

June 27, 1952

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Discussion at NSC Meeting
of the National Security Council,
Thursday, June 27, 1952

PRES. ONLY

Present at the 42d NSC meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; Deputy Secretary Quarles for the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Special Assistant to the President for War Cabinet; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (participating by phone); the Director, U. S. Information Agency; the Director, International Cooperation Administration; Assistant Secretary of State (asst); Assistant Secretary of Defense (asst); Captain John W. Moore, Jr., USN, Atomic Energy Commission (participating); the Chairman and Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; and Asst Assistants to the President (not in attendance); the White House Staff Secretary; the Director, Electricity, Public Works; and Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion, the main topic, and the main points taken.

1. TYPES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
(NSC Action No. 1252-1)

Mr. Cutler pointed out that at the luncheon meeting of May 27, the President had requested Admiral Strauss to make a presentation of the types of nuclear weapons produced and developed by size of yield, and the approximate percentage of each type in the stockpile. Admiral Strauss had made his presentation to the President and most of the members of the Council on war in the U.S. Congress last week. At that time the Secretary of State had indicated that he would like to return to the subject for further consideration at a later time. In addition to the presentation at the luncheon, Mr. Cutler said that Admiral Strauss had briefed the Vice President and other members of the Council who had not been in attendance just prior to this morning's meeting. The presentation had also been made to the NSC Planning Board. Mr. Cutler said that Admiral Strauss would now like to repeat and brief the Council on the use of nuclear weapons, and would appreciate the members' asking questions.

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Admiral Strauss emphasized that the subject of tactical use of nuclear weapons had arisen in his mind as a result of particular questions directed to him earlier by the Secretary of State. Admiral Strauss went on to point out that public opinion at present today mostly considers nuclear weapons to be indiscriminate in character and capacity for destruction, and that there probably is a likelihood to induce general nuclear war. The Soviets, however, do not share this illusion since, if nuclear weapons were to be tactically used, the Soviets would enjoy the great military advantage of their superiority in manpower. Thus, if the United States were to discontinue the use of nuclear weapons we might well be unable to respond to Soviet Communist aggression. It was therefore essential that the American public come to understand that the United States does possess nuclear weapons, and that they can be used in military operations without causing indiscriminate destruction.

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Admiral Strauss replied that we judged, from the tests so far detected in the Soviet Union, that the Soviets were manifesting no interest in the super-large weapons. On the other hand, they have not as yet tested a very large nuclear weapon - probably, the largest detected to date was of about 200,000 lbs.

Mr. Allen Dulles pointed out that it was not possible that the Soviets faced either severe problems in the matter of testing very large weapons, because they had no complete or empty spaces equivalent to our Pacific testing grounds at Bikini or Eniwetok. In short, if they were to test weapons of very great magnitude they might find it necessary to move whole populations. Senator Stassen pointed out that in his speech about May 1, Marshall had claimed that the Soviet Union possessed a wide variety of nuclear weapons.

The President inquired about the claim recently made by the Soviets that they had manufactured a nuclear bomb which was so big that they did not dare set it off. Governor Strom Thurmond indicated that this claim derived from a rumor about a speech of Marshal Zhukov had made to some foreign journalists.

Turning to Admiral Riddiford, the President expressed great doubt as to whether it was possible to blow up concrete pillboxes by the use of atomic bombs. Admiral Riddiford agreed that this was doubtful, but pointed out that we had alternatives in case against such fortifications, as, for example, napalm bombs. Moreover, he said, with our present scientific capabilities we would expect our forces to be held up by a line of pillboxes; it would be perfectly simple to go around them.

The National Security Council

Discussed the subject in the light of recent information by the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, and referred to NSC action to be taken.

