

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE March 2, 1955

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OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD

Washington, D.C.

OVERSEAS REACTION TO THE AEC REPORT ON
THE EFFECTS OF HIGH-YIELD NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS

REFERENCE: NSC Action No. 320-b

DCB FILE NO. 55

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E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4(b)

Case NSC 58-1480

Case DR 87-387 #4

NLE Date 4/18/92

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OPERATIONAL INFORMATION BOARD
Washington, D. C.

MEMORANDUM



MEMORANDUM FOR THE OPERATIONAL INFORMATION BOARD

SUBJECT: Overseas Reaction to the AEC Report on the Possibility of High-Yield Thermonuclear Bombs.

The attached Operational Information Board Report, dated March 1, 1955, pursuant to NSC Action 10, is hereby dated March 1, 1955, as noted by the National Security Council on March 1, 1955, File No. 1944.

The recommendation of the report was approved by the Council and approved by the President on March 1, 1955.

The Council noted the dissemination, subsequently approved by the President on March 1, 1955, of the report, File No. 1944, No. 925, oral or written statements to be made by the Government officials regarding nuclear weapons which constitute information not previously made public officially, must be disclosed in advance with the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, to coordinate the intelligence and foreign relations aspects with the operational information board.

The previous draft of the report team dated March 1, 1955, is to be destroyed and the report to be destroyed with the security requirements of the report.

W. A. Rorer
Director
Operational Information Board

Attachments:

Executive Officer, OCE File No. 1944, on above subject, dated March 1, 1955, with attachment as listed.

OCE File No. 50

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OVERSEAS REACTION TO THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT
 (Prepared Pursuant to CIA Directive No. 5000.104)
 Approved for Release by NSA on 05-08-2014 pursuant to E.O. 13526

A. SUMMARY.

1. In general, reaction to the AEC announcement was generally mild. Most Free World countries accepted it without comment. The only countries which showed any reaction were always particularly sensitive to atomic matters.

2. The announcement of a possible split in the West European continent, as it might have appeared to West European countries, and the rearming of West Germany, are both one of the old, well-worn propaganda lines, but they were repeated in a new way in which Western Europe could not ignore them.

3. There also was little reaction in India, although the outstanding exceptions to the Free World was the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. conducting tests which are admittedly dangerous to the human race which could lead to a total destructive war, and the threat of atomic and hydrogen bombs as a tool of mass destruction.

4. The only Soviet reaction to the rearmament of West Germany. The rest of the bloc, including the U.S.S.R., the Communist China pointedly refused to mention the rearmament, but continued to stress atomic energy matters. The U.S.S.R. comments, mostly in terms of Soviet progress in atomic energy, the atomic energy, the Soviet progress in atomic energy, the limiting conventional arms race, the U.S.S.R. has developed atomic weapons.

5. The significant feature of world reaction was the deliberate avoidance of any mention of the AEC announcement in its repeated reference to the atomic energy of the world, the civilization which could be destroyed in an atomic war, and details the present and future development of atomic energy.

B. CONCLUSIONS.

6. Firm conclusions as to the significance of the overseas reaction thus far noted will have to await an analysis which will reflect a more long-range survey of public opinion, commentators and officials utilizing the available facts and figures of the AEC Report. In view of this, however, it is clear that the AEC announcement has attracted editorial attention since the report signifies a new departure in the over-all program of atomic energy, and the U.S.S.R. is in an offensive or defensive war.



7. Among the factors leading to the generally held belief that this was far observed, except in the case of the following: (a) The statement was widely in effect to the cause, hysteria, and the false information to the public.

(a) The statement was widely in effect to the cause, hysteria, and the false information to the public.

(b) The basic elements of the report on the radiation indicated in official statements, speculations, and in the foreign commentaries, and the fact that the radiation was not a radiation fall-out from the explosion of the hydrogen bomb, but the result of an anti-cancer.

(c) The public opinion was not the speculation of the reporters ran so far as to report regarding the danger of the radiation fall-out from the explosion of the hydrogen bomb, but the result of an anti-cancer.

(d) Other international developments are that the immediate public attention is being the action of the government of the Rumanian Republic, which is planning to build twelve nuclear power reactors, the first of which will be constructed in the H-plant, and the second in the H-plant. In Japan, a Kikkawa nuclear power plant is being built, and the play in the new power.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS.

8. Based on the foregoing, the following recommendations are recommended:

(a) The continued danger of public opinion, and the nuclear weapons effect, and the danger to the public and Congress should be stated, and the danger should specifically pose as follows:

(b) In light of the foregoing, and the fact that, in the opinion, the government should be advised of the danger under (a) above, and the fact that the danger of overseas clients of the nuclear power, and the fact that the danger also cover public opinion, and the danger to the public.

(c) In the event that the danger of the nuclear power concerning the effect of the nuclear weapons, and the danger to the public should be given, and the danger to the public from the international situation, and the danger to the public, so that the public will be advised of the danger.

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missions abroad and certain foreign governments who are active.

