

June 14, 1957

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Discussion at NSC Meeting  
of the National Security Council,  
Thursday, June 14, 1957

EYES ONLY

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Present at the NSC meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; Deputy Secretary Quarles for the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Special Assistant to the President for Management; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (participating in Item 1); the Director, U. S. Information Agency; the Director, International Cooperation Administration; Assistant Secretary of State, Senior Assistant Secretary of Defense, League, Captain John H. Warner, Jr., USN, Atomic Energy Commission (for Item 1); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; and several Assistants to the President, including the Special Assistant to the House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion, its results, and the main points taken.


1. TYPES OF NUCLEAR WEAPON.  
(NSC Action No. 1777-1)

Mr. Cutler pointed out that at the NSC meeting on May 27, the President had asked Admiral Strauss to "make a presentation of the types of nuclear weapons produced or being developed by size of yield, and the approximate percentage of each type in the stockpile." Admiral Strauss had made his presentation to the President and most of the members of the Council on May 30. The NSC Secretariat last week. At that time the Secretary of State had indicated that he would like to return to the subject for further discussion at a later time. In addition to the presentation to the President, Mr. Cutler said that Admiral Strauss had briefed the NSC staff and other members of the staff and had not returned to the NSC just prior to this morning's meeting. The presentation had also been made to the NSC Planning Staff. Mr. Cutler said that Admiral Strauss would now like to present briefly to the NSC the use of nuclear weapons, and that he would like to discuss any questions.

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Admiral Strauss emphasized that the concept of limited use of nuclear weapons had arisen in his mind as a result of particular questions directed to him earlier by the Secretary of State. Admiral Strauss went on to point out that public opinion in the world today mostly considers nuclear weapons to be indiscriminate in character and capacity for destruction, and that there are good reasons likely to induce general nuclear war. The Soviets rather than encourage this illusion since, if nuclear weapons were to be tactically used, the Soviets would enjoy the great military advantage of their superiority in manpower. Thus, if the United States were to abstain from the use of nuclear weapons we might well be unable to respond to Communist aggression. It was therefore essential that the American public come to understand that the United States does possess tactical nuclear weapons, and that they can be used in military operations without causing indiscriminate devastation.



Admiral Strauss replied that we judged, from the tests so far detected in the Soviet Union, that the Soviets were manifesting no interest in the so-called atomic weapons. On the other hand, they have not as yet tested any large nuclear weapons. In fact, the largest detected to date was of about 7 megatons.

Mr. Allen Dulles pointed out that it was not possible that the Soviets faced either severe problems in the matter of testing very large weapons, because they had no completely empty space equivalent to our Pacific testing grounds at Bikini or Eniwetok. In short, if they were to test weapons of very great magnitude they might find it necessary to move whole populations. Chairman Stassen pointed out that in his speech about May 1, Khrushchev had claimed that the Soviet Union had tested a side war type of nuclear weapons.

The President inquired about the claim recently made by the Soviets that they had manufactured a nuclear bomb which was so big that they did not dare to set it off. Governor Stassen indicated that this claim derived from a rumor about a speech that Marshal Zhukov had made to some foreign journalists.

Turning to Admiral Radford, the President expressed great doubt as to whether it was possible to blow up concrete pillboxes by the use of atomic weapons. Admiral Radford agreed that this was doubtful, but pointed out that we had alternate means for attacking such fortifications, as, for example, napalm bombs. However, he said, with our present atomic capabilities we would support our forces to be held up by the use of pillboxes. It was not perfectly simple to go around them.

The National Security Council:

Discussed the subject in the light of our own position as the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, and in regard to NSC Action 10, 11, 12, 13.

2. SIGNIFICANT WORLD NEWS WHICH IS APPARENTLY WORTH REPORTING

The Director of Central Intelligence said that we are first deal with developments in the Middle East. Of late years, Masera had lost a great deal of ground and standing in the world. King Saud was still in power. King Hussein had also broken diplomatic relations with Iraq following his expulsion of Egyptian diplomats from Jordan. . . .

