

~~SECRET~~

This document consists of 3 pages
5 8 A

UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

October 27, 1947

Dec Dec 146

REPOSITORY NARA - College Park
COLLECTION RB 326 46-51 Secretary
BOX No. 109 (NN3-326-93-007)
FOLDER 471.6 (4-21-47)
Sandstone Vol. 1

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:
THROUGH: THE MILITARY LIAISON COMMITTEE.
SUBJECT: REPORT OF THE JOINT PROOF TEST COMMITTEE.

409593

1. Reference is made to Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum SM 9078 of October 18, 1947, which incloses a report by the Joint Proof Test Committee. Subject to the comments below, the Atomic Energy Commission concurs in the recommendations contained in paragraphs 16 a. and 16 b. of that report. The Commission has also taken note of the other recommendations of paragraph 16.

R

2. The following comments are intended to clarify the Commission's understanding of certain points in the paper. It is not our intention that the presentation of these comments be allowed in any way to delay progress in implementing the plan. We suggest that the Task Force Commander be informed of these comments in the interest of clear understanding in his relationships with the Commission's Test Director, and we would appreciate hearing from the Joint Chiefs of Staff in due course as to whether any of the points made below are unacceptable to the Armed Forces. For your information, the Commission is today requesting the Secretary of the Treasury to transfer an additional \$15,000,000 to the Navy Department, completing the \$20,000,000 which you have estimated as the incremental cost of Armed Forces participation in the test. The Secretary of Defense is being informed.

cc: Sumner T. Pike, Actg Chairman

18-27-47

3. Comments:

a. With reference to the recommendation in paragraph 16 a., the Commission assumes that the Task Force Commander would not set a time of firing which would be unsatisfactory to the Test Director.

b. The Commission agrees to the principle for reimbursement for shipping as set forth in paragraph 1 a. (8) (a) of Enclosure "B", although noting that this principle departs from the general pattern of cooperation for other logistical support from the Services. The point is mentioned here for two reasons. First, the stipulation appears

(for the record)

CLASSIFICATION CANCELED
DOE NOT DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW E.O. 12958
BY: ADELE WILLIAMS DOE/NN-523

WAO 7/22/48

SECRET

6401/4942/17/39

to conflict with the provision of paragraph 1 b. (7) of the same enclosure. Second, the inference could be drawn from paragraph 1 of Appendix "D" to Enclosure "H" that there is in fact no Army shipping available to support this cooperative venture, except by substitution. If this inference is correct, it is suggested that the use of other shipping might be considered in the interest of over-all economy to the Government.

c. The Commission notes that Enclosure "B" provides that the Atomic Energy Commission will be charged for over-seas pay of military personnel resulting from this project. Discussions with fiscal personnel of the military establishment have indicated that it would be difficult and costly to separate these charges from the pay accounts of such personnel. In the interest of over-all Government economy, it therefore appears desirable to alter this requirement.

d. With reference to the security provisions in Enclosure "C", arrangements have gone forward between the security organizations of the Commission and of the Task Force, and it is understood that these arrangements will be incorporated in the more detailed plans of the Task Force Commander.

e. The Commission assumes that the functions in paragraphs 6 and 7 of Enclosure "C", with reference to information for public release, will be coordinated in Washington and all public releases will be cleared jointly between the Secretary of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission.

f. With reference to paragraph 6 of the basic paper and paragraph 5 of Enclosure "C", the Commission takes note that the downgrading of any atomic energy "restricted data" will be accomplished only by the Atomic Energy Commission and is in complete agreement that intelligent downgrading of information from time to time will be essential to the success of the operation. However, it is pointed out that at present the date and place of the test are beyond the authority of either the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Atomic Energy Commission to downgrade.

g. With reference to the first sentence of paragraph 1 of Enclosure "E", it is pointed out that the Scientific Director will have to assume responsibility in emergency for allowable exposure to radiation of scientific personnel of his organization, as in the gathering of test data after the explosion.

h. With reference to paragraph 2 of Enclosure "H", the Commission notes that it is expected to furnish all technical supplies, material, and equipment not an article of issue in any service required for the conduct of the tests. It may be advantageous for the military establishment to furnish some of the supplies, equipment, and material in this category. We therefore suggest that there should be further discussion on the staff level on the details of carrying out this task.

U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION:

Sumner T. Pike
Acting Chairman