

CONFIDENTIAL - SECURITY INFORMATION

Working Group Meeting - September 19, 1958

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Department of Defense



MEMORANDUM OF MEETING WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
REVIEW OF THE SECURITY INFORMATION POLICY  
IN THE FIELD OF DISARMAMENT AND  
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, HELD ON SEPTEMBER 19, 1958.

Working Group Members Present:

State	Mr. Philip D. Morrison, Acting Director
USIA	Mr. George E. Kinsley, Jr.
CIA	Representative, CIA
ICA	Mr. James C. Gandy
AEC	Mr. Marshall Thompson
FUDA	Mr. Thomas J. Smith
CCB	Mr. Edward J. Gandy

Others Present:

Defense	Major General John F. Tracy
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1. Overseas Reactions to U.S. Non-navigable Nuclear Tests

The USIA representative, George Kinsley, stated that in view of the U.S. announcements of November 1957 (see attached),

2. USIA Proposal to Present Safety and Non-Navigability of the U.S. Test Program

Discussion of this proposal was deferred to a future meeting.

a. That the exchange of information concerning atmospheric tests made by the U.S. went so far as to include the safety and non-navigability aspects of its own tests in the fall of 1957, followed by the statement of the U.S. statement to date was not a coincidence. This was not concerned, but it could be argued that the safety and non-navigability reporting was concerned. The former reporting of the safety aspects by the U.S. might result in a lack of worldwide confidence in safety which might be counter-productive to U.S. interests. On September 16, there was a non-navigable public hearing on the safety of the safety of U.S. continental test sites when the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission held a hearing at the U.S. Army's test site at the Lake City, Utah. Hearings were also held in Nevada and New Mexico. A stock man claimed a dam had collapsed in Sheep Range, Nevada, caused by the Nevada Proving Grounds atomic test, but he was contradicted by the Nevada Proving Grounds. The hearing was adjourned.

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pointed out that a damage suit had been brought by medical claims against the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy for damages resulting from sudden and dramatic loss of life and services resulting from fall-out of the same Nevada tests which has been submitted for trial in Los Angeles in October. It was noted also that it is anticipated a book will be published giving the medical, technical and photographic aspects of the Marshall Islands tests where significant damage occurred from the Pacific Proving Grounds tests.

b. In the light of the foregoing, the majority of the working group felt that it would be appropriate for the U.S. to embark upon the type of campaign proposed by the USSR in November. These considerations were felt to outweigh those raised above. A representative who felt that the U.S. should continue to place attention on the secrecy-safety issue, while it is known that we are strong on this, the Soviets have shown their alleged vulnerability. He expressed concern that if we do not do "what" the Soviets will shift the question to the "stop-tests" question. He stated from the propaganda viewpoint, they are strong and we are vulnerable. This would firmly re-emphasize the time-tested strategy of using propaganda to divert attention from questions of what we can do to prevent an effective nuclear war.

#### 3. Basis for U.S. Reporting Program

It was agreed that the recent announcement of three Soviet shots in eight days had been advantageous to the United States and that the best policy to be followed would be a conservative one known to simple repetition that "Soviet Test Nuclear Number 1", and agreed to the proposal of "Soviet shots when such shots were of some significance". It was also agreed that there is danger in continuously repeating announcements of Soviet shots least the aversion of peoples of the world to testing would be stimulated. It was agreed that the United States government should officially report each Soviet shot but should do so selectively.

4. The working group agreed, taking cognizance of the above, that its position with regard to the indicated efforts to dissuade the Soviets on the weapons testing problem should be as follows, namely the following lines:

a. Continued Soviet test until the USSR and others of the same has given the USSR a clear policy of banning nuclear weapons worldwide unless to adopt a program substantially more stringent than that in the face of a potential Japanese atomic bomb explosion or similar general.

b. The USA suggested for emphasis on safety, secrecy and non-secrecy has been eventually important. The majority of the working group questioned the feasibility of adopting a policy of a line of the safety of U.S. tests and the U.S. public right to safety particularly in view of the possibility of uranium mining and processing out of U.S. control causing damages to persons, property and property lessees after the test itself. Thereafter, the USA

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### 5. Other Business

Pakistan newspaper reporter's request for clearance to publish story of Soviet Testing Grounds - After discussing the situation, it was decided that it would be useful for USIA to furnish the Pakistani newspaper reporter materials on an unattributable basis which would make it possible to identify the location of the Soviet testing grounds. It was suggested that USIA and U.S. newspaper comment could be brought to the attention of the Pakistani reporter. It was further agreed that it would be appropriate for the U.S. to expedite the supply of unclassified photographic equipment to neutral and friendly nations, such as the People's Republic of China.

