

July 29, 1951

100-100000

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Discussion of the 330th meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, July 26, 1951

EYES ONLY

Present at the 330th NSC meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Under Secretary of the Treasury; Mr. William H. Rogers for the Attorney General; the Under Secretary of the Interior (for Item 3); the Acting Secretary of Agriculture (for Item 2); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Acting Federal Civil Defense Administrator; the Acting Director, U. S. Information Agency; the Director, International Cooperation Administration; the Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (for Item 1); the Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers (for Item 2); the Deputy Secretary of Defense; Assistant Secretary of State Bowie; Assistant Secretary of Defense Sprague; the Deputy Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Acting Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; The Assistant to the President; The Deputy Assistant to the President; Special Assistants to the President Cutler, Randall, and Dearborn; the White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There followed a summary of the disposition of the meeting and the main points taken.

1. DEFENSE MOBILIZATION PLAN D-MINUS

(NSC 5521; NSC Action No. 1717-a-(3); Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated May 29 and June 1, 1951)

Mr. Cutler commenced to brief the Council on the reference subject, and read in total Situation Assumption No. 1, which depicted the results of a surprise nuclear attack on the continental United States which resulted in reduction of U. S. military strength, disruption of government, 5,000,000 casualties in the United States, and the national economy at a virtual standstill. (The copy of Mr. Cutler's briefing note is filed in the minutes of this meeting.)

At this point the President interrupted Mr. Cutler, saying why he felt it was necessary to go any further, since at that time we would all be dead (laughter).

UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED WITH DELETIONS
E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4(b)
Agency Case NSC 586-408
NLE Case 99-77-13
NLE Date 11/7/91

Handwritten notes and signatures at the bottom of the page, including the name "John H. ...".

UNCLASSIFIED

Mr. Cutler continued his briefing by explaining the comments and recommendations of the NSC Planning Board on the portions of Plan D-Minus which the Board had been requested to consider. He pointed out that the Budget Bureau representative on the Planning Board had expressed concern as to the validity of the casualty figures (totaling 50,000,000) which were set forth in paragraph 5 on page 29 of Part I of the Plan. The Budget Member had pointed out that these casualty figures were not supported by a current study of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee.

The President again interrupted to say that this questioning of the validity of the casualty figures illustrated the dangers of getting into "a numbers game". The President suggested that instead of over-all casualty figures, Plan D-Minus should assume certain classification of areas of casualty and damage which would be related to the targets and the degree of damage in the different categories of areas.

Mr. Cutler replied by stating that the Planning Board had deemed the 50,000,000 casualty figure as reasonable in the light of past reports by the Net Evaluation Subcommittee. The Planning Board further felt that some such over-all casualty figures were necessary for planning purposes. For example, one had to estimate the number of estimated available hospital beds to such casualty figures.

.....

Mr. Cutler then called on Mr. Gray to speak on this point. Mr. Gray replied that the Bureau of the Budget was probably right. No one could actually prove that under such a surprise nuclear attack we would have 50,000,000 casualties in the United States. But some kind of estimate was essential for the purposes of the Federal Civil Defense Administration and their rehabilitation planning. Perhaps this could be done, as the President suggested, in terms of areas related to targets within them. Since the over-all figure was not very useful, Mr. Gray said that the problem should be examined in the light of the President's suggestion.


.....

UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

Mr. Cutler then returned to his briefing of the Planning Board's comments and recommendations. He pointed out that the comments in paragraph 3, page 2, of the Planning Board memorandum dealt with the less significant exceptions to the Planning Board's general approval of the assumptions in Plan D-Minus as being suitable for the purposes of defense mobilization planning. The principal exceptions to the Planning Board's agreement that these assumptions were suitable as a basis for defense mobilization planning, were set forth in paragraph 5 of the memorandum. Mr. Cutler explained why the Planning Board believed that certain of the policy assumptions on pages 44-46 of Part I of the Plan needed to be qualified and then called on Mr. Gray.




UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET

REPRODUCED BY THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Mr. Cutler resumed his briefing, and turned to the next major area in which the Planning Board qualified its general approval of Plan D-Minus as suitable for defense mobilization planning. This was paragraph 5-b of the Planning Board's memorandum, in which, contrary to the thinking of Plan D-Minus, the Planning Board had recommended that with respect to the immediate post-attack and recovery periods, further consideration be given to utilizing existing Federal agencies rather than to creating new emergency Federal agencies. In explaining the Planning Board view on this matter, Mr. Cutler asked the President and Council whether they could imagine, in the catastrophic conditions envisaged in Plan D-Minus, that an emergency National Food Agency could conceivably be set up and function.