2. SIGNIFICANT WORK OF OFFICES APPENDIX B U. S. GOVERNMENT

The Director of Central Intelligence called attention first to developments in the Middle East. Of course, King Farouk had lost a great deal of power and standing in the world. King Faisal was still in power. King Hussein had established closer diplomatic relations with Iraq by following his stepbrother, Egyptian diplomats from Jordan. The situation in Lebanon was still fluid. The situation in Syria was still fluid. The situation in Turkey was still fluid. The situation in Greece was still fluid. The situation in Italy was still fluid. The situation in Spain was still fluid. The situation in Portugal was still fluid. The situation in France was still fluid. The situation in Belgium was still fluid. The situation in Luxembourg was still fluid. The situation in West Germany was still fluid. The situation in East Germany was still fluid. The situation in Poland was still fluid. The situation in Czechoslovakia was still fluid. The situation in Hungary was still fluid. The situation in Yugoslavia was still fluid. The situation in Romania was still fluid. The situation in Bulgaria was still fluid. The situation in Turkey was still fluid. The situation in Greece was still fluid. The situation in Italy was still fluid. The situation in Spain was still fluid. The situation in Portugal was still fluid. The situation in France was still fluid. The situation in Belgium was still fluid. The situation in Luxembourg was still fluid. The situation in West Germany was still fluid. The situation in East Germany was still fluid. The situation in Poland was still fluid. The situation in Czechoslovakia was still fluid. The situation in Hungary was still fluid. The situation in Yugoslavia was still fluid. The situation in Romania was still fluid. The situation in Bulgaria was still fluid.

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Nevertheless, according to Mr. Dulles, we cannot but worry about Nasser's possible reactions to these recent reverses. We believe that he is still plotting secretly with King Saud and King Hussein, and will try to gain members.

Meanwhile, President Kennedy of Syria has been visiting in Egypt. It is not clear what has transpired in the course of this visit. There are, however, indications of further American disapprovement with Iraq. With regard to the recent resignation of the government of Nuri Said in Iraq, Mr. Dulles predicted that Mr. Said probably would be persuaded to return to the office of Prime Minister. There seemed no particular reason for his resignation, and he can remain for a rest.

Secretary Dulles went in to comment that in recent days Nasser had grown increasingly bitter, and that he was blaming the United States in general and Secretary Dulles in particular for everything that had gone wrong. This was illustrated by Nasser's article in *Look Magazine*. Nasser's attitude seemed to indicate Dulles' to be rather ironical, in view of the direction of US policy when Egypt was invaded last November, although, admittingly, the prime motivation of our actions then seems to have been to protect private the friendship of Nasser and of Egypt.

Turning to Lebanon, Mr. Dulles reported the third forest of the four successive Shi'ite who had turned out to vote for the pro-Western candidate.

With regard to Israel, Mr. Dulles pointed out that on June 7 the first Israeli freight vessel had docked at Suez with little publicity and fanfare. Meanwhile, one or perhaps two vessels chartered to the CIA also have quietly docked at the Suez Canal.

Mr. Dulles then turned from the Middle East to the situation in Algeria, which he described as very, very difficult, with serious clashes highlighted by the massacre of the Moslem clerics and boys by the Algerian native militia. This strife, he said, had met counter incidents in the west of Algeria. The situation there was on the upswing.

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The situation in Tunisia, said Mr. Dulles, was likewise critical, with an increasing number of clashes between the French Army and the Tunisians. Reportedly, the Soviet Ambassador has stated that he would pray in all that Prime Minister Bourguiba needed by way of replacement for the suspended Prime Minister to Tunisia. While this offer had been rejected, the Soviet Ambassador in Tunisia believes that the only way of preventing the situation there from getting out of hand would be for the French to withdraw all their armed forces within the confines of the coastal base at Bizerte.

The Japanese Communists, Mr. Dulles reported, together with the Communist front labor organization, are now planning a great anti-American demonstration in Tokyo on June 15, just before Prime Minister Kishi departs for Washington. The general idea was to hamstring Kishi in his negotiations here. Not the right come off this plan of the Socialists, because the Japanese Communist has been alerted to the situation.

