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OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

March 30, 1954

STAFF STUDY

SUBJECT: Coordination of Nuclear Energy Projects and
Related Information Programs

THE PROBLEM

1. To formulate recommendations with regard to overall coordination of nuclear energy projects, and related information programs, particularly as to the extent of OCB responsibility in these fields.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. OCB Responsibilities under Executive Order 10483 -- Section 2 of Executive Order 10483 provides for two types of OCB actions:

a. Subparagraph (1) which deals with actions specifically assigned to OCB by NSC, charges the Board with "advising with the agencies concerned" respecting "the execution of each security action or project so that it will make its full contribution to the attainment of national security objectives and of the particular climate of opinion the United States is seeking to achieve in the world." In recognition of this function, the NSC recently assigned two actions to the OCB in the general nuclear energy field:

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- (1) NSC Action 1045 charged the OCB with advising the Council with respect to the timing of release of the Ivy Film.
- (2) NSC Action 1061 charged OCB with coordinating the timing of the public announcement of the nation-wide Civil Defense Exercise, as well as the general line to be taken by publicity about it.

b. A second responsibility of OCB stems from subparagraph 2 of Section 2 of Executive Order 10483, which provides that "the Board shall... initiate new proposals for action within the framework of national security policies in response to opportunities and changes in the situation." In fulfillment of this function, the OCB, by action of December 9, 1953, authorized a program for the domestic and international information program in support of the President's UNGA speech. This group includes representatives of the AEC and FCDA.

c. Within the framework of subparagraph (2) of Section 2, cited above, the OCB makes recommendations to the NSC on such matters as nuclear energy projects which have not been specifically assigned to it by the Council, but which affect other national security actions assigned to OCB.

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d. OCB's interest and responsibility in this latter aspect has been recognized by the Atomic Energy Commission. Although NSC Memo, October 8, 1953, "Official Statements on Nuclear Weapons", charges officials in the Executive Branch with clearing nuclear weapons statements with the Chairman AEC, and charges the latter with clearing intelligence aspects with the Director of CIA, and foreign relation aspects with State, in two recent instances, the Chairman AEC has sought the advice of the OCB with respect to timing and content of official statements on nuclear weapons. By letter to the OCB Staff Representative of February 19, 1954, the AEC Working Group member requested OCB advice on the timing of the announcements of Joint Task Force Seven, and by letter to C. D. Jackson on March 1, with reference to public reporting of the Joint Task Force Seven tests, the Chairman of the AEC stated:

"The ultimate decisions on whether to use these materials, how to adopt them, and what timing to follow in issuance, if it should be found desirable, should of course be made in the light of the judgments that can be assembled by the Operations Coordinating Board."

3. Additional Major Actions not Presently Assigned for Coordination

a. A number of major public statements with respect to peace-time application of atomic energy, international exchange of power reactor technology, and exchange of weapons with NATO allies will be made in connection with the forthcoming hearings on amendments of the Atomic Energy Act. These hearings are presently scheduled for May.

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b. The FCDA has developed a statement with respect to basic planning assumptions for the fiscal year 1955 which it wishes to release for use by state and local Civil Defense organizations. These assumptions include a considerable amount of significant data with respect to the effect of nuclear weapons, targets, destruction, etc.*

c. A number of additional actions and public statements will need to be developed with respect to FCDA's annual report, FCDA's exchange of Civil Defense information with friendly countries, and public information developed through the ODM with respect to non-military defense measures (industrial dispersion, dispersal of federal agencies, etc.). These actions may have important aspects affecting the United States position overseas, depending principally upon their content and their timing in relation to other significant overseas developments.

4. Major Responsibilities for Actions Cited Above.

a. The FCDA under Public Law 920 has responsibility to "publicly disseminate appropriate Civil Defense information by all appropriate means."

b. The AEC under the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 is charged with making available to Congress and the public unclassified reports with respect to atomic energy.

c. The ODM, under authority of the National Security Act and Reorganization Plan No. 3, has responsibility for the broad programming of non-military defense measures, including public information with respect to such measures.

