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MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESS:

The attached statements were released to the press in Honolulu, T. H. at 5 PM (EDT) today at a press conference held by the following:

Lieutenant General John E. Hull, USA,
Commander, Joint Task Force Seven

Captain James S. Russell, USN,
Test Director, Joint Task Force Seven

Doctor Darol K. Froman,
Scientific Director, Joint Task Force Seven.

These statements are being made available for information of the press.

STATEMENT OF LIEUT. GENERAL JOHN E. HULL, COMMANDER, JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN, AT PRESS CONFERENCE, HQ., USARPAC, FORT SHAFTER, T. H., 18 MAY 1948.

Joint Task Force Seven has successfully completed its mission as assigned by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This mission was dual in character. First, it was the mission of the Task Force to construct an atomic energy proving ground for the Atomic Energy Commission at Eniwetok. Secondly, it was required that we assist the AEC in the conduct of the first series of tests of atomic weapons during the months of April and May.

The Task Force had completed the construction of the proving ground by April, in time to permit the conduct of the tests as scheduled. In general, this involved the construction and rehabilitation of housing and living facilities for the scientific group and for troops. Installation of utilities, water, power, and communications was required. Fortunately, we were able to use existing structures, left over from the war, mostly quonset-type buildings, at the proving ground for housing personnel and for storage and work shops; after repairs, of course. Some equipment was repairable, for instance refrigerating equipment. Considerable savings resulted from these efforts. It was necessary to repair air strips to permit the landing of heavy planes including C-54's, B-29's and B-17's. Landing facilities for small water craft had to be provided, although cargo had to be off-loaded on lighters from the transport ships.

Construction of the actual testing ground involved special construction for the placement of various scientific instruments and test equipment.

These tests had no kinship to the Bikini tests, the purpose of which was to test the effect on naval equipment and other materials as well as animal and marine life. In the words of the directive given to the Commander of Joint Task Force One, the purpose of the Bikini test was to determine "the effects of atomic explosives against naval vessels in order to appraise the strategic implications of atomic bombs including the results on naval design and tactics." We did not conduct the postponed underwater test Charlie.

The tests of Operation Sandstone were literally and truly field laboratory tests, designed to determine how the bombs now under development by the United States would work and to determine their efficiency. We did just that. We got our answers. We liked the answers. These answers belong to the United States Government and, naturally, are not for publication. It can be said, however, that the bombs worked. We have proved the weapon-development work done by the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory during the past two years.

This job which we have just completed was begun on 3 April 1947 when the General Advisory Committee of the Atomic Energy Commission concurred in the recommendation of the Los Alamos

Scientific Laboratory that tests of certain new designs of weapons be conducted in 1948. The Commission requested and received the President's approval to go ahead with the program in June, 1947.

In September, 1947, preparations had progressed to the point where formation of a Joint Task Force was directed. Joint Task Force Seven actually came into being on 18 October 1947.

As a military organization, Joint Task Force Seven is unique. It was organized along the lines of our best war-time experience, but there was an additional element. As a part of the organization we had a Task Group which was essentially civilian in makeup. This was the Scientific Group which conducted the actual tests and which recorded and is still analyzing the results. Captain Russell, who is Deputy Director of the Division of Military Application of the AEC, headed this Task Group as Test Director, and Doctor Darol K. Froman, as Scientific Director for the Proving Ground, headed the Task Unit of scientists within the Task Group. Through Captain Russell, the scientific unit operated technically under the AEC. This Task Group, by common consent, did not work through my staff. The channels between Captain Russell, Dr. Froman and myself were direct. Dr. Alvin C. Graves served as Deputy Director to Dr. Froman and Mr. Robert W. Henderson and Dr. John C. Clark were Assistant Scientific Directors--all from the Los Alamos Laboratory.

The operation of Joint Task Force Seven, thus organized, was the ultimate in integrated effort and embodied our present-day concept of preparedness--this is the concept we are currently teaching at the National War College--the integrated effort of the Armed Forces with civilian scientists and other specialized civilian elements.

It is a tribute to the scientists who were members of the Task Force that the Operation was successful. The mixing of civilian and military elements in the past sometimes has reacted like oil and water. Joint Task Force Seven was a unified team. Successful accomplishment of its mission was the result of an integrated effort. Much credit for this accomplishment is due Dr. Froman. It has been a real pleasure to have been associated with him on this project.

I am sorry that Dr. Norris E. Bradbury, Director of the Los Alamos Laboratory is not here, but I want to say for his benefit that if the men under Doctor Froman are typical of the Los Alamos organization, the research and development in the field of nuclear weapons is in good hands.

