

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

VII

THE SECRETARY OF STATE, THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, AND
THE CHAIRMAN, ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION



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On July 18, 1946, you discussed the responsibilities of Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, in carrying out the policy and recommendations thereon with respect to the atomic energy program developed by Atomic Energy Commission. The Atomic Energy Commission is responsible for the development of the atomic energy program. The Atomic Energy Commission is also responsible for the development of the atomic energy program. The Atomic Energy Commission is also responsible for the development of the atomic energy program.

- *1. The Atomic Energy Commission should be authorized to carry out the program.
- *2. The Atomic Energy Commission should be authorized to carry out the program.
- *3. The Atomic Energy Commission should be authorized to carry out the program.

The Atomic Energy Commission has a responsibility which should be carried out with a careful review of the program and for the development of the technical feasibility of the program. The Atomic Energy Commission should be authorized to carry out the program. The Atomic Energy Commission should be authorized to carry out the program. The Atomic Energy Commission should be authorized to carry out the program.

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Therefore, the Atomic Energy Commission should be authorized to carry out the program.

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SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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the feasibility of developing weapons with a capability
of determining the upper yield limit of a weapon which is desirable
as to size and weight with the highest reliability. From data obtained by means of
prior experimentation, the maximum reliability of facilities for the
weapon of low fissile yield. The development of a weapon of low yield
as a response to a changing technology for the development of a weapon for
military requirements. The development of a weapon of low yield is
essential. "Clean" weapons in the nature and the requirements for their
active development and studies are in progress looking toward the develop-
ment of "clean" weapons in the future. The development of a weapon of low yield
A complementary development is the development of a weapon of low yield
corresponding with the development of a weapon of low yield which is
under development. From the studies conducted by the Atomic Energy Commission
which make it desirable that the development of a weapon of low yield
of delivering with certainty of its yield of a higher yield to a target
now on hand. In the first instance, a weapon of low yield would be a
more effective in delivering its yield to a target than a weapon of high yield
offering direct threat against the military targets, including low
range aircraft bases, naval commanding centers, submarine bases, and
storage sites, and wide areas of land and sea development.

1. The development of a weapon of low yield is essential for the development of a weapon of low yield which is a response to a changing technology for the development of a weapon for military requirements.

the second place, the increasing complexity and cost of first line aircraft and the attrition which must be expected for Soviet offensive and defensive action make it necessary to base our plans on the availability of smaller numbers of our aircraft over targets. This is in order that our aircraft forces attain maximum unit effectiveness.

It is a matter of serious concern that the utilization of the high yield weapons now in stockpile against major targets in the interior and border areas would cause heavy casualties in adjacent friendly and neutral countries from radioactive fallout. It is our policy to avoid such but exercise the degree of control that must be maintained with regard to such weapons. We would not permit the use of these weapons against such targets. On the other hand, existing information shows that if an individual very high yield "clean" weapon were developed, it would decrease the overall lethality of fallout from a nuclear war by a factor of [] with present weapons, which are low yield, low altitude bursts. Therefore, a program of research and development of "clean" weapons of the highest yield but lowest fallout is most desirable that we establish definitely when the development of a "clean" weapon capable of delivery by the B-36 bomber is completed. This program should be completed with the greatest certainty if a research and development program were initiated at the next Pacific test series. Existing data on the effects of radioactive pro-predictions and the question of fallout may be verified, and conclusions based on the three systems of the "clean" weapons, for the world possible, as a high yield weapon of the lowest fallout for the B-36 bomber.



Should it become known that our intelligence activities are directed in part towards developing a weapon which we do not possess, some unfavorable and possibly harmful publicity might be expected. Certainly the facts should be reported in such a way as to avoid any propaganda advantage which might be gained. The publicity should be addressed necessary and appropriate for the United States and should not be a program to develop and spread a false impression of our activities. Rather, we should proceed with the research and development of our efforts to a point where we have the information of the nature and extent of the possible. If information of the nature and extent of our activities, its effect could be published, and it is believed that the effect of fact that the research and development of a weapon which we do not possess to be first will be a great advantage to us and a great disadvantage to our firms in the field.

As regards the responsibility of Mr. Hoover, it is believed that more aspects of our intelligence activities should be made use of by our own intelligence activities in order to avoid the responsibility of the United States in such cases. It is believed that it is necessary to make a report on the activities of the participating participants. The development program should be the object of our intelligence activities.