Mr. Dulles predicted that the new Prime Government, under Prime Minister Bourguiba's leadership, might conceivably last through the summer. The new government was opposed by the Communists, the Panjedists, and certain scattered elements in other parties. Since it was proposed to retain the role in the new government, there appeared to be little likelihood of a significant change in foreign policy toward Algeria.

In conclusion, Mr. Dulles made a brief comment on the attack by the Chinese Communists on an American aircraft carrier, the *USS Midway*. The President observed that he should think that the state of Navy's face would be very red. Admiral Radford stated that the recent message had explained that the President was simply doing a bad judgment on the part of the flying leaders.

The National Security Council

Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to the situations in the Middle East, Algeria, Tunisia, and Japan; the new French Government; and the incident involving the capture of the plane of the Chinese Communist

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3. U. S. POLICY TOWARD KOREA

(NSC 5514; NSC 5610, Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "U. S. Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea", dated October 12 and November 1, 1956; NSC Actions Nos. 1654, 1660 and 1695; NSC 5702, Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subjects "Evaluation of Alternative Military Programs in Korea", dated January 30, 1957; NSC 5703, Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Action to Stop Soviet K-13s", dated April 10, 1957, and June 12, 1957; PW 100-737)

Mr. Butler tried in the Council on NSC 5702/1, with particular reference to the revised paragraphs 9, 10 and 11, copies of which were handed out to the members of the Council. (See the ordering note filed in the minutes of the meeting.) Mr. Butler also distributed the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on these and other paragraphs in NSC 5702/1. After indicating that it had still not been feasible for the Planning Board to present agreed recommendations for modernization of U. S. forces in Korea, Mr. Butler invited the members of the Council to first study the proposed changes for comment.

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Mr. Cutler pointed out that as a result of a proposed package deal, the United States would save \$127 million in costs to South Korea over a period of four years. Again citing the figures in the Financial Appendix to support his argument, Secretary Dulles reiterated his belief that the savings that we could realize from the introduction of the complete list of modern weapons (copies of which had been distributed to the Council members) would scarcely compensate for the political and propaganda line it would be thrust upon us. Indeed said Secretary Dulles, we can't even assure that there was a necessary interdependence between the introduction of these modern weapons and the retention of the ROK forces.

In summary, Secretary Dulles stated his feeling that the proper way to proceed in this program was, first of all, to serve the notice of our intention that he had spoken of in January and thereafter sit down and negotiate with the ROK authorities in order to determine what we can do to induce the desired reduction in ROK active forces. He expressed the hope that we could achieve the desired reduction in PVA forces by providing dual-purpose weapons for modernizing U. S. forces or South Korea, but avoided the high price of introducing nuclear weapons at the expense of the Honest John rockets.

The President inquired whether the U.S. might really be so clumsy and so immature a weapon. He added that he himself had very little confidence in mobile weapons. Admiral Clegg implied that he didn't think the U.S. man was quite as bad as he had been depicted, but at any rate, you could hardly turn him into a U.S.

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ever, we had five or six such guns in Germany, and they were proving useful, even though they were now five or six years old and would gradually be replaced. Secretary Quarles said that in its original sense both the 230 mm. gun and the Honest John missile could be described as dual-purpose weapons.

Governor Strassen passed a note to Secretary Cutler, who then pointed out the possible threat of some counter action by the Soviets or the Chinese Communists if such weapons were introduced.

Secretary Quarles commented that the position of the Department of Defense could be summarized in the following terms. The Department felt that we must move into this situation very promptly if any changes were to be made in the size and levels of the ROK armed forces. Far from wishing to reduce them, but we divisions, the ROKs wish to increase their active units. Accordingly, it would be wise for the United States to propose a three-hundred million dollar program for modernizing its forces, including the weapons, if we hope to bargain effectively with the ROKs for reductions in their own forces.

Secretary Murphy said that what really concerned him was what we thought we saw in Korea. He was prepared to go on spending \$600 million a year in assistance to South Korea for the rest of our natural lives! Secretary Quarles replied that the outlook was certainly not very promising, but that he did not see any other course of action available unless something very bad should occur.