All of us have been equally impressed with the scientific competence, the technical skill, and the sound judgment of the civilian scientists and technicians assembled for these tests. Our close association has been valuable in many respects and, I am sure, paves the way for a continuing and increasing cooperative effort to insure the common defense and security of the people of the United States.

The military staff of Joint Task Force Seven included Rear Admiral William S. Parsons, USN, and Major General William E. Kepner, USAF, as Deputy Commanders. General Kepner also served as Commander Air Forces, Joint Task Force Seven. Brigadier General Claude B. Ferenbaugh was Chief of Staff.

Naval units of the Joint Task Force were commanded by Rear Admiral Francis C. Denebrink. Brigadier General David A. D. Ogden, USA, commanded Army units of the Task Force and Major General Roger M. Ramey, USAF, was in command of Air Force units under the overall direction of General Kepner.

The major portion of the Joint Task Force sailed from Pearl Harbor on 8 March in ships of the Naval Task Group. Flagship of the force was the command ship USS Mount McKinley, veteran of the Pacific war and of the Bikini atomic tests. The four ships of the convoy had aboard the principal participants, both scientific and military. Construction of the proving ground had been commenced in late December 1947 by General Ogden's Army units, in accordance with plans developed in coordination with the Scientific Group. Some of our construction was performed by civilian contract.

One of the most extensive construction projects was that of signal communication. Both radio and telephone service was required. Nearly 1,000,000 feet of submarine cable was laid under direction of the U. S. Coast Guard.

Incidentally, it might interest you to know that within the Task Force in addition to the Scientific personnel from the AEC's Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory at New Mexico, and many other parts of the country, we had engaged at different periods during the preparation for and conduct of the tests personnel from the Army, Navy, including Marines, Air Force, Coast Guard, Public Health Service, Coast and Geodetic Survey, civilian employees from the different Services and civilians working under contract. Consequently, upon arrival of the main body of the Task Force, the scientific group was able to commence its preparations immediately.

During the period of construction and preparation for the tests some 50,000 measurement tons of material, supplies and equipment were shipped from the mainland and from Oahu to the test area. Some of this was shipped by air although the bulk, of course, went by water.

It was decided at the outset that the most economical means of mounting the operation would be to utilize the existing administrative and logistical channels of the three Services. Primarily, these Channels were Commander in Chief, Pacific, and Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet; U. S. Army, Pacific; Pacific Air Command; the Pacific Division, Air Transport Command; and the Naval Air Transport Service. We also had the services of the Western Ocean Division, Corps of Engineers, Department of the Army, at Sausalito, California; the Naval Supply Centers at Oakland and Port Hueneme, California, and at Pearl Harbor; and the San Francisco and Seattle Ports of Embarkation.

The overall strength of the Joint Task Force was approximately 9,800 including civilian personnel.

Observers of the tests were limited in the extreme, since it was the view of all agencies that only those who had actual need for the knowledge should attend. These observers included members of the Joint Congressional Committee for Atomic Energy and its staff, the AEC and the Armed Forces. No other observers were permitted.

To sum up, aside from the value of the tests themselves, the Operation was one of great profit to the Armed Forces. Valuable training in joint operations was gained--training almost impossible to get in peacetime, and generally, all too limited to most members of the military services. Such experience is invaluable in fostering integration within the Services.

So much for the general picture. I'm now going to ask Captain Russell, the Test Director, and Dr. Froman, the Scientific Director, to make a few remarks. I know you will be interested in what they say as, after all, although these tests were tests of military weapons, the tests were conducted by the Scientific Group headed by Dr. Froman. After they have finished, we will endeavor to answer such questions as you may have in mind insofar as we can do so. You realize, of course, that much of the information is of the category of classified data under the Atomic Energy Act and the Espionage Act and none of us is at liberty to answer questions pertaining to the technical aspects of the test or their results.

General Kepner of the Air Forces and Admiral Parsons of the Navy, both of whom were Deputies to the Commander of Joint Task Force Seven are also here today. As stated earlier, General Kepner was also in command of the Air Forces participating. It may be that you will wish to question them.

I have had copies of these notes from which I spoke made and you are welcome to a copy if you desire one. If you wish to quote any of my remarks, I suggest you quote them from the notes. They are written out to such an extent that this can be done. I stand behind any quotation that you may wish to make from the notes, and you are at liberty to use all or part of them in such manner.

I am now going to turn this discussion over to Captain Russell and Doctor Froman.

STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN JAMES S. RUSSELL, USN, TEST DIRECTOR, JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN, AT PRESS CONFERENCE, HEADQUARTERS, USARPAC, FORT SHAFTER, T.H., MAY 18, 1948.