*On March 22, 1954, the Justice Department made public a circular which in January 1954 had been sent to all U.S. law enforcement officials by FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, requesting an alert against possible smuggling of small atomic weapons into this country by enemy agents. This March public release was not coordinated with the Operations Coordinating Board.



d. The Chairman of the AEC, under NSC 151/1, is responsible for coordinating programs for the disclosure of atomic energy information to friendly countries. In carrying out this responsibility he operates through various agency channels depending upon the purpose involved.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

5. NSC Actions 1045 and 1061, and the AEC letters of 19 February and 1 March 1954, cited above, acknowledge OCB's interests in the nuclear energy field. As precedents they suggest that the NSC should instruct the OCB to advise with the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Director of the FCDA on the timing, and manner of presentation of such programs as may significantly affect the climate of opinion factor which the United States is seeking to maintain abroad. Such programs, in addition to those previously cited, logically would include:

- a. the timing of declassification of information covered in 151/1, "disclosure of classified information to allied countries";
- b. manner and timing of release of proposed information to public officials, law enforcement agencies on clandestine nuclear weapons;
- c. domestic nuclear proving ground publicity;
- d. military applications aspects of AEC unclassified reports, and non-military applications aspects of Department of Defense unclassified reports.



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6. In addition, since the non-military defense programs of the United States, coordinated by the Office of Defense Mobilization, clearly affect OCB's responsibilities in the area of foreign climate of opinion, the NSC should make explicit the primary coordinating role of ODM in non-military defense matters, and the advisory role of OCB with respect to the timing of projects and manner of release of information of significance to foreign climate of opinion.

7. In the discharge of its functions of coordinating the timing and execution of the programs affecting the national security, the Operations Coordinating Board has the clear responsibility of:

- a. Formulating the general considerations which should be taken into account by agencies of the Executive Branch in the execution of approved NSC policies bearing on this problem.
- b. Proposing particular operations designed to produce certain specific results of significance to foreign climate of opinion which supports the U.S. security interests.

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8. Climate of opinion considerations formulated by OCB should guide all government actions in the sphere of nuclear energy and related projects which are capable of significant overseas impact. However, since there are many factors which may militate against a program which seems desirable from a climate-of-opinion standpoint, the NSC must reconcile conflicting viewpoints.

9. Review of the NSC programs assigned to OCB, NSC programs assigned to the AEC, the Office of Defense Mobilization, and the various obligations imposed upon departments and agencies by the Atomic Energy Act, 1946, (AEC) and Public Law 920 (FCDA) indicates that potential gaps in coordinated operational control exist in the area of nuclear energy projects and related information programs. The National Security Council should, in the interest of the U.S. security position world-wide, take action to insure that such gaps do not operate to the detriment of national policy.

RECOMMENDATIONS

10. It is recommended that the Operations Coordinating Board:

a. Inform the NSC with respect to OCB responsibilities for the coordination of nuclear energy projects and related information programs, that:

"The OCB interest and concern is primarily to assure maximum foreign support of the U.S. international position with respect to national policies, programs and objectives.

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The OCB should therefore be in a position to express its views with respect to important actions in the field of nuclear energy which it feels would have significant bearing on overseas programs.

"It is recognized that in such matters as nuclear energy, domestic action cannot be separated from their overseas impact. In view of already established mechanisms, the OCB should not be the final authority for balancing domestic considerations against overseas considerations with respect to actions and statements in the field of nuclear energy. In the event there is the necessity to evaluate the overseas considerations against those that must be considered domestically, the OCB will notify the NSC of such conflict of interest.

"In fulfillment of the above, the OCB will develop guidance setting forth climate-of-opinion objectives which may be affected by nuclear energy projects and related information programs."

- b. Request the NSC to issue the following memorandum:

"In order to coordinate projects and related information programs in the nuclear energy field which may affect the international security interests of the United States, the Operations Coordinating Board shall advise with the several agencies concerned with respect to the advisability of actions

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and the timing and manner of public release of information,
in the following categories:

- A. Peaceful applications of nuclear energy of potential interest to the peoples and governments of the world.
- B. Nuclear energy developments of a weapons category including announcement of Pacific and Nevada Proving Grounds tests and any subsequent public information materials connected therewith.
- C. Weapons developments reflecting on offensive or defensive capabilities involving nuclear characteristics.
- D. Announcements of national civil defense, air defense, or international strategic air command exercises.

"Release of public information in areas of non-military defense related to the following programs will be coordinated by the Office of Defense Mobilization:

- A. Reduction of urban target vulnerabilities.
- B. Civilian defense activities other than those cited above.
- C. Continuity of industry.
- D. Continuity of Government.
- E. Physical security of facilities.