Mr. Cutler indicated that the reduction of the ROK active divisions, as set forth in the package deal in NSC 5415, would be only the first step. It was hoped that further reductions could be achieved later and, in any event, a reduction by the ROKs in the package deal would result in savings to the United States of approximately over a period of four years. Both Secretary Dulles and Secretary Humphrey commented that they did not believe this savings would have any great significance.

Admiral Radford expressed surprise that Secretary Murphy would scorn a saving of \$1 billion. Admiral Feltz, however, went on to state that the Council might be somewhat confused in precisely what the Joint Chiefs of Staff had in mind in suggesting the package deal set forth in NSC 5415. The United States, he pointed out, has some 60,000 troops in Korea, our two divisions spread out on a front line which stretched to 110 miles. Except for a British brigade, there were practically no other UN troops in Korea. While, as the Secretary of State had pointed out, the ROKs had 100,000

..... would eventually stop any Communist invasion of South Korea, the Communists would have to be stopped before they had overrun the 50,000 U. S. troops. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff felt that defensive forces could not and actually be in place in South Korea to protect the security of the 50,000 U. S. troops and to prevent them from being overrun in the initial phases of a Communist offensive. Moreover, from the point of view of the ROKs themselves, their capital, Seoul, was only 35 miles distant from the front lines, and since this capital had already been overrun three times, the ROKs were only too well aware that it could be overrun once again. Accordingly, the ROKs felt very much safer if the invasion route into South Korea were cut off at an early stage. (depl ref'd in para.)

Secondly, said Admiral Radford, we do not really know precisely what the ROK authorities will agree to be up of a reduction of their own forces. We think they will agree to reduce their 20 active divisions by four, and they might be willing to eliminate these four divisions, which would reduce the total ROK forces to 16 active divisions and 10 reserve divisions. We might be able eventually to reduce even more. General Leimither, for example, thought that at some future time we might induce the ROKs to reduce to a level of 10 active and 5 reserve divisions. But in the end, our Number One reason for wanting to introduce the 10 nuclear weapons and the 280 mm. guns for our forces in South Korea is to provide for the security of those UN forces in South Korea.

Thirdly, continued Admiral Radford, he had also discussed these nuclear weapons in the course of his visits to the various countries of the Far East. Most of the military men in the friendly nations of Asia accepted such weapons. The only exception where there was still a strong hostile feeling toward nuclear weapons was Japan; and even in Japan many military men and diplomats accepted the vital necessity of an atomic defense.

Fourthly, Admiral Radford said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were convinced that they could not continue the present plan along the lines agreed in our basic policy to the UN Command to count on the use of nuclear weapons.

Finally, Admiral Radford said, there was the related problem of the command of UN forces in Korea. If the United States reduced its forces in Korea much below their present strength, we might find real difficulty in retaining a U. S. major general in command of the UN Command. The Koreans would wish to have one of their own nationals as the UN Commander. And if some nation in Europe which resulted in a renewal of hostilities between North and South Korea, we might well not even be able to determine who would be responsible for renewing the war.

In conclusion, Admiral Radford again stressed the fact that the Joint Chiefs of Staff felt that the Council's decision with respect to the package deal proposed would be a great improvement from the military point of view. The Joint Chiefs simply wanted to see their way to assure the security of U. S. forces in South Korea. They were in a position to equip our forces there with the latest equipment in weapons.

Mr. Brundage was asked if he had any comments on the Joint Chiefs' proposal. He said that he had no objection to the Joint Chiefs' proposal. He said that he had been in contact with Mr. Dulles and that Mr. Dulles had told him that the Joint Chiefs' proposal was acceptable to the Department of Defense. Mr. Brundage said that he had no objection to the Joint Chiefs' proposal.

Mr. Brundage was asked that when the Council initiated its study of a package deal involving U. S. forces in Korea, we had hoped that we could not only cut the costs of U. S. military assistance to South Korea, but that we could also cut the costs of maintaining U. S. forces in South Korea. At the present time, we see very little prospect that this objective can be achieved. Secretary Humphrey agreed, and said that it was extremely difficult to see what the future would bring, in view of the rapidly increasing cost of U. S. defense program and new weapons.

