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AEC 153/11

August 18, 1950

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ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

OFFICIAL OBSERVERS FOR OPERATION GREENHOUSE (u)

Note by the Acting Secretary

The attached report by the Director of Military Application is circulated by request of the Acting General Manager for consideration by the Commission during the week of August 21, 1950.

PHILIP J. FARLEY

REPOSITORY NARA - College Park Acting Secretary
COLLECTION RG 326, 46-51 Secretary
BOX No. 102 (NN3-326-93-007)
FOLDER 471.6 (10-20-48)
Greenhouse Vol. #1

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW	
1ST REVIEW DATE: <u>08/27/01</u>	DETERMINATION: <u>1</u>
AUTHORITY: <u>DM/JA</u>	2. CLASSIFICATION: <u>SECRET</u>
NAME: <u>William H. Hopper</u>	3. CONTAINS: <u>NO</u>
2ND REVIEW DATE: <u>11/18/01</u>	4. COORDINATE WITH: <u>NO</u>
AUTHORITY: <u>DM/JA</u>	5. CLASSIFICATION: <u>SECRET</u>
NAME: <u>Darryl Austin</u>	6. CLASSIFIED INFO: <u>NO</u>
	7. OTHER (SPECIFY): <u>PP 112-117</u>

~~CLASSIFICATION OF ORIGINAL DOCUMENT
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DATE: 08/12/03~~

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REVIEWER (ADD): <u>[Signature]</u>	1. CLASSIFICATION RETAINED
NAME: <u>[Signature]</u>	2. CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO: <u>FRD</u>
DATE: <u>8-12-96</u>	3. CONTAINS NO DOE CLASSIFIED INFO
	4. COORDINATE WITH: <u>NO</u>
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ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

OFFICIAL OBSERVERS FOR OPERATION GREENHOUSE

Report by Director of Military Application

THE PROBLEM

1. To consider certain policies for the selection and handling of observers for Operation GREENHOUSE, as suggested by the Commanding General, Joint Task Force Three.

BACKGROUND

2. No great problem has heretofore been encountered as to observers at atomic tests, inasmuch as housing and logistic support were both available. At Eniwetok, on the contrary, housing and transportation for GREENHOUSE will be critical, even for necessary scientific and administrative personnel. Furthermore, the security aspects of GREENHOUSE are more restrictive than at previous tests. For these reasons, the number of observers must be limited.

DISCUSSION

3. The Commanding General, Joint Task Force Three, has suggested* certain policies for the selection and handling of observers for Operation GREENHOUSE. The Commander JTF-3 has requested the concurrence of the Atomic Energy Commission with these suggestions prior to his requesting concurrence of the Department of Defense. The policy suggested by the Commander, JTF-3, in-

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August 18, 1950

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ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

OFFICIAL OBSERVERS FOR OPERATION GREENHOUSE (U)

Note by the Acting Secretary

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PHILIP J. FARLEY

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COLLECTION PG 326, 46-51 Secretary
BOX No. 102 (NN3-326-93-007)
FOLDER 471.6 (10-20-48)
Greenhouse Vol. #1

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW	
1ST REVIEW DATE: <u>08/24/01</u>	1. DETERMINE THE CLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY: <u>DAVID J. DADD</u>	2. CLASSIFY
NAME: <u>Arthur Hagan</u>	3. CONTAINS
2ND REVIEW DATE: <u>11/8/01</u>	4. COORDINATE
AUTHORITY: <u>AD</u>	5. CLASSIFICATION
NAME: <u>Nancy Austin</u>	6. CLASSIFIED INFO
	7. OTHER (SPECIFY): <u>PP 112-117</u>

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WITH ATTACHMENTS/ENCE

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW	
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REVIEWER (ADD):	2. CLASSIFICATION RETAINED
NAME: <u>[Signature]</u>	3. CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO: <u>FRD</u>
DATE: <u>8-12-96</u>	3. CONTAINS NO DOE CLASSIFIED INFO
	4. COORDINATE WITH
	5. CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED
	6. CLASSIFIED INFO TRACKED
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ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

OFFICIAL OBSERVERS FOR OPERATION GREENHOUSE

Report by Director of Military Application

THE PROBLEM

1. To consider certain policies for the selection and handling of observers for Operation GREENHOUSE, as suggested by the Commanding General, Joint Task Force Three.

BACKGROUND

2. No great problem has heretofore been encountered as to observers at atomic tests, inasmuch as housing and logistic support were both available. At Eniwetok, on the contrary, housing and transportation for GREENHOUSE will be critical, even for necessary scientific and administrative personnel. Furthermore, the security aspects of GREENHOUSE are more restrictive than at previous tests. For these reasons, the number of observers must be limited.