"OCB guidance as to climate-of-opinion factors affecting the timing of release of information in these categories will be furnished by the Operations Coordinating Board to the

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Office of Defense Mobilization.

"Memorandum for the National Security Council, October 8, 1953, Subject: Official Statements Regarding Nuclear Weapons, is hereby amended so as to read:

"Following the words 'Director of Central Intelligence' add '; the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission to request the guidance of the Operations Coordinating Board.'" "

c. Contingent upon NSC approval of a. above, circulate the memorandum, attached as TAB "A" with enclosure, to members of OCB, Chairman AEC, Director FCDA, and the Director ODM.

d. Establish working groups or make such other arrangements as may be appropriate (1) to assist the Board in advising the Chairman of AEC and other agencies concerned with respect to OCB views as to the timing of proposed actions or statements pertaining to nuclear energy; and (2) to initiate suggestions to the NSC or to other appropriate authorities for the more effective exploitation of actions or statements in the field of nuclear energy. This group should have appropriate security clearances for access to AEC restricted data, and the Chairman of AEC should participate in meetings of the OCB at which nuclear energy matters are discussed.

Attachment:

TAB "A" - Draft Statement by OCB with attached Check List, dtd 3/30/54.

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Draft Statement by OCB to:
Members of Board
Chairman, AEC
Director, FCDA
Director, ODM

TAB "A"

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The area of United States Government public reporting in which the most important problems of coordination now arise is that of nuclear energy development, both for weapons and general beneficial uses. The urgency of bringing about such coordination has been heightened by the need to maintain and enhance the American leadership established by the President's speech of December 8, 1953, to the UN General Assembly. Major actions taken and the subsequent public statements on nuclear applications and findings should obviously be examined with an eye to making them play the fullest possible part in support of this Nation's objectives throughout the world.

The Board stands ready to assist in this type of coordination. It will give first priority of members, staff assistants, staff, and working groups to expediting it and to providing written guidances where appropriate. Our purpose is to bring quickly to bear on problems of content and timing of official actions and statements the whole range of judgments available in the agencies represented in the Board and the working groups, to make sure that no pertinent considerations will be overlooked, and that the maximum support for the United States' international position in nuclear energy matters may be exerted by timing of actions taken and by official public reporting generally in this field, and to reduce the possibility of lapses, oversight, or delay in consultation on matters of nuclear energy action or announcements. The Board's staff and working groups have compiled the attached check list of current items

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TAB "A"



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which in the judgment of the various agency representatives hold potentialities for harm or help in the advancement of the United States' interests.

It is suggested that agency heads advise their principal assistants dealing with these and related matters to bring them to the attention of the OCB for advisory comment on content or timing or operational significance as concerns national policy. The longer in advance notice can be provided, the more adequate and useful will be our advisory action.

The check list, of course, does not include all points that might merit attention. It will be revised periodically. We will welcome your comments on additions--or on deletions--which occur to you and your staff.

Attachment:

Check List.

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
Check List of Actions of Interest to OCB Responsibilities
in the Nuclear Energy and Related Fields

1. Actions in support of the President's proposals in the UNGA speech of December 8, 1953.
2. Major policy statements expressing or furthering U.S. proposals on international control of armaments.
3. Executive Branch proposals with respect to Amendments of the Atomic Energy Act.
4. General content of information plans for, and timing of public announcements on weapons test series at Pacific or Nevada Proving Grounds.
5. General content of information plans for and timing of public announcements, and official reporting materials including evaluations of nationwide civil defense exercises.
6. General content of information plans for and timing of public announcements and official reporting materials on military exercises, such as the proposed Strategic Air Command-Air Defense Command (SAC-ADC) exercises plan for July 1954.
7. General content of information plans for and timing of public announcements and reporting materials on major non-military industrial defense activities in the United States conducted by ODM.
8. Declassified information proposed for release to public officials and law enforcement agencies to aid them in detection of attempted clandestine delivery of nuclear weapons by enemies.

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9. Timing of public announcements of overseas deployment of military combat elements capable of employing nuclear weapons.
10. Official comment on guided missile developments reflecting on air offensive or air defensive capabilities involving nuclear characteristics.
11. Timing and content of public reporting materials on radiological warfare, either offensive or defensive.

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