On behalf of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, I wish to acknowledge the outstanding contribution to progress in the development of atomic weapons which General Hull has made as Commander Joint Task Force Seven.

Joint Task Force Seven was formed because the scope of operations at the Commission's Proving Ground at Eniwetok required the assistance and services of all Departments of the National Military Establishment. Joint Task Force Seven provided the command structure, the military and internal security, the means for an overseas movement to a base 4500 miles from the mainland, the construction force, and the operating force for the Eniwetok Proving Ground. Not only was it a completely unified operation of the Army, Navy, and Air Force including the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, but it was a combined operation of military personnel and civilian scientists and technicians of the Atomic Energy Commission and its contractors.

The support given to the AEC Proving Ground Group which conducted the tests was complete, and without the assistance of military personnel in the technical phases of the operations, the test program could not have been carried out.

The successful completion of this test program is a triumph for the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, where weapon development work for the Commission is carried on. It is also a triumph for Dr. Darol K. Froman and the remarkable scientific and technical staff which he assembled for these tests. Again on behalf of the Atomic Energy Commission, I wish to congratulate Doctor Froman and his staff.

As Test Director for the Commission, I want to pay tribute to the work of Dr. Alvin C. Graves as Deputy Scientific Director under Doctor Froman and to Colonel Paul T. Peruss, USAF, as Deputy Test Director.

In order to understand the importance of the operations of Joint Task Force Seven it is necessary only to consider the reasons why these tests were held. During the period of wartime development of atomic energy, the one goal relentlessly pursued was the creation of an atomic bomb which would work - - and work in time to be effective in World War II. It had only to work; it needed not to be too efficient, and the related problems of engineering and production were dealt with in the urgency of wartime conditions.

The bomb did work. It worked initially at Alamagordo, N.M., where the first test took place on July 16, 1945. It worked again at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, then the following year at Bikini.

But all of these weapons, as far as their state of development is concerned, were about on a par. They were the wartime weapon -- designed under extreme pressure and without regard for many problems which in the long run are of great importance in the military application of atomic energy.

In its January Report to Congress, the Atomic Energy Commission said its goal in the field of weapon development was the scientific and engineering perfection of improved designs, and that thorough testing of weapons and components is necessary to improved design.

In any program of developing and producing weapons, the need for proof testing, or for conducting full scale experiments, is natural and obvious. Failure to test new developments would soon throttle the design of improved weapons. America's preeminence in the field of atomic weapons is not a static thing, it depends upon achievement -- day to day, year to year, and test to test achievement.

( Note to correspondents: If Captain Russell is to be quoted, please use remarks as contained in this statement.)

STATEMENT OF DR. DAROL K. FROMAN, SCIENTIFIC DIRECTOR, JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN, AT PRESS CONFERENCE, HEADQUARTERS, USARPAC, FORT SHAFTER, T.H., MAY 18, 1948

General Hull and Captain Russel have outlined the historical background leading up to the 1948 program of atomic weapon tests and the organization of the Task Force which was formed to carry out the program. Although the tests were conducted by a combined military and civilian team, Joint Task Force Seven is a military organization with a great majority of its personnel from the Armed Forces. However, the spirit of cooperation which existed between the military and civilian personnel resulted in the smoothest possible operation. Throughout the whole life of the Joint Task Force, there has not been a single incident which impeded any test or measurement and which arose from the rather great differences between military and civilian philosophies and methods of operation. The mixing was really very intimate; for example, most of the technical sections were staffed with both civilians and members of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project.

A year ago, I would not have believed such a pleasant and successful working relationship could be achieved, and I believe now that it resulted in this case from the broad understanding and wisdom of General Hull. He has set a standard for all future integrated projects involving the Armed Forces and civilian groups. To have been a member of his organization has been a most pleasant experience for me personally, and I believe for all the civilians of the Task Force.

The Task Unit responsible for carrying out technical operations and making Scientific measurements was part of the Task Group commanded by Captain Russell. Captain Russell also represented the Atomic Energy Commission as Test Director. Only his wide and intimate knowledge of the organization, activities, and technical work of the Commission, and of military operations - particularly naval and air operations - made it possible for us to do the job required. Since the beginning of this project, Captain Russell and I have worked very closely together. We have even shared the same room for the past three months. We are now nearing the end of one of those rare experiences which someone as lucky as I sometimes finds and which marks a highlight in one's life.