Secretary Dulles replied that the only answer was to keep working on our objective of convincing all our allies to spend more on the deterrent capacity of our nuclear retaliatory capability, or less on local defenses. There simply was not going to be enough money available to maintain both the U. S. deterrent capability and large military establishments in allied countries throughout the world. We must project into the future for South Korea since what it is far less costly than the present arm defense system of South Korea. This must move ahead with the "no-win" theory, with the theory that the real deterrent to aggression rests in the existence of the United States of a great retaliatory capability. Reverting to Secretary Dulles reiterated his feeling that if the Council would adopt the package deal proposed by the Joint Chiefs, paragraphs 9 and 10 of NSC 5030/1, in effect, incurring a long-term liability and one for which we would not have adequate return. In other words, to deploy these particular weapons--the Honest John missiles and the 230 mm. guns--we should have to insist that the South Korean forces be much more responsible.

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Admiral Radford pointed out that the problem was thus confronting in South Korea was not confined to that country alone, but applied also to Germany and to all the other areas around the perimeter of the Soviet Union. Everywhere, he said, it had faced this problem of convincing our allies that we did possess the necessary nuclear deterrent to aggression and that we were willing to use this deterrent in case they might suspect that if our own allies are still not convinced of this situation, that was the way they insist on seeing military power being exercised in their own territories which are under Communist control.

Secretary Humphrey said that he could understand the validity of Admiral Radford's argument, but the real question was who we want to continue the kind of large force that we have commitments in Europe, or do we prefer to reinforce the smaller military forces in South Korea. He felt probably one or the other, but not do both.

Admiral Radford replied to Secretary Humphrey by pointing out that if the United States left South Korea it would presently lose its entire position in Far East Asia. General Gruenther said stated that the limit of his troops down to date had been three divisions in South Korea, plus the number of aircraft required to patrol the long frontier line. He believed that the number of divisions were too few, but that as a matter of fact, an additional three divisions, including two long range fighters with the B-57 bombers, might be sufficient.

Secretary Humphrey argued that probably the best policies as we looked ahead we must think first has of U. S. forces and nuclear power being the answer to the existence of the Soviet Union. To implement the redeployment of our forces from South Korea, we must not only begin to talk about retraining, but we must begin promptly to move our forces and our aircraft northward. They will in effect have to be paid for. It does not seem to me that Ruth to agree to the deployment of our forces would be a good idea. On the other hand, if we go in with our present forces, we can increase and with the cost of a small amount of aircraft, the present fiscal situation will be greatly improved.

Admiral Radford agreed that the problem was serious. Secretary Humphrey was the first to note the difficulty of getting into wrestling with every division and every aircraft to get rid of surplus U. S. forces from overseas, but he was fully right in his point in selling this policy.

Mr. Cutler turned to Secretary Humphrey and asked him whether he was proposing to insist to help the South Koreans or simply to abandon them. Secretary Humphrey responded that he had no reliance on the U. S. Air Force, but relied

The President turned to Admiral Radford and asked if it was conceivable reason there would not both our forces and the Korean should be located combat duty on the front lines. Admiral Radford replied that only one of his men was in the front lines and that both U. S. divisions were a distance to defend South Korea during that invasion and a sudden sweep across of its territory. The Ambassador Governor Stassen pointed out that it would be difficult to get allies like the South Koreans voluntarily to accept such a redeployment of U. S. forces because of the loss of their military exchange which accrued through the expenditure of U. S. military personnel. Secretary Humphrey stated that it was still his task to see why this should be difficult. Admittedly we had a polite and diplomatic; but the United States hardly needed a good argument but its own to the redeployment of its own armed forces. Admiral Radford pointed out that the United States would find it very hard to hold its alliances together if forced in such manner to do so.

