in English, French, Spanish, Portuguese, Russian, Marshallese, etc.

b. If determined necessary by scientific surveys to be conducted in the near future, the craters on each zero island will be covered with sand or dirt in order to make the removal of samples more difficult. This action would also reduce the radiological hazard.

6. Informal advice from the AEC is that it is desirable to provide absolute insurance for an indefinite period against unauthorized entry and the securing of information, particularly the collection of samples on the ground, but that this would be prohibitive in cost because of the size of the force required. A calculated risk in this regard seems to be implicit in the decision to conduct tests outside the continental limits of the United States. The dangers of unauthorized agencies obtaining technical information of value on the zero islands are:

a. Determination of blast and radiological effect by examination of test structures on zero islands. JTF 7 will obliterate or move such structures to prevent accurate measurements.

b. Collection of samples around the tower sites for later laboratory tests. In order for any unauthorized agency to obtain profitable sample materials, it is estimated that (after filling the craters with sand or dirt if this is necessary) surface soil would have to be removed in quantities readily detected by general surveillance only.

7. On about 1 June 1948, when JTF 7 will have taken the measures necessary for rollup and establishment of the permanent garrison, the command assuming over-all post SANDSTONE military responsibility for Eniwetok Atoll should assume control. Since the Marshall Islands sub area is a part of his command, this control would logically revert to CINCPAC. A small garrison detachment at Eniwetok could then meet minimum requirements for security, safeguarding of government property, and maintenance of

[REDACTED]

facilities for a small number of official visitors. It will be necessary for the AFSWP to furnish the necessary radiological personnel however. Although, in the absence of a permanent garrison, security and surveillance and logistic support for official post SANDSTONE survey parties could be arranged by ISCOM Kwajalein, it is understood that the AEC favors a garrison at Eniwetok.

8. Necessary standby preparations and closeout of facilities to ready Eniwetok Atoll for the reception of a small permanent garrison are being performed by JTF 7 troops as they become available from other tasks and will be carried out during the rollup with a negligible expenditure of funds. It is planned that these preparations will be completed without delaying to any serious extent the departure of the bulk of JTF 7 troops for their home stations.

9. The Atomic Energy Commission should be prepared to allocate funds to defray the cost of any special items not normally borne by the three services as a part of their routine operations.

RECOMMENDATIONS

10. It is recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

a. Note that the necessary preparations for the reception of a small garrison force on the Eniwetok Atoll are being accomplished by JTF 7 as part of SANDSTONE rollup.

b. Approve the transfer of over-all post SANDSTONE military responsibility for the Eniwetok Atoll to CINCPAC on or about 1 June 1948.

c. Obtain the concurrence of the AEC to the attached proposed directive to CINCPAC (Appendix).

d. After concurrence of the AEC, issue the directive in the Appendix to CINCPAC for implementation.

e. Make arrangements with the Atomic Energy Commission to allocate funds as may be necessary to defray the cost of housing the garrison and of any special items not normally borne by the three services as a part of their routine operations.

11. Pending examination of crater on ENGEBI, a recommendation is to be made by AEC representatives on the following points:

[REDACTED]

Whether or not to fill up craters by one of the following means:

sluicing	bulldozing, or
dredging	concrete capping

12. After receipt of foregoing the mission and size of permanent garrison can be determined. The requirements in personnel will be based on whether mission to be performed is one of security requiring detachment on each zero island or surveillance only with force based on Eniwetok, with zero islands patrolled only by air or small surface craft with each command under CINCPAC furnishing proportionate share of personnel and means required to accomplish.

13. Subsequent to decision being rendered, CTG 7.2 will accomplish necessary engineering work and will submit plan to accomplish missions assigned, i.e. security or surveillance to include T/O and E for force required.

14. a. In order to save time in getting this paper to JCS for their approval we would propose the following procedure:

(1) As soon as scientific group here have given us their requirements as to engineering and recommendation as to degree of security required on zero islands to prevent alien enemy from obtaining information of value; we will correct the draft copy and forward to CINCPAC for his concurrence and/or incorporation of any changes he may desire.

(2) Following CINCPAC'S action on the paper all corrections to be furnished you and paper drawn up in final form by you for submission to JCS planners thru P&O Division for approval by JCS with AEC concurrence.

(3) It might be well to let the JCS planners see this draft copy and to carry them along with us as changes if any are received from CINCPAC. However, you there acting with advice of P&O planners probably know better the correct manner of proceeding to avoid loss of time. We leave this to your best judgement.

(4) You can well realize that early decision by JCS with AEC concurrence on this matter is essential to avoid delay in rollup operations.

15. General Ogden and his staff have done considerable planning both as to the engineering necessary on zero islands to fill craters by several means and on setting up a T/O and E for whatever force remains on the Atoll. It is too long for transmission even

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by this means and therefore will be transmitted by courier. It is the latest version of what he has been able to plan without final recommendation by the scientific group of AEC. It is furnished you for background in answering questions in the minds of the planners. If after receipt of this letter you have further questions suggest you set up a telecon with us and with Starbird now in Oahu in on it.

[REDACTED]

A P P E N D I X

DRAFT INSTRUCTION FROM JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
TO COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC, SUBJECT
OVER-ALL MILITARY CONTROL OF
ENIWETOK ATOLL

1. The Atomic Energy Commission desires that, upon completion of Operation SANDSTONE, the Eniwetok Atoll be retained as a permanent proving ground for atomic weapons. It is contemplated that the Eniwetok Atoll and its territorial waters will remain a "closed area" under the provisions of the strategic trusteeship agreement of the United Nations Charter throughout the remainder of this year and for the year 1949. You will be advised of any changes in these plans.

2. On or about 1 June 1948, the exact date to be as mutually agreed between yourself and CJTF 7, you will assume over-all military responsibility for the Eniwetok Atoll and the atomic weapons proving ground established thereon. In fulfilling this responsibility, you will, with minimum forces required for the accomplishment of your mission:

- a. Establish a garrison on Eniwetok Atoll.
- b. Maintain the status of Eniwetok Atoll and its territorial waters as a "closed area."
- c. Maintain the existing standby facilities as turned over to you by CJTF 7.
- d. Maintain housing and messing facilities suitable for the support of post SANDSTONE scientific and survey parties of not to exceed fifty men at any one time.
- e. Provide necessary safety measures to protect members of the garrison forces from radiological hazards. You will not be responsible for the safety measures adopted to protect the members of duly authorized scientific and survey parties from radiological hazards. This responsibility will rest with the senior member of the party.

3. General surveillance only of the entire Atoll need be maintained in order to meet the requirements imposed by paragraph 2 b above. This surveillance will be such as to insure

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against the removal by unauthorized agents of significant samples from the islands which have been used for detonation of bombs. It is also desired to prevent unauthorized photography, trespassing, or the removal of smaller samples. However, because of limitation in available manpower, permanent guard of the contaminated islands of the atoll need not be maintained normally.

4. In carrying out your assigned mission with respect to Eniwetok Atoll, you are authorized to call on all three services in the Pacific Command for such support as may be required. The Armed Forces Special Weapons Project will attach to your command the necessary radiological safety monitors to carry out the provisions of paragraph 2 e above.