..... Nevertheless, until Mr. Dulles, we cannot but worry about Nasser's possible reaction to these recent reverses. We believe that he is still plotting, in concert with King Saud and King Hussein, and others, to gain a foothold in the Middle East.

Meanwhile, President Nuri of Syria has been visiting in Egypt. It is not clear what was transpired in the course of this visit. There are, however, indications of further Syrian rapprochement with Iraq. With regard to the recent resignation of the government of Nuri Said in Iraq, Mr. Dulles predicted that Nuri would probably be persuaded to resume the office of Prime Minister. There seemed no particular sense in Nuri's resignation, especially since he was for a rest.

Secretary Dulles broke in to comment that the recent days Nasser had grown increasingly bitter, and that he was blaming the United States in general and Secretary Dulles in particular for everything that had gone wrong. This was illustrated by Nasser's article in Look Magazine. Nasser's attitude seemed to Secretary Dulles to be rather ironical, in view of the direction of U.S. policy when Egypt was invaded last November, although, admittedly, the prime motivation of our actions last autumn was not to destroy or to divide the friendship of Nasser and of Egypt.

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Turning to Lebanon, Mr. Dulles reported the first of the four successive Sundays the electors had turned out to vote for the pro-Western candidates.

With regard to Israel, Mr. Dulles pointed out that on June 7 the first Israeli flag vessel had loaded at Eilat with little publicity and fanfare. Meanwhile, one or two oil tankers, vessels chartered to the Israelis, have quietly sailed through the Canal.

Mr. Dulles then turned from the Middle East to the situation in Algeria, which he described as very, very serious, with serious clashes highlighted by the massacre of 200 Algerian men and boys by the Algerian nationalists. This strike by the Algerian counter incidents in the north of Algiers. The situation in Algeria was on the upswing.



3. U. S. POLICY TOWARD KOREA

(NSC 5514; NSC 5510; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "U. S. Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea", dated October 12 and November 1, 1950; NSC Action Memorandum, NSC 5500 and 1695; NSC 5702; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Evaluation of Alternative Military Programs in Korea", dated January 30, 1951; NSC 5702/1; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Policy Toward Korea", dated February 10, 1951 and June 12, 1951 (NSC 5702/1-1))

Mr. Butler briefed the Council on NSC 5702 with particular reference to the revised paragraphs 9, 10 and 11, copies of which were handed out to the members of the Council. (Copy of briefing note filed in the minutes of the meeting.) Mr. Butler also distributed the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on these and other paragraphs in NSC 5702/1. After indicating that it had still been possible for the Planning Board to present agreed recommendations on the modernization of U. S. forces in Korea, the Council discussed the subject and the Joint Chiefs of Staff's views on the subject. The Council then adjourned for comment.

Secretary Dulles said that the State Department agreed that at the earliest possible date a statement should be made to the appropriate UN authority that, in view of Communist violation of the Korean Armistice Agreement, the United States proposed and desired to exercise greater flexibility in the armaments maintained in South Korea. In this point, at least, there was no dispute between State and Defense. Thereafter, however, we came to the second phase. What, precisely, do we do to implement the policy set forth in the public statement referred to above? We in the State Department, and indeed Secretary Dulles, were inclined to feel that it would be more preferable if we could confine our efforts to South Korea to limiting weapons (both conventional and nuclear). It was felt that the United States should not put into foreign territory any weapons which would be difficult to control. There was some discussion of the degree of difficulty. In particular, Secretary Dulles mentioned the fact that these huge 230 mm. guns, for which it was necessary to use the roads and bridges so that the guns could be transported, had been used to stand why in the world it was essential that we should not build these great monsters around our own base, to advertise the worst use of such huge weapons as they would be bound to cause in various circumstances for the United States throughout Asia. It was felt that such weapons to Korea would be regarded throughout Asia because they were identified with the West and with the policy of white supremacy, quite apart from the weapons themselves.



ever, we had five or six machine guns in Germany, and they were proving useful, even though they were now five or six years old and would gradually be replaced. Secretary Quarles asked what the technical sense both the 230 mm gun and the Honest John rocket could be described as dual-purpose weapons. . . .