In view of the responsibility of the United States in such cases, it is believed that it is necessary to make a report on the activities of the participating participants. The development program should be the object of our intelligence activities.

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satisfactorily in order to get the best of new designs (in
weapon of ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~also~~ ^{also} ~~available~~ ^{available} ~~to~~ ^{to} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~Department~~ ^{Department}).
The planned gross yield of the first series should be as high as
possible consistent with the above. The yield should be no less than
no less than the minimum yield (500 kilotons) of course, for quality of the yield (500 kilotons).

b. If further completion of this and the reports of activities
concerning the development of atomic weapons are needed,
patterns, we will report to the President as soon as we are able to
the availability of the necessary resources for such purposes.

It will be understood that the entire Atomic Energy Commission for the past
graphs will be made to report to the President as soon as we are able to
ment for a large weapon, and that the development of the atomic energy
in a practical sense development program for such purposes.

APPROVED

Joseph P. Kamp
Joseph P. Kamp

Date: April 22, 1950

Approved by the
President
April 22, 1950

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Name of Researcher B. K. ... Title ... Page Number ...

Collection and or Series (e.g. OF; PFF; Mitchell Papers)	Box No.	Folder No. (E.g. 13)	Folder Title (E.g. 1964-1965)	Material names and/or dates (E.g. Memo, 1964)	Date of Docs.	Number of Pages
Mitchell Papers	200	10	1964-1965	Memo to Jones	1/15/64	1 ✓
	200	11	1964-1965	Letter from Jones	1/20/64	2 ✓
	200	12	1964-1965	Memo to Jones ^{Handwritten notes}	1/25/64	10 ✓
	200	13	1964-1965	Letter from Jones	1/30/64	1 ✓
	200	14	1964-1965	Memo to Jones copy 1964	2/5/64	25 ✓
	200	15	1964-1965	Memo to Jones	2/10/64	2 ✓
	200	16	1964-1965	Memo to Jones	2/15/64	1 ✓
	200	17	1964-1965	Memo to Jones	2/20/64	7 ✓
	200	18	1964-1965	Memo to Jones Handwritten notes	2/25/64	4 ✓
	200	19	1964-1965	Memo to Jones	3/5/64	1 ✓
	200	20	1964-1965	Memo to Jones	3/10/64	3 ✓
	200	21	1964-1965	Memo to Jones Handwritten notes	3/15/64	1 ✓
	200	22	1964-1965	Memo to Jones	3/20/64	2 ✓
	200	23	1964-1965	Memo to Jones	3/25/64	2 ✓
	200	24	1964-1965	Memo to Jones	4/5/64	1 ✓
	200	25	1964-1965	Memo to Jones	4/10/64	1 ✓
	200	26	1964-1965	Memo to Jones	4/15/64	1 ✓
	200	27	1964-1965	Memo to Jones	4/20/64	1 ✓
	200	28	1964-1965	Memo to Jones	4/25/64	1 ✓
	200	29	1964-1965	Memo to Jones	5/5/64	1 ✓
	200	30	1964-1965	Memo to Jones	5/10/64	1 ✓
	200	31	1964-1965	Memo to Jones	5/15/64	1 ✓
	200	32	1964-1965	Memo to Jones	5/20/64	1 ✓
	200	33	1964-1965	Memo to Jones	5/25/64	1 ✓
	200	34	1964-1965	Memo to Jones	6/5/64	1 ✓
	200	35	1964-1965	Memo to Jones	6/10/64	1 ✓
	200	36	1964-1965	Memo to Jones	6/15/64	1 ✓
	200	37	1964-1965	Memo to Jones	6/20/64	1 ✓
	200	38	1964-1965	Memo to Jones	6/25/64	1 ✓
	200	39	1964-1965	Memo to Jones	7/5/64	1 ✓
	200	40	1964-1965	Memo to Jones	7/10/64	1 ✓
	200	41	1964-1965	Memo to Jones	7/15/64	1 ✓
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	200	43	1964-1965	Memo to Jones	7/25/64	1 ✓
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	200	45	1964-1965	Memo to Jones	8/10/64	1 ✓
	200	46	1964-1965	Memo to Jones	8/15/64	1 ✓
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	200	52	1964-1965	Memo to Jones	9/20/64	1 ✓
	200	53	1964-1965	Memo to Jones	9/25/64	1 ✓