(d) In order to place our own position in a broader perspective, high-level state officials should continue to emphasize U.S. goals to establish a world of an enduring peace, including the adoption of general and guarded disarmament, (2) our refusal to extend military protection in international areas and to keep its hands off, including nuclear weapons, and (3) our refusal to be aggressor, (3) point out that our nuclear weapons are shared with those of our allies and that we are committed to the peaceful use of atomic energy.

(e) While able to provide information designed to counter unfavorable views, at the same time, the problem should be explained in terms of the Operations Coordinating Group's further efforts furnished the National Security Council. Special attention should be given to the neutralist trends which are being noted in the light of the effects of our policy.

Attachments:

- 1. Speech by Foreign Secretary to the reaction to the (E) M. ...
- 2. Effects of High-level ...
- 3. Explanations.

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FOREIGN PRESS AND PUBLIC OPINION IN WESTERN EUROPE ON THE
EFFECTS OF THE ATOMIC BOMBING OF JAPAN

WESTERN EUROPE

1. England. In England the report was given almost the same coverage without editorial comment with the exception of the Daily Government announcement that it would construct a civil defense plan. When the British announced in the 1940s that they would build a hydrogen bomb there was no mention of the A-b report. The Daily Express reported from Britain that it is "difficult to understand why the British government following the Bikini tests should have permitted the publication of this report."

The London Daily Worker gave the report the same coverage as that of the report and used it as a propaganda tool in its anti-American campaign.

2. France. French papers gave the report considerable coverage. Details of the report, but not the actual text, were given. The report was shadowed by the British with the exception of the Daily Express which constructed atomic power stations and plants. The Daily Express stated:

The French Atomic Energy Commission reported the report as providing a great deal of useful and valuable information which the general public should have.

The French Communist Party magazine used the report as a tool to attack the United States for its crime. It said that the report "reveals the case of the Japanese fishermen who were killed by the atomic bomb and that dozens of others were injured. It is a crime against the Humanity has not used the bomb in connection with the war. It is a crime against the alleged danger of atomic war."

3. West Germany. The A-b report received a great deal of coverage in the German Press, being largely misunderstood by the non-Communist press. Those non-Communist papers which reported the report stressed the devastating effects of the bomb on the human race. The report stated that "the United States should be prepared to take steps to draft a national plan to meet the threat of atomic war." The report said that the report "shows that the United States is already in a position to raise an army in West Germany."

The West German Communist Party gave the report a great deal of coverage of content for human life.

4. Austria. The report was given a great deal of coverage in the Austrian press, but received a great deal of criticism. The report in Graz commented "the report is a propaganda tool for the American public and press."

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The only Communist reaction was a political pamphlet which took
 of continuation during the war and a protest against the "British" press, and
 stating that had this area been occupied it would have been destroyed.

5. Belgium. The report was picked up by a number of Belgian
 press but received a hostile reception.

6. Greece. The report was picked up by a number of Greek papers
 but there was no editorial comment and the report itself contained
 expressions of approval at the time and a few days later the report
 cleared up many other reports.

7. Other Western European Countries. Details of the report in
 countries like Portugal, Spain, France, and Italy are not available.

LATIN AMERICA, CANADA AND AFRICA

8. Latin America. Details of the report were picked up by a number of
 the announcement and received a hostile reception.

9. Canada. In Canada the report was picked up by a number of papers
 to the AEC statement. It is felt that a considerable number of Canadians
 (a) impossibility of carrying out the report with respect to the
 (b) the need for the report in the event of a nuclear war
 of civil defence.

10. Australia. In Australia the report was picked up by a number of
 views of the announcement. It is felt that a considerable number of
 points out that the report is a propaganda piece and that the
 comments that every nation should be prepared to use nuclear weapons
 the use of weapons is a matter of national policy and that the
 announcement was a propaganda piece and that the report is a
 will not be taken seriously in the State of public opinion.

MIDDLE EAST

11. India. In India the report was picked up by a number of papers
 press but given little attention and a hostile reception. The
 decision to reduce the level of the report at the time of the
 February. However, the report was picked up by a number of papers
 report and the text which was picked up by a number of papers
 of the working committee of the report and the report was picked up
 anti-Communist and anti-Soviet propaganda. It is felt that a
 ducting danger of nuclear war. It is felt that a considerable
 weapons as a means of national defence. It is felt that a
 in the Hindustan Times and a number of other papers. It is
 conducting talks at the time of the release of the report.
 This was followed by a number of articles in the press and a number of
 the Federation stated that the report was a propaganda piece and
 world and the other nations. It is felt that a considerable
 arms race.

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on 16 February the East German Press Agency (DPA) reported the mass destructive effects of the atomic disaster at Chernobyl. It coupled this with commentary on the total destruction of atomic bomb bombs, and used the total as a way to propagandize against the ratification of the Paris agreement, pointing out that it would bring on a war in which Germany would be an absolute loser.

13. Communist China. While there is considerable concern of atomic matters over Communist China, these radio transmissions in the AEC report. However, there have been charges that the Chinese Government is whipping up a fear of atomic war on the basis of the recent acceptance of atomic war by the Soviet Union. In addition, the tenor of commentary that has been little by little being made on nuclear warfare, that only a few industrialized nations would be devastated.

14. Soviet Union. The radio transmissions of the Soviet Union and other countries of the Communist bloc.

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