DISCUSSION

3. The Commanding General, Joint Task Force Three, has suggested* certain policies for the selection and handling of observers for Operation GREENHOUSE. The Commander JTF-3 has requested the concurrence of the Atomic Energy Commission with these suggestions prior to his requesting concurrence of the Department of Defense. The policy suggested by the Commander, JTF-3, includes the following points:

a. Maximum ceiling, for any one shot, of 30 observers divided equally between the AEC and Department of Defense;


*Copy of letter on file in Division of Military Application.

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b. Selection of observers based solely on familiarity with the test operation and technical requirement for attendance thereat;

c. Joint Task Force Three to be responsible for administrative instructions and services for all observers, such as housing, briefing, and transportation (except in continental United States);


d. Department of Defense to provide for Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Research and Development Board, Military Liaison Committee, Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, the three Services, and the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project from its allotment of fifteen spaces;

e. Atomic Energy Commission to provide for Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, the General Advisory Committee, and field agencies from its allotment of 15 spaces;

f. "Q" clearance requirement for all observers, and a ban on all press representatives.

4. The above policy is believed basically sound and acceptable. It should, however, be extended somewhat to include the following factors:

a. Transportation within the continental United States is recognized as a responsibility of the agency concerned;


c. Maintain flexibility in observer space allocations until more concrete knowledge is available concerning attendance requirements;

d. Recognize that the proposed ceiling is a highly desirable objective, but cannot now be considered absolute.

5. Within the Atomic Energy Commission, it is suggested that the 15 spaces be divided tentatively on the basis of eight spaces for the Washington Staff and the other seven for Santa Fe Operations. The Washington Staff spaces must also provide for the requirements of the General Advisory Committee and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. The spaces allotted to the Manager, Santa Fe Operations, must provide for the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory and the Sandia Corporation as well as his own staff. Staff coordination between the Director of Military Application

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and the Manager, Santa Fe Operations, will provide for later desirable changes in this tentative allocation as well as for assignment of relative priorities to all observer requests. In case of an excessive number of requests, staff coordination with Joint Task Force Three will also be effected.

6. At a later date, when the test site and dates have been confirmed by the President, the Director of Military Application will prepare invitations to the Joint Committee and to the General Advisory Committee. Experience indicates that only a limited acceptance may be expected, so that the limited facilities, should not be unduly burdened.

CONCLUSIONS

7. It is concluded that:

- a. The number of observers at GREENHOUSE must be limited;
- b. A maximum ceiling of 30 observers per shot, divided equally between Department of Defense and AEC, is a reasonable objective, but should not now be considered an absolute ceiling;
- c. A tentative sub-allocation within the AEC of 8 spaces for the Washington Staff and 7 spaces for Santa Fe Operations is reasonable;
- d. The basic policy suggested by Commander, Joint Task Force Three is reasonable and acceptable.

RECOMMENDATIONS

8. That the Atomic Energy Commission:

- a. Note the allocation of 15 observer spaces to the AEC;
- b. Approve the policy for selection and handling of observers for GREENHOUSE set forth in paragraph ~~4~~³ above, as expanded by the factors expressed in paragraph ~~5~~⁴;
- c. Note that the Director of Military Application will, after the test site and test dates have been confirmed, prepare invitations to the General Advisory Committee and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy for GREENHOUSE attendance;
- d. Note that a letter such as that in the Appendix will be sent to the Commander, Joint Task Force Three concurring with his suggested policy, as modified by the suggestions in paragraph ~~5~~⁴ above.

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
A P P E N D I X

DRAFT MEMORANDUM FROM THE CHAIRMAN TO THE COMMANDER,
JOINT TASK FORCE THREE

1. Your proposals concerning official observers for Operation GREENHOUSE, as presented in your letter of June 8, 1950, are generally acceptable to the Atomic Energy Commission.

2. The necessity for holding the number of official observers at GREENHOUSE to a minimum is recognized. Housing restrictions and security problems will prevent the accommodation of many interested individuals. The policy, therefore, for the selection of observers on the basis of their general familiarity with the operation together with their definite need for observing is believed sound.

3. The ceiling of 30 observers which you have proposed, to be divided equally between the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission, is also accepted as an excellent objective although considerable difficulty may be anticipated in our endeavor to stay within this ceiling. We will, as you suggest, include in the 15 spaces allocated to the Atomic Energy Commission, provision for the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, the General Advisory Committee and field agencies.

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If this should prove true, we are sure that a trade of spaces can be arranged to the mutual benefit of the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission.

5. We also concur with the other points of policy which you suggested in your letter. These include "Q" clearance require-

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ments, a ban on press representatives, JTF-3 responsibility for transportation outside the United States and administrative instructions and services for observers. It is believed that one central control point for all observer participation will prove efficient and desirable. We understand, of course, that all transportation within the continental United States is a responsibility of each agency concerned.

6. As a final suggestion, we believe that all space allocations for observers should be kept as flexible as possible until more concrete information is available concerning which observers require attendance.

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