Governor Stassen passed a note to Secretary Dulles, who then pointed out the possible threat of some counter-attack by the Soviets or the Chinese Communists if such weapons were introduced.

Secretary Quarles commented that the position of the Department of Defense could be summarized in the following terms. The Department felt that we must move into this field as very promptly if any changes were to be made in the existing levels of the ROK armed forces. Far from wishing to reduce them, but we divisions, the ROKs wish to increase their active divisions. Accordingly, it would be wise for the United States to prepare a three-hand in modernizing its former Japanese forces with appropriate weapons, if we hope to bargain with the ROK for the transfer of their own forces.

Secretary Murphy said that what really bothered him was what we thought we saw in the need in Korea. It was to go on spending \$600 million a year in assistance to South Korea for the rest of our natural lives. Secretary Quarles replied that the outlook was certainly not very promising, but that there might be any better course of action unless a settlement could be reached.

Mr. Cutler indicated that the reduction of the ROK active divisions, as set forth in the package deal in NSC 5402, was only the first step. It was hoped that further reductions could be achieved later and, in any event, a reduction by the ROK of its active divisions would result in savings to the United States of \$1 billion over a period of four years. Secretary Dulles and Secretary Murphy commented that they thought this sort of a deal would have very great significance.

Admiral Radford expressed surprise that Secretary Murphy would scorn a saving of \$1 billion. Admiral Radford went on to state that the Council might be somewhat confused as to precisely what the Joint Chiefs of Staff had in mind in suggesting the package deal set forth in NSC 5402. The United States, he pointed out, has some 60,000 troops in Korea, four two divisions are on a front line which stretched for 150 miles. Except for the 1st Airborne Brigade, there were practically no other UN troops in the North, as the Secretary of State had pointed out in his report to the House.

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..... would eventually stop any Communist invasion of South Korea, the Communist offensive be stopped before they had overrun the 50,000 U. S. troops. Hence, the Joint Chiefs of Staff felt that defensive forces should actually be in place in South Korea to protect the security of their own U. S. troops and to prevent them from being overrun in the initial phases of a Communist offensive. Moreover, from the point of view of the ROKs themselves, their capital, Seoul, was only 30 miles distant from the front lines, and since this capital had already been overrun three times, the ROKs were only too well aware that it could be overrun once again. As a result, the ROKs did not feel much safer if the invasion routes into South Korea were cut off by a defensive .....

Secondly, said Admiral Radford, we do not actually know precisely what the R. K. authorities will agree to in way of a reduction of their own forces. We think they will agree to reduce their 20 active divisions by four, and they might be willing to eliminate these four divisions which would reduce the total R. K. forces to 16 active divisions and 10 reserve divisions. We might be able eventually to reduce even more. General Lennitzer, for example, thought that at some future time we might induce the ROKs to reduce to a level of 10 active and 10 reserve divisions. But on the other hand, our Number One reason for wanting to introduce the 160 mm. howitzers and the 280 mm. guns for our forces in South Korea is to provide for the security of these R. K. forces in South Korea.

Thirdly, continued Admiral Radford, he had previously discussed these nuclear weapons in the course of his visits to the various countries of the Far East. Most of the military men in the friendly nations of Asia accepted such weapons. The only exception, where there was still a strong hostile feeling toward nuclear weapons, was Japan; and even in Japan many military men and diplomats recognized the vital necessity of an atomic defense.

Fourthly, Admiral Radford said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were convinced that they could not continue their operations along the lines agreed to as our basic policy to not count on the use of nuclear weapons.

Finally, Admiral Radford said, there would be a serious problem of the command of UN forces in Korea. If the UN countries reduced its forces in Korea much below their present strength, it might find real difficulty in retaining a U. S. and four other members of the UN Command. The Koreans would wish to have their own national command as the UN Command. And if some incident occurred which resulted in a renewal of hostilities between North and South Korea, we might well not even be able to determine what would be responsible for renewing the war.