The President replied with emphasis that if the United States was going to conceivably survive any such attack as was envisaged in this Plan, you would certainly have to have such emergency agencies as a food agency. This would probably be initially headed by the Secretary of Agriculture, but in any event the President said he could not imagine that this National Food Agency would be thought ridiculous in the slightest degree.



UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET

REPRODUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT IS PROHIBITED


[Large area of extremely faint, illegible text, possibly a redacted section or bleed-through from another page.]

Mr. Gray indicated that he had no objection to this recommendation, and that this matter was of course "by the President"

[Faint, illegible text block, possibly a continuation of the previous paragraph or a separate section.]

[Handwritten signature or initials]

REPRODUCED BY THE DIRECTOR, R. [illegible]



The National Security Council

- a. Noted and discussed Parts I and III of Mobilization Plan D-Minus (except the "Definitions" in Part I-E, pages 47-52) prepared by the Office of Defense Mobilization and transmitted by the reference memorandum of May 29, 1957, and the comments and recommendations of the NSC Planning Board thereon transmitted by the reference memorandum of June 25, 1957, in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as presented at the meeting.
- b. Noted that the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization, agreed that the "Weapons Effects" section (Part I-B, pages 3-26), being of a highly technical nature, should be subject to continuing review and appropriate concurrence for technical accuracy by the Atomic Energy Commission, the Department of Defense (AFSWP), the Federal Civil Defense Administration, and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (Public Health Service), including the medical representatives.
- c. Noted that the "Capabilities Assumptions" (Part I-A, pages 1-2), the "Situation Assumptions--The Attack" (Part I-1, pages 27-29), and the "Situation Assumptions--Post Attack Analysis" (Part I-C, pages 30-43), are suitable as a basis for defense mobilization planning for a surprise attack on the continental United States, it being understood that the assumptions will be subject to continuous change and review; provided that the Office of Defense Mobilization, in preparing revisions of Plan D-Minus, will:

[Faded text, likely a list of conditions or actions related to item c.]

REPRODUCED FOR THE DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE MOBILIZATION

(2) Review, in consultation with the staff of the NSC
Net Evaluation Subcommittee, the tabulation in
paragraph 4 of Part I-2 and:

(a) the validity of the figures shown on the tab-
ulation, with particular reference to the
ratio of nuclear radiation casualties to
blast and thermal casualties.

(3) Confer with the Public Health Service the assump-
tions as to communicable diseases in paragraph 5
of Part I-2.

TOP SECRET

PROPERTY OF THE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

NOTE: The above actions, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Director, ODM, for appropriate implementation; except paragraph d-(3), which has been transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman, AEC, for appropriate implementation.

2. BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY: STOCKPILING

(NSC 5707/8, paragraph 48; NSC Action No. 1726-1000. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated June 20, 1957; NSC 5414/1)

Mr. Cutler reminded the Council that when the basic NSC policy paper (NSC 5707/8) was approved six weeks ago, action on paragraph 48 (Stockpiling) was deferred to allow the various departments and agencies better to develop their views. The stockpiling policy approved in 1956 (paragraph 4 of NSC 5602/1) allowed stockpile planning to be done on the basis of a five-year war, but provided for procurement on a priority basis only for objectives based on three years.

In the proposed new paragraph 48 which was now before the Council, the majority Planning Board recommendation would restrict all stockpile procurement to the three-year basis, except in those limited cases where procurement, within the long-term objectives described in the President's April 1954 directive, was necessary to maintain the vital domestic production component of the materials mobilization base. The Director of ODM, continued Mr. Cutler, had noted at the bottom of the page that in FY 1958 procurement under this policy could include lead, zinc, and battery-grade manganese.

The Defense, Treasury and Budget members of the Planning Board proposed deleting the exception clause and noting that through FY 1959 there may be limited procurement of antimony, lead, zinc, and battery-grade manganese. These members feel that the majority language might be interpreted as approval, from a national security viewpoint, of the long-term objectives.