The President turned to Admiral Radford at this point and said that he certainly agreed that the United States could introduce into Korea jet aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons; but if we had these nuclear-capable jet aircraft together with all the other modern weapons of the sort, this would certainly constitute a considerable atomic capability ready to be used. However, it was not necessary to inform anybody about this except [REDACTED] in South Korea, except, of course, that it also went in the Honest John and the F8U gun. The President concluded that you would have to explain their introduction to the whole world, as Secretary Dulles had pointed out.

Admiral Radford responded in any case we would have to tell the South Koreans what [REDACTED] we were talking about. Otherwise we should not be able to convince them of the need for us to be during their own forces.

Secretary Humphrey responded that he would like to add to the United States maintain a sufficient air force in South Korea made up of forces equipped with nuclear weapons. This was not of such a course of action would be erratic. It was the constant harried him so constantly. Admiral Radford pointed out that he had the same view that if in 1950 the United States had an atomic bomb in their forces it had in truth been a good idea probably to drop it on the Korean war.

The President responded at the end of this conversation that he said that we could continue to talk about this problem as long as an end, but he believed that in view of the present situation he should begin by taking the procedure an amendment on the bill to provide new weapons for our forces in South Korea. In particular, he said, he was very worried men may remain in combat in Korea, in the event of a

Ambassador Dowling and General Lemnitzer. Therefore, the second step was to direct them to go and talk to Rhee and see if we can make some kind of an arrangement for reducing ROK forces, but an arrangement that will not include the destruction of the 105 mm. gun, the 152 mm. the 280 mm. gun and the Honest John rocket. Admiral Radford pointed out that such negotiations with the ROK were bound to take a considerable time, and the General Lemnitzer was due to leave Korea at the end of the month. The President replied that the main thing was to have Lemnitzer stay on for a while. This jet was very important for the time being that he had Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

Admiral Radford turned to the President and said he was puzzled about one aspect of the problem of the package deal. He had himself taken part in certain of the negotiations which had been directed by the President the last time the Council paper was discussed --the negotiations with the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, etc.. So far as Admiral Radford knew, representatives of these allied countries had agreed with our proposal to modernize our forces in South Korea, and they had actually read the list of weapons which we proposed to send to South Korea. The only problem that had come up in the course of these negotiations was whether we envisaged giving the ROK forces nuclear weapons, which of course we had assured them we did not intend to do. These allied representatives have also recommended that if the United States determined in the course of action to modernize our forces, we should do it as soon as possible. Otherwise we were bound to run into difficulties with the United Nations. It was believed that a communiqué could be issued no later than June 15.

Secretary Dulles stated that he was ready to go on this matter at once, and to make the announcement of our intention to modernize our forces in Korea by next Monday.

Admiral Radford said that there were still two options remaining in his mind. The first of these was that we should wait to agree to report to the Military Armistice Commission on modern weapons which we send to South Korea. Assistant Secretary of Defense Sprague pointed out that the proposed statement as presently drafted did not specify precisely what weapons would be sent to South Korea. Secretary Dulles agreed that such precise specification was not desirable, and that what we sought was flexibility. We should therefore confine our announcement to stating that we are sending in modern weapons. Thereafter we will go to President Rhee and begin our negotiations with him. Admittedly such negotiations are likely to be very difficult, but it is in the course of these negotiations that we shall become involved with the question of the types of weapons involved in the modernization of our forces. Secretary Dulles then repeated his view on the date of the communiqué.

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educating the world to acceptance of the theory of the deterrent power as the primary safeguard of the Free World against Communist aggressions. He also expressed strong doubt that the North Koreans or the Chinese Communists would ever dare to launch an invasion of the ROK as long as they knew that we would use this powerful military power to wipe out the first line industrial centers.

Admiral Radford's second point consisted in addressing the importance of a final settlement of the Korea problem and the achievement of a free and united Korea. Admiral Radford did not suggest, in answer to questions, how it is objective might best be achieved.