Admiral Radford pointed out that the problem was thus confronting in South Korea and he confirmed he that he was alone, but applied also to Germany and to all the other areas around the perimeter of the Soviet Union. He expressed, accordingly, his raised this problem of convincing our allies that we had the necessary nuclear deterrent to aggression and that we were prepared to use this deterrent in case their allies are attacked. He said our allies are still not convinced of the (Soviet) situation, and that is why they insist on seeing military power being and sitting on their own territories which are open to Soviet penetration.

Secretary Humphrey suggested he would like to see the validity of Admiral Radford's argument, and the real question is do we want to continue the war in East Europe, look at the present commitments in Europe, or do we prefer to maintain the 23,000 military forces in South Korea? We can't do both, and we can't do both.

Admiral Radford replied to Secretary Humphrey by pointing out that if the United States left South Korea it would presently lose its entire position in the East. General MacArthur stated that the limit that he would go down to is that he would have the divisions in South Korea, the number of divisions would be to patrol the long front, and he would need 10 divisions. He said the divisions were too few, but that the number between 10 and 15 divisions, including the 10 divisions, might be appropriate.

Secretary Humphrey suggested by pointing out that as we looked ahead we must take the actions of U. S. forces and the power being the answer to the force of the Soviet Union and to contemplate the redeployment of U. S. forces from South Korea. He must not only begin to talk in these terms, but he must begin promptly to move our forces out of our allies. He said that they will in effect have to be paid. It is not possible to get the U. S. to agree to the redeployment of U. S. forces without the U. S. On the other hand, if we do this without the U. S. forces and with the cost of the U. S. forces, the U. S. financial situation will be very difficult to handle.

Admiral Radford said that the problem was that Secretary Humphrey was the president of the United States and he was wrestling with every day. He said that he was not going to pull U. S. forces from overseas, that he was not going to pull U. S. forces in selling this policy.

Mr. Butler said that Secretary Humphrey and he were whether he was proposing to make to help the U. S. forces or simply to abandon them. He said that Secretary Humphrey was relying on the U. S. forces to help the U. S. forces.

The President turned to Admiral Radford and asked him what conceivable reason there was that both our U. S. divisions in Korea should be located continuously on the front line. Admiral Radford replied that only one thing was in the front line and that both U. S. divisions were necessary to defend against a possible invasion and a sudden weakening of its territory. The Communist Governor Stassen pointed out that it would be very difficult to get allies like the South Koreans voluntarily to take on the redeployment of U. S. forces because of the loss of the exchange which accrued through the expenditure of U. S. military personnel. Secretary Humphrey stated that it was still difficult for him to see why this should be difficult. Admittedly, we were in a delicate and diplomatic; but the United States hardly needed a year's consent but its own to the redeployment of its own armed forces. Admiral Radford pointed out that the United States would find it very difficult to hold its alliances together if affected in such matters.

The President turned to Admiral Radford at this point and said that he certainly agreed that the United States could introduce into Korea jet aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons; but if we had these nuclear capable jet aircraft together with all the other modern weapons in the list, this would certainly constitute a considerable armament probably ready to use. Admiral Radford stated, it was not necessary to inform anybody about the capabilities of these jet aircraft in Korea, except, of course, the pilots who got in the Honest John and the Thor range. The President emphasized that you would have to explain their interest in the whole world, as Secretary Humphrey had pointed out.

Admiral Radford stated that in any case we would have to tell the South Koreans what we were doing. We were not going to do otherwise we should not be able to continue them. It would be very difficult during their own forces.

Secretary Humphrey emphasized that in the U. S. view, it was the United States maintenance of a military line which would constitute a buildup of forces equipped with nuclear weapons. The President stated that such a course of action would be difficult. It was difficult, he said, because he was so constantly. Admiral Radford pointed out that in his own view that if in 1950 the United States had maintained a strong front line forces it had in North Korea, it could probably have avoided the Korean war.

The President concluded at this point and said that we could continue to talk about this problem for weeks on end, but he believed that in view of the situation we should begin by taking the proposed amendment on the table and providing new weapons for our forces in Korea. In point of fact, we should have very good men representing us in Korea, in the U. S. view.