The President commented that he supposed that these members wished to continue this minerals component of a vital mineralization base, but they wished to do so by means of tariffs to protect domestic production of these minerals rather than to achieve such protection through stockpile procurement of these minerals.

Mr. Gray observed that actually at the present time there were only three such items to be procured--namely, lead, zinc, and battery-grade manganese. He went on to point out that in the Council adopted paragraph 4B without the exception clause, as indicated by Defense, Treasury and Budget, such a proposal would appear to override the President's directive of April 9, 1954. He therefore hoped that the exception clause would remain in the paragraph. In any event, he could assure the Council that we were not out of the business of procuring lead, zinc, and manganese for one year or two.

The President said suggested the addition of the three specified materials to the exception clause. Secretary Wilson, however, said he would stop the world procurement of materials for the stockpiles. He had absolutely no confidence in the reliability of the stockpile requirements, which he believed were based on concepts of fighting a war along the lines of World War I. He explained that this was rather an extreme position, but he sincerely believed that stockpiling as something that we had past in the world.

The President replied that he was not a stockpiling advocate. Stockpiling was a thing of the past. In view of what he had just heard in the discussion of Pan American, Secretary Wilson's position warmed the President that if we continued to stockpile, the Government would have these materials brought around his neck just as it has with agricultural surpluses. The stockpiling of these minerals would be a means of supporting domestic production that we could do in this country.

The President replied that either we had to continue to stockpile these minerals or else we should have to encourage domestic production by raising the tariff on them. He mentioned that he was very much afraid of losing markets like Mexico. This latter point was quite apart from the question of competition which would be brought in by the mining states.

UNCLASSIFIED

APPROVED BY THE DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Secretary Wilson replied that he certainly had no objection to recognizing the political aspects which required stockpiling. But it was important not to disguise these political considerations as requirements of national security. The President also stated his opposition to a resort to tariff, tariff removal, or other measures. If we did so, we were bound to have our enemies.

Asked for his views, Secretary Burgess stated that he found himself in agreement with Secretary Wilson. While he did not oppose the purchase of these minerals for the stockpile, he did not wish to have such purchases made in the name of the national security. Mr. Gray noted that battery-grade manganese, although it has national security implications.

After further discussion of this matter, the President stated that he would accept paragraph 48 as then drafted, in the majority, together with the amendments.

The National Security Council

- a. Noted and approved the draft paragraph on "Stockpiling" transmitted by the reference memorandum (June 25, 1957), prepared by the NSC Planning Board on the basis of a draft by the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization, concurred in by the Defense Mobilization Board as a proposed paragraph 48 of NSC 5417, in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as presented orally at the meeting.

- b. Noted the President's approval of the foregoing paragraph and authorized the Secretary of State to transmit paragraph 48 to the NSC staff.

Stockpiling. The United States should not authorize further procurement* for additions to the Strategic Stockpile authorized under Public Law 85-20, 80th Congress, beyond the 3-year procurement priority levels, except in those limited cases where procurement within the long-term objective described in the Presidential directive of April 16, 1954, is necessary to maintain the vital home production component of the materials mobilization base.**

* This limitation would not apply to purchases where commitments have already been made to purchase or otherwise acquire materials for the Strategic Stockpile or for procurement of it under the Defense Production Act or War Reliance Act or other programs, unless such commitments to purchase are not in compliance with the Government.

*** Through FY 1958 new mobilization program...
ment should include lead, zinc and battery-
grade manganese (synthetic diamonds). At the
current rate of purchase (in accordance with
the Presidential Directives of 1/11/56, 1956),
the long-term objective for zinc would be
reached in almost a year and the short-term
objective for lead would be reached in almost
two years. New purchases of zinc and lead for
the Strategic Stockpile will end the imple-
mentation of the long-range mineral program
and before the Congress, even if the date pre-
cedes the attainment of the long-term objective.

NOTE: Paragraph 14 of NSC 5701/A, as approved by the Executive Order above, subsequently eliminated all holders of NSC 5701/A, and so also eliminated NSC 5411.1, Defense Mobilization Plans, by assumption, as a person during the last two months of the paragraph of NSC 5701/A.

3. SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING U.S. INTERESTS

Mr. Cutler indicated that the Directorate of Intelligence would confine its reporting to the recent changes in leadership of the Soviet Union, a subject which the Board has found of less find of absorbing interest.

