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The President's Advisory Commission feels that the country is approaching a crisis with regard to the continuation of atomic tests on anything like the present scale. While most of the widely disseminated arguments against further tests are, in our opinion, unsound, there is widespread uneasiness in the country over the prospect of constantly increasing radioactive fallout, and a vast majority of scientists share this feeling. The statements of the President regarding a possible change of policy after the completion of the present series of tests make it imperative in our opinion to explain that a statement should be issued to the people of this country indicating that hereafter we are willing to restrict our tests. That fallout will be sharply reduced.

In our opinion the best reason for which the Commission could offer with regard to winning over a substantial part of the sincere opposition would be to say that hereafter the great bulk of our tests would be carried out underground, with no fall-out production, and that tests in the atmosphere would be limited so that the maximum fission yield from the tests of the year or two during year would not exceed a megaton per year. The Russians would be subject to a similar limitation. If they did so, and we did not, we would reduce the addition



to potential fall-out to between 10 and 20% of the average annual addition resulting from the tests conducted during the past 10 years. What is more important, in view of the rate of radioactive decay, if we would actually not increase the total amount of potential radioactive fallout beyond that prevailing this summer.

Admittedly the carrying of this program would not be easy, but an international inspection agency could be created which could determine compliance fairly accurately for each side. And, as a matter of fact, such a policy would penalize us so much that we might continue it for some time even if Russia did not carry out. Actually, the only tests of any size and importance which our people could not be carried out underground, would be in connection with the development of anti-missiles and some "flowing" tests.

While a majority of the Commission recommends that the first proposal be the one made, it would be desirable to go still further if necessary and eliminate all the proposals during a period of, say, two years. This would make it much harder for us to develop anti-missile missiles. It would also prevent testing some types of weapons as "ditch-digger" unless special exceptions were made for the type called under international inspection. Such an agreement could not be easily pulled, especially on small weapons, and would probably be avoided by the Russians unless there



were extensive political debate. Finally, it is only practically  
eliminate any additional restrictions that would the agreement  
was effective.

The Committee is unanimously agreed that to go any  
farther than this in the restriction of rights would seriously endanger  
the security of the United States.

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