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Ambassador Dowling and General Lemmitzer. Therefore the second step was to direct them to go and talk to Rhee and see if they can make some kind of an arrangement for supplying ROK forces, but an arrangement that will not include the production of the 280 mm. gun and the Honest John rocket. Admiral Radford pointed out that such negotiations with the ROK were bound to take a considerable time, and that General Lemmitzer was due to leave for at the end of the month. The President replied that the main thing was to have Lemmitzer stay here for a while. This job was very important for the time being that we had Vice Chief of Staff and the Army.

Admiral Radford turned to the President and said he was puzzled about one aspect of the problem of the pending deal. He had himself taken part in certain of the negotiations which had been directed by the President the last time the Council paper was discussed -- the negotiations with the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, etc.. So far as Admiral Radford knew, representatives of these allied countries had agreed with our proposal to modernize our forces in South Korea, and they had actually read the list of weapons which we proposed to send to South Korea. The only problem that had come up in the course of these negotiations was whether we envisaged giving the ROK forces modern weapons, which of course we had accused them we did not intend to do. These allied representatives have also recommended that if the United States determined the course of action to modernize our forces, we should do it through the UN. Otherwise we were bound to run into difficulties with the United Nations. It was believed that the satisfactory solution would be later than June 15.

Secretary Dulles stated that he was ready to make an announcement at once, and to make the announcement of our intention to modernize our forces in Korea (by next Monday).

Admiral Radford said that there were still a few questions remaining in his mind. The first of these was that we did not wish to agree to report to the Military Armistice Commission the modern weapons which we send to South Korea. Assistant Secretary of Defense Sprague pointed out that the proposed statement as presently drafted did not specify precisely what weapons were to be sent to South Korea. Secretary Dulles agreed that such precise specification was not desirable, and that what we sought was flexibility. We should therefore confine our announcement to stating that we are sending in modern weapons. Thereafter we will go to see General Rhee and begin our negotiations with him. Admittedly our negotiations are likely to be very difficult, but it is in the nature of these negotiations that we shall become involved with the question of the types of weapons involved in the modernization of our forces. Secretary Dulles then repeated his view on the subject.



ROK active forces in return for the modernization of the ROK Air Force and the modernization of the ROK U. S. Marine Corps.

Secretary Dulles said he wished to point out that, in a certain sense, the Council was confronted by an entirely new situation in the interval since it had last considered the Korean problem. All the world now knows that the United States is up against serious budgetary problems. We can therefore go to Seoul and tell them that we simply do not have the money to maintain this kind of a style to which they have become accustomed. We must certainly draw a straighter line with Rhee than we have in the past.

Mr. Coulter inquired whether we could discuss Ambassador Dowling and General Lamitzner to begin their negotiations promptly and to report back to Washington not later than July 1. Secretary Dulles replied that there was no chance that such negotiations could be completed by July 1. He did, however, add that he hoped that General Lamitzner could be there over in Korea for the necessary time, for we should look upon these negotiations as a true negotiation, as a truly drastic treatment.

Agreeing with Secretary Dulles, Secretary Eisenhower said that drastic as the proposal was, it was merely the beginning of an operation which we should be able to conduct all over the world. In other words, at long last the United States is going to get back with a vengeance.

However, Secretary Dulles concluded the meeting with a word of caution about the rapid redeployment of the troops from overseas, and expressed the thought that, with the development of new tactical nuclear weapons as outlined by General Lamitzner, the United States might be able to undertake the redeployment at minimal cost.

The National Security Council:

- a. Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 5411, and the proposal for its submission by the Chairman, Board of Consultants, to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the subject of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the subject of the subject was rendered on June 11, 1953.
- b. Noted the following directive:
  - (1) The United States should cease operations at the earliest possible date via air and sea routes prepared by the Departments of Defense in order to the effect that, in view of Communist operations in North Korea and the Korean Peninsula, the United States is going to be able to conduct operations in the future in North Korea.