Mr. Allen Dulles displayed a chart entitled "Single Party and Government Organization" with this chart as background of remarks he went on to describe the recent developments in the USSR as the most dramatic which had occurred in recent years, not even excepting the death of Stalin. He described the collective dictatorship in the Soviet Union as finished through her had achieved almost total control of the Party apparatus. The only potential rival, Marshal Zhukov. The Central Committee of the Communist Party, had exercised real power against the Premier, the old Politburo, for the first time in years. Mr. Dulles followed this with the point that the major policy issues which had been the subject of the...

Mr. Dulles then pointed out that the members of the new Presidium were second-level figures, and that the two known members had been eliminated. This left Zhukov and Malenkov as the only two personalities of real importance remaining members of the new Presidium. Malenkov appeared from the start to be a genuine seeker after power.

Mr. Dulles pointed out the elements with a brief summary and analysis of the recent events had occurred in the USSR, from the departure of Khrushchev and Malenkov's...

REPRODUCED AT THE DISCRETION OF THE DIRECTOR

present time. This was followed by a recital of the official charges against "the rebels". Mr. Dulles stated his inclination to believe that in this extended contest Zhukov's intervention on the side of Khrushchev had been decisive. Bulganin's resignation, on the other hand, appeared uncertain. Perhaps in the early stages of the debate he had voted with the rebels against Khrushchev. In any event, Khrushchev would probably deem it advisable to keep Bulganin around for a while. This would tend to soften the blow that a disgrace of Bulganin would cause in countries like India, which Bulganin and Khrushchev had recently visited. After a while, however, Bulganin might be allowed to retire quietly and be replaced by Zhukov. If this happened, Marshal Konev would be the logical successor to succeed Zhukov in the Ministry of Defense.

Mr. Dulles indicated no doubts that the majority of the rebels were likely to be staged. Banishment or imprisonment and arrest was more likely than exile trials.

Mr. Dulles followed with what he has termed as the tentative conclusions of the CIA as to the meaning of these events, pointing out that as yet these conclusions had not been formulated within the intelligence community as a whole. Firstly, Khrushchev as a dictator would be dangerous and impulsive, though he may be restrained by Zhukov. Throughout his career, Khrushchev had shown signs of being a shrewd opportunist. He favors co-existence, different roads to socialism, reconciliation with Yugoslavia, and increased contacts with other countries. Khrushchev was likely to continue to follow these policies in the future, but preventive measures would be in his control.

Secondly, the future policy of Khrushchev was unknown with regard to the Soviet satellites was hard to analyze. Mr. Dulles stated the belief of CIA that these two individuals had primarily been responsible for the problems that had been done to Hungary. On the other hand, Khrushchev's recent statements would indicate an interest in the satellites for a softer Moscow line. This might give rise to serious problems in the satellites, but Khrushchev would be bound by Moscow's strict control.

Thirdly, Mr. Dulles thought it unlikely that these recent events would produce much of a change in the Soviet position on disarmament at London. It was conceivable, however, that Khrushchev might make some concessions in order to exhibit a more liberal attitude.

Finally, Mr. Dulles indicated that Khrushchev would be facing very severe internal problems, particularly with respect to industrial decentralization and agriculture. If these problems were not solved, the consequences for Khrushchev could be very serious. De-Stalinization is going on rapidly. The steady development of the fanatic ideological Communist is the part.

In conclusion, Mr. Dulles said that he would like to emphasize three vitally important questions: First, can party careerists really make the new industrial system work? Second, if the Party careerists fail, can Khrushchev save himself by adopting wholly new policies? Third, is the next great step militancy or friendship?

(A copy of Mr. Dulles' briefing is filed in the minutes of the meeting.)

The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to the recent changes in the top leadership of the Communist Party and the government regarding the USSR.

- 4. U. S. POLICY TOWARD FINLAND
(NSC 5403; Progress Report, dated June 28, 1954, by OEF as NSC 5403)

The National Security Council:

Noted the reference Progress Report on the subject by the Operations Coordinating Board.

- 5. U. S. POLICY TOWARD FORMOSA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA
(NSC 5503; Progress Report, dated July 3, 1954, by OEF as NSC 5503)

After Mr. Dearborn had completed his outline of the contents of the Progress Report on Formosa, Secretary Dulles commented that we must pull down our expenses on Taiwan.

The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed the reference Progress Report on the subject by the Operations Coordinating Board.

John Edgar Hoover
Director