At this point Mr. Cutler attempted to suggest an appropriate action by the National Security Council in terms. First, of issuing the proposed announcement that the United States was modernizing its forces in Korea, and secondly, a directive to Ambassador Dowling and General Lemnitzer to begin negotiations with President Khee looking toward a reduction of current ROK force levels. He was interrupted by the President, who again expressed his dislike of advertising our introduction of modern weapons by including among them such monster weapons as the 300 mm gun. Secretary Quayle said he understood the problem, but hoped that the Defense Department could be given some clear concept as to the degree and kind of modernization of our armed forces which is now being contemplated. The President replied by stating his belief that the time had come when we must

The Vice President pointed out the importance of what was to be said about this course of action at press conferences of the President and the Secretary of State after our announcement had been made public. The press was free to ask what privilege we meant by modern weapons, and it was important to determine the answer. The President said that he would simply refuse to discuss the nature of the weapons that we were referring to.

In response to a further question on the nature of the Council's action, the defendant stated, in the first instance, that the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense had agreed on a message to Ambassador Dowling and General LeMay explaining the general problem as they saw it here and directing them to see what they could do to assist in a filing of the necessary documents.

ROK active forces in return for the modernization of the ROK Air Force and the modernization of the U. S. Forces in Korea.

Secretary Dulles will be wished to point out that, in a certain sense, the Council was confronted by an entirely new situation in the interval since it had last considered the Korean problem. All the world now knows that the United States is up against serious budgetary problems. We can therefore go to them and say "look, sir, that we simply do not have the money to maintain this Korean war style to which they have been accustomed." We must begin to take a steeper line with Rhee than we have done for years.

Mr. Cutler inquired whether we could direct Ambassador Dowling and General Lemnitzer to begin their negotiations promptly and to report back to Washington not later than July 1. Secretary Dulles replied that there was no chance that such negotiations could be completed by July 1. He did, however, add that he hoped that General Lemnitzer could be home over in Korea for one or two days at least, for we should look upon these negotiations as a kind of ultimatum, as a truly drastic treatment.

Agreeing with Senator Dulles, Secretary Humphrey said that drastic as the proposal was, it was merely the beginning of an operation which we should expect to conduct all over the world. In other words, at long last the United States has come to realize fully a vengeance.

However, Secretary Dulles concluded the discussion with a word of caution about too rapid deployment of United States forces overseas, and expressed the belief that, with the exception of new tactical nuclear weapons, as outlined by Ambassador Cutler earlier, the United States might be compelled to rely on conventional forces at minimal cost.

The National Security Council

- a. Discussed the draft statement of policy and its subject contained in N.S.C. 17/3, and the revised version transmitted by the Planning Board to the Council on the minimum of June 20, 1953; on the basis of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted to the Council via memorandum dated June 20, 1953.
- b. Noted the following directions taken:
 - (1) The State Department should on behalf of the Council furnish to the appropriate date the joint statement prepared by the Departments of State and Defense to the effect that, in view of conditions in South Korea in North Korea, the Korean War, and the United States' obligation to defend South Korea, the Korean War must be fought to a conclusion.

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- (2) The Secretaries of State and Defense should agree upon prompt instructions to Ambassador Dowling and General Lemmitzer directing them, in the light of increasing costs of the U. S. defense effort and the deterrent provided by U. S. retaliatory capability, to negotiate with President Rhee for a substantial reduction in active ROK forces, with resultant improvement in the Korean economy, in return for converting the three remaining ROK Air Force squadrons to jets and modernizing U. S. forces deployed in Korea.
- (3) Following the announcement in (1) above, U. S. forces deployed in Korea should be modernized;
- c. Deferred action on NSC 5702/1, as amended by the reference memorandum of June 10, 1957, pending reactions to the announcement and the results of the negotiations referred to in b above.

NOTE: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense for appropriate implementation.

4. U. S. POLICY TOWARD YUGOSLAVIA
(NSC 5601; Progress Report, dated April 24, 1957, by OCB on NSC 5601; NIE 31-57)

The National Security Council:

Noted the reference Progress Report on the subject by the Operations Coordinating Board.

S. Everett Gleason

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