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GSA - DIA - DCI - CIA - FBI - NSA

Attachment

Summary of Overseas Reporting of  
U.S. Announcements of Nuclear Tests

REF ID: A6912



Overseas Reaction to Whit. House-Strauss Reversal on Nuclear Test

Preliminary Report

USIA queried 20 overseas posts by telegram on press reaction; most of these posts are in the Middle East and Europe, areas nearest the Soviet test sites in Siberia and the Far East S.A. While not all replies are in (New Delhi and Tokyo are among the important posts which have not yet replied), it is clear that reaction has been much greater than past AF announcements of Soviet tests.

News play has been very prominent -- front page coverage almost everywhere; Editorial reaction has been mostly favorable, but not extensive as yet.

SAMPLE REACTIONS:

London - All papers carry prominently, most on front page under headlines such as "Ike Reveals Russian H-test area" (Chronicle) and "Russia Sets Off New H-Bomb" (Herald).

Paris - "Moderate" play. Several papers used Agence France Presse despatch interpreting Eisenhower announcement as "Start of new and important American counter-offensive against active Soviet propaganda in favor of cessation of nuclear tests."

Rome - Very wide coverage. Editorial interpretation similar to Paris: that the U.S. move is an important counter-propaganda stroke; some papers also say that Ike's statement had domestic significance, as a slap at Stevenson for recommending tests be stopped.

Karachi - Leading dailies carry on front page. Headline features proximity to Pakistan of Soviet Siberian test site. No editorials.

Tehran - Strauss statement extensively front-pageed in leading papers. No editorials.

Rangoon - A strong editorial in the independent Rangoon Tribune contrasts US openness and Soviet secrecy on tests, and criticizes for supporting the USSR.

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New Delhi - It is notable that before limited September 1, in answer to a question in Parliament (since Eisenhower's statement, that "nobody had "suddenly and markedly" improved over India's nuclear program "presumably" due to the Soviet tests in Siberia. This was the first time Soviet tests have at aired such utility in India. The item appearing in the New York Times (September 4, in particular) may be by USIS media, especially to the Indian East.

Soviet Reaction - The two White House statements August 27 and August 31, obviously forced the Russians into the announcement they finally made on August 31: two tests had been made, and others were "planned". Their statement was defensive in tone. Soviet tests are no mere circus because detonated at high altitude, and because "minimum yield" is used.

The Russian statement gave no further details of yield or precautions. did not mention the test date, and did not say how long the current series would continue.

Aside from repeating old propaganda on Soviet support of banning nuclear weapons etc., the current line in Soviet foreign communists reflects one new note: Increasingly to control nuclear tests is not necessary, because tests can be conducted by insinuation. This has not yet become a major Soviet line.

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Reaction to Announcement of Nuclear Explosions in Japan

FBIS radio coverage of the current Soviet nuclear test centers on Moscow and Tokyo comment. Moscow has, in the last three days, excused the tests on the basis of military necessity generated by continued US and UK tests and manufacture of nuclear weapons. The Soviet commentator emphasized that nuclear tests can be stopped without formal agreement because of the technical impossibility of hiding such tests. Moscow also made a point of calling attention to recent remarks by Adlai Stevenson alleging that Mr. Stevenson said "American business circles are opposed to the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes because the manufacture of atomic and hydrogen weapons is really their main profit."

The Tokyo commentary called on the USSR for running a moratorium on tests and noted an increase in the radioactivity of rain "which might be caused by the Soviet tests". The USSR rejected the projected visit to Moscow of the Japanese Atomic Energy Inspection Team composed of Socialist Party Diet member . Although it is willing to welcome the visit of the Socialist Party Chairman to the lower house committee on Scientific Research who is slated to go to Moscow about 20 September, it is not in an atomic energy exchange program with the USSR.

CIA reports no reaction thus far from Communist Chinese propaganda to the Soviet atomic tests. The Communist Chinese population would be particularly vulnerable to propaganda that it is being unnecessarily exposed to atomic fallouts from the Soviet tests, being closer to their origin than Japan where incineration has already occurred.

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