The Deputy Commanders of the Task Force, Major General W. E. Kepner, USAF, and Rear Admiral W. S. Parsons, USN, were of great assistance throughout the operations. General Kepner's intimate knowledge of so many phases of air operations contributed directly to the success of our more important experiments, and Admiral Parsons' wide experience and understanding in the field of military applications of atomic energy were of the greatest value.

The test program just completed at the Eniwetok Proving Ground involved a series of nuclear explosions, carried out under conditions as close to laboratory control as we could make them, and with very extensive instrumentation.

The technical and experimental work really fell into two categories. As General Hull has said, the purpose of these tests was not to find the effects of atomic explosions on materiel and equipment as at Bikini. Yet, since the detonations were to be made, several agencies of the Armed Forces carried out tests of this kind. Many of these tests were not very extensive and, in general, they were designed to fill in gaps in the knowledge gained at Bikini. These tests were successful in the sense that the desired data were obtained.

The second category of tests and experiments was designed to answer questions arising in connection with the military applications of atomic energy. The program for this work was laid out at the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory. It was quickly realized, however, that if all the technical personnel required were drawn from that laboratory, other very important work would suffer seriously. The problem was solved by forming a skeleton organization at Los Alamos, consisting of one expert in each phase of the technical work. In some cases, where the work of the Laboratory would not be too badly impeded, scientists and technicians were drawn from the Los Alamos staff to carry out certain technical operations under these experts acting as section leaders. In other cases the University of California, which operates the Los Alamos Laboratory for the Commission, made contracts with outside agencies. In these cases the Los Alamos experts filled liaison positions.

The technical work, in which naturally I have the most interest, has received the very best support from both the Atomic Energy Commission Headquarters in Washington and the Los Alamos Laboratory. In fact, one of the Commissioners, Dr. Robert F. Bacher, spent about three weeks with us Eniwetok. During this time he contributed very significantly to the success of the operation by assisting with the interpretation of the data. Also, Dr. N. E. Bradbury, Director of the Los Alamos Laboratory, spent an even longer time in the field with us doing similar work.

Dr. Alvin C. Graves as Deputy Scientific Director, and Mr. R. W. Henderson and Dr. John C. Clark as Assistant Scientific Directors - all from the Los Alamos Laboratory - have formed a highly qualified committee making scientific and technical decisions on what to do and how to do it. It has been a great personal satisfaction to me to be so closely associated with these men and I have the highest regard for the ability of each of them. Dr. Graves and I have worked so closely for several years we each have learned how the other thinks. It was easy to learn since we think alike, and when Graves does a job, I always feel that it has been done as I would have done it but just a little bit better.

You understand, of course, that I am strictly limited in what I can say about the details of the conduct of the tests and about the scientific results. I am going to tell you as much as possible now, then when we have questions we will limit ourselves to the non-scientific aspects of the operation. If I am to be quoted, I would appreciate it if you would quote directly from these notes. There are some copies available for you.

The ultimate purpose of the tests was to insure efficient utilization of the national resources required for the development and application of atomic energy. Captain Russell has suggested to you that the Los Alamos Laboratory had developed new weapon designs. It is obvious that a research and development program of any nature cannot long be fruitful if the product of the program never gets tested. If the nation elects to develop and manufacture atomic weapons, these weapons must be tested. Unlike other bombs, however, the cost in actual cash, man hours and natural resources is quite high for each weapon. Moreover, the physical processes going on during the explosion of an atomic bomb are very complicated. For these reasons, development and improvement of atomic weapons cannot be carried on by the common methods of making small changes in current models and proof-testing after each change.

A very great deal of physical research and mathematical analysis goes into the plans of an atomic weapon. Therefore, tests of the kind we have just completed are designed primarily to provide experimental data necessary for a better understanding of the process of nuclear explosion and necessary to form a sound basis for improved design of weapons. Certainly such tests do include proof-firing new models of weapons, but the model types must be selected carefully in order to make information obtained from one test supplementary to that obtained from another. A well planned series of atomic weapon tests can yield much more information than an equal number of unrelated single tests.

Proof-tests of new models often can be carried out under conditions that make it possible to attain secondary, but important objectives. Without interference with the primary objective, much information can be gained which is useful in the peaceful applications of atomic energy.

We have not had time to tabulate and analyze but a small portion of the experimental data obtained in these tests. Yet, what we have learned already would have been enough to make the tests profitable. We are very pleased with the results. Our tests were not successful merely because the weapons we used exploded with a loud bang. They were successful because the weapons did explode and we obtained good experimental data which will guide us in research and development in the future.

One of the most gratifying results of the entire operation has been the confirmation of the large body of ideas, theories and methods which have grown out of the theoretical and experimental work done since the war at the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory.