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By DA. LK Date 7/22/95

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March 12, 1956

AEC 787/20

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ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

OFFICIAL OBSERVER PROGRAM FOR REDWING

Note by the Secretary

The General Manager has requested that the attached report by the Director of Military Application be circulated for consideration by the Commission at an early date.

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W. B. McCool  
Secretary

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 AUTHORITY: CLASS. EXT. DRDO  
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ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

OFFICIAL OBSERVER PROGRAM FOR OPERATION REDWING

Report to the General Manager by  
the Director of Military Application

THE PROBLEM

1. To consider the Official Observer Program for Operation REDWING.

SUMMARY

2. A program for Official Observers in Operation REDWING is necessary. However, limited housing facilities available in the PPG severely restrict the number of observers that can be accommodated.

3. The recommended AEC invitation list (Appendix "B") includes high government officials, AEC Washington headquarters personnel, AEC advisors and contractors, and AEC Operations Offices personnel in accordance with previous practices. Although the AEC list totals 110 individuals to be invited, an allocation of 60 AEC observer spaces is considered sufficient, since past experience indicates a large number of invitations are expected to be declined. Current Joint Task Force planning contemplates an allocation of 60 observer spaces to AEC.

4. The Official Observer Program approved by the DOD (AEC 787/17) and forwarded to the Commission for comment includes

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5 U.K. and 10 Canadian observers. By letter dated February 9, 1956 (AEC 787/16) the Deputy Secretary of Defense advised the Commission that dissemination of atomic information to these foreign <sup>observers</sup> ~~services~~ would be within the provision of Section 144b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and subject to the appropriate procedures pertaining to the necessary joint determinations required by Section 144b.

5. The DOD program places a five day limitation on the stay of each observer group in the PPG. This is considered necessary for use as a general rule. It is understood that CJTF-7 intends to temper application of the rule as appropriate in cases involving VIP.

6. The DOD program in AEC 787/17 specifies that representatives of the press or public information service will not be invited. On the other hand, we are of the opinion that DOD and AEC public information service representation will be needed throughout the series.

7. The official observers will have "Q" or <sup>other</sup> appropriate clearances. Information imparted in general briefings will be limited to weapon effects, size, weight, yield, etc. Specifically excluded will be information revealing the theory of TN design and specific amounts of fissionable and TN material. Information to which the U.K-Canadian observers will have access is yet to be determined by joint agreement between AEC and DOD.

#### STAFF JUDGMENTS

8. The Divisions of Classification, Information Services and Security and the Office of the General Counsel concur in the recommendation of this paper.

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CONCLUSIONS

9. It is concluded that:

a. An Official Observer Program for Operation REDWING is necessary and feasible.

b. The personnel listed in Appendix "B" should be invited by AEC to participate as Official Observers; and

c. The program recommended by the DOD (AEC 787/17) is acceptable to AEC provided that:

(1) The AEC is allocated 60 observer spaces in lieu of the 50 presently proposed;

(2) The DOD submits specific proposals for joint determination of the shot or shots to be observed by UK-Canadian observers, the extent of information to be imparted under the provisions of Section 144b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, and the measures to be taken to limit the dissemination of information to that agreed upon.

(3) The restriction on public information personnel attendance is removed. (The matter of news media representation is being dealt with separately.)

RECOMMENDATION

10. The General Manager recommends that the Atomic Energy Commission:

a. Approve the Official Observer Program for REDWING as proposed in AEC 787/17 and as modified in paragraph 9c above;

b. Approve the extension of appropriate invitations to the personnel listed in Appendix "B";

c. Note that the Chairman, MLC, will be informed of the Commission's action by a letter such as that in Appendix "E"; and

d. Note that the OSD will be informed of the Commission's action on the Foreign Observer question by a letter such as that in Appendix "F".

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APPENDIX "A"

BACKGROUND AND DISCUSSION

1. The Official Observer Program for Operation REDWING is concerned with key U. S. government officials and certain AEC and DOD personnel who have a direct interest in and responsibility for the atomic weapons program, plus a small number of United Kingdom and Canadian nationals whom the DOD plans to invite under the provisions of U. S. bilateral defense agreements with these nations.

2. A program for Official Observers is a necessity considering the intense interest of high government officials and key military personnel in the general progress of the atomic weapons development program, and particularly in the results of megaton weapon tests. The REDWING program probably will attract world-wide attention at a time when considerable pressure is being exerted to discontinue atomic weapon tests. An awareness of the necessity for and the progress made as a result of development and effects tests is required by certain key governmental officials, and others who have an immediate interest in the atomic weapon program. A limit to the number attending is required, however, because of limited accommodations at the test site.

3. Appendix "B" is a proposed list of AEC-invited Official Observers. The list, which includes high government officials, AEC Washington Headquarters personnel, AEC advisors and contractors, and AEC Operations Offices personnel, is in accord with previous practices. That portion of the list concerned with high government officials has been coordinated with DOD to avoid duplicate invitations. Appendix "C" describes a tentative JTF-7

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plan for handling observers in groups of about twenty per trip. Each trip would require ten to fourteen days absence from the Washington, D. C. area, including five to eight days in the forward area.




On the basis of 20 observer spaces per shot, equally split between DOD and AEC, these six shots would provide 60 observer spaces for each.

5. An allocation of 60 AEC spaces should be sufficient to allow extension of invitations as appropriate to all of the 110 individuals listed in Appendix "B", since on the basis of past experience a large number of invitations are expected to be declined. Records of Operation CASTLE show that of approximately 100 Official Observers invited, about one-half made a trip to the PPG, and about half of these or one-fourth of the total actually stayed to see a shot. Undoubtedly the extensive weather delays experienced in CASTLE were largely responsible for the small number who observed a shot. In this respect the REDWING operation should effect a definite improvement, since greater flexibility will result from more than double the number of shots, many low

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yield shots, and a dual firing capability (one in Bikini area and one in Eniwetok area).

6. AEC 787/17 contains the DOD-approved Official Observer Program for Operation REDWING, which was prepared by the CJTF-7 and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a modification to provide a total of 110 spaces, in lieu of the 100 spaces initially recommended. The DOD-approved program, which is forwarded to the AEC for concurrence and/or comment, provides for 50 AEC spaces, 50 DOD spaces, and 10 spaces for members of the Joint Permanent Defense Board, Canada -- United States, who are listed in Appendix "D". Five of these members are Canadians. The program also specifies that 10 of the DOD spaces will be reserved for 5 United Kingdom and 5 Canadian observers, making a total of fifteen foreign observers scheduled to participate in Operation REDWING.

7. The JTF-7 program providing for a total of 100 observer spaces was prepared prior to the addition of the Bassoon Prime shot to the REDWING series. Likewise the JCS action did not take into consideration this additional shot. Informal information from the Joint Task Force indicates that they are now planning on the basis of six megaton shots and a total of 120 observer spaces. Therefore, the Joint Task Force is agreeable to an allocation of 60 observer spaces to AEC. It is not anticipated that any difficulties will arise with the DOD since an allocation of 60 spaces to DOD may increase their present allocation by 10.

8. There are three other aspects of the DOD approved program which should be specially considered. One is the five day limitation placed on the stay of each observer group in the PPG. Another is the inclusion of foreign observers in the program. And the third is the statement that no representatives of the press or public information service be in attendance.

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Appendix "A"

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9. In consideration of the limited housing facilities available, and the desire to accommodate the maximum number of observers consistent with over-riding operational requirements, the five day limitation is necessary for use as a general rule. However, in view of the weather delays which will undoubtedly be encountered, it is understood that CJTF-7 intends to temper the application of this rule in the cases of VIP as appropriate.

10. By letter dated February 9, 1956 (AEC 787/16) the Deputy Secretary of Defense advised the Commission of DOD plans to invite 15 foreign observers to the tests and stated that dissemination of atomic information to these observers would be within the provisions of Section 144b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and subject to the appropriate procedures pertaining to the necessary joint determinations required by Section 144b. The attention of the Commission is invited to their previous actions in matters of this nature. In previous cases the Commission has approved the transmission of certain specified information on fission weapons, but has refused to authorize the transmission of any information on thermonuclear weapons. The Office of the General Counsel advises that permitting foreign nationals to observe the shots from the controlled area may involve the communication of Restricted Data to them within the meaning of Section 144b. However, the proposed observers in this case are representatives of Canada and the U. K., which have bilateral agreements under Section 144b that permit the exchange of certain Restricted Data, including yields and effects information. To the extent that the test information revealed to them comes within the exchangeable topics and does not in the joint judgment of AEC and DOD reveal important information concerning design or fabrication of the nuclear components, communication would not be prohibited by the 1954 Act. It is proposed therefore that

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DOD be informed that AEC concurrence in the foreign observer participation in the program proposed will be subject to joint agreement of the shot or shots to be observed, joint determination as to the information to be imparted under the provisions of Section 144b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, and the measures to be taken to limit the dissemination of information to that agreed upon.

11. Due to world-wide public attention on the tests and persistent demands that tests be discontinued, it is felt that public information service representatives of AEC and DOD will be needed throughout the series. The question of news media representations is being dealt with separately.

12. All official observers will have "Q" clearances or other appropriate clearance. Security briefings for all observers will be conducted by the CJTF-7. Each observer will be required to indicate his understanding of his security responsibilities by signing a Certificate of Security Responsibility. The general briefing for observers will be restricted to information within the following scope: weapon effects, size, weight, shape, kind of material used, general description of method of operation of weapon and yield. Specifically excluded will be information revealing the theory of TN design and specific amounts of fissionable and thermonuclear material involved. Less restrictive briefings for selected observers may be arranged by the CJTF-7 as appropriate and in accordance with guidance furnished by DMA. The access which will be afforded foreign observers must be determined by joint agreement of the AEC and DOD.

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APPENDIX "B"

INVITATION LIST FOR AEC OFFICIAL OBSERVERS

1. High Government Officials -- 40

President

Vice President

Secretary of State

Undersecretary of State

United States Representative to the United Nations

Secretary of Treasury

Director, Central Intelligence Agency

Director, Bureau of Budget

Administrator, Federal Civil Defense Administration

Special Assistant to Administrator, Federal Civil Defense Administration

2 -- Special Assistant to President

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Director, Office of Defense Mobilization

Director, National Security Council

18 -- Joint Committee on Atomic Energy

Chairman, House Appropriations Committee

Chairman, <sup>Public Works</sup> ~~Independent~~ Offices Subcommittee of ~~House~~ Appropriations Committee

Chairman, Senate Appropriations Committee

Chairman, <sup>AEC Panel, Public Work</sup> ~~Independent~~ Offices Subcommittee of Senate Appropriations Committee

Director, International Cooperation Administration

Chairman, Operations Coordinating Board

Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee for Internal Security

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2. Atomic Energy Commission Staff -- 37

- 5 -- Chairman and Commissioners
- 3 -- Special Assistants to the Chairman and to Commissioners
- 5 -- Office of the General Manager
- 1 -- Office of Operations Analysis
- 10 -- Division of Military Application
- 1 -- Office of the Secretary
- 1 -- Division of Biology and Medicine
- 1 -- Division of Classification
- 1 -- Division of Construction and Supply
- 1 -- Division of Finance
- 1 -- Division of Information Services
- 1 -- Division of Intelligence
- 1 -- Division of International Affairs
- 1 -- Division of Production
- 1 -- Division of Raw Materials
- 1 -- Division of Reactor Development
- 1 -- Division of Research
- 1 -- Division of Security

3. Atomic Energy Commission Advisors and Contractors -- 20

- 9 -- General Advisory Committee
- 3 -- Sandia Corporation
- 3 -- Regents, University of California
- President, Carbon and Carbide Chemical Company
- President, Mallinckrodt Chemical Company
- President, Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company
- President, Atomic Products Division, General Electric Company
- President, E. I. DuPont de Nemours Company

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4. Atomic Energy Commission Operations Offices -- 13

- 4 -- Santa Fe
- 1 -- Hanford
- 1 -- Kansas City
- 1 -- Los Alamos
- 1 -- New York
- 1 -- Oak Ridge
- 1 -- Rocky Flats
- 2 -- San Francisco
- 1 -- Savannah River

5. Total Official Observers to whom invitations would be issued -- 110

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APPENDIX "C"

TENTATIVE PLAN FOR THE ACCOMMODATION OF THE  
OFFICIAL OBSERVERS FOR OPERATION REDWING

1. Observers would be transported via SAM aircraft from the NATS SAM Squadron at Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland, or more probably Navy FLOGWING.

2. Proposed Itinerary:

Washington, D. C.	--	Washington National Airport
San Francisco	--	Travis Air Force Base
Honolulu	--	Hickam Air Force Base
Eniwetok	--	Eniwetok Air Base

3. Prior to witnessing detonations in the Pacific Proving Ground, the Official Observers would:

- a. Attend briefings.
- b. Take guided tours of Eniwetok and Parry, possibly Bikini.

4. Duration of Visit:

Each group would be in the PPG about five (5) days. This should provide them with an opportunity to view a large shot, or possibly a small shot if the large shot is delayed excessively, and perhaps both.

5. Witnessing points:

Small Shot: From a vantage point on the ground, or from the air in the JTF-7 R5D.

Large Shot: From the air - JTF-7 R5D.

There is a possibility that selected observers would be able to be aboard the ESTES, whose facilities are very limited, at shot time.

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6. Departure:

It is planned that the VIP aircraft will land at Eniwetok, discharge the passengers and then depart for Kwajalein to await the return trip. This is necessitated because of the extreme shortage of aircraft parking space on Eniwetok Island. They would view the shot from the ground or from the JTF-7 R5D. Post-shot, either the R5D will take them to Kwajalein, or the VIP aircraft would be called from Kwajalein to pick them up for return to the U.S. through Honolulu.

7. Variations:

Depending on the stature of the individuals and the practicability of their expressed desires, requested variations might be included in the plan.

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APPENDIX "D"

MEMBERS OF PERMANENT JOINT DEFENSE BOARD,  
CANADA - UNITED STATES

CANADA

Chairman:

General the Honorable Andrew G. L. McNaughton, former  
C of S of Canadian Army, now retired.

Members:

Maj. General Norman E. Rodger, Vice C of S, Canadian Army.  
RAdm Horatio Nelson Lay, Vice C of S, Canadian Navy.  
Air Vice Marshall C.R. Dunlap, Vice C of Air Staff, RCAF.  
Mr. Randolph A. Macdonnell, Asst. Dep. Minister of External  
Affairs for North American Affairs.

UNITED STATES

Chairman:

Dr. John A. Hannah, former Asst. Sec. of Defense, now  
President, Michigan State University.

Members:

Maj. General James Briggs, Asst. DC of S, Opns., DA.  
Maj. General Russell L. Vitrop, Asst. DC of S, Mil.  
Opns, DAF  
RAdm Chas. W. Wilkins, Pan American Affairs, CNO, DN.  
Mr. Robert G. Minor, Bureau of British Commonwealth, etc.,  
Dept. of State.

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APPENDIX "E"

DRAFT LETTER TO THE CHAIRMAN,  
MILITARY LIAISON COMMITTEE

1. Reference is made to your letter of February 17, 1956, which requested concurrence in or comments on the DOD approved Official Observer Program for Operation REDWING.

2. The Atomic Energy Commission concurs in the recommended program with the exception of the limitation on AEC observer space to 50 in number and the exclusion of public information personnel, and with reservations concerning foreign observer participation.

3. The number of official observers that we must sponsor requires that the AEC allocation be raised to 60 observer spaces. We suggest that, to accomplish this increase, the JTF-7 conduct six trips of approximately 20 observers each. The original program, which recommends five trips, was based on attendance at the five megaton category shots which were in the test program at the time.

 The sixth trip will provide the required 10 additional spaces for AEC and 10 extra for DOD.

4. Due to world-wide public attention on the tests and persistent demands that tests be discontinued, it is felt that representatives of AEC and DOD public information service will be needed throughout the test series. The question of informing news media is being dealt with separately.

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6. We concur in the foreign observer representation which you propose provided that the DOD and the AEC first agree on the shot or shots to be observed, and jointly determine the extent of information to be imparted under the provisions of Section 144b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the measures to be taken to limit the dissemination of information to that agreed upon. The Secretary of Defense is being informed of this proposal by a separate communication in answer to the Deputy Secretary's letter of February 9, 1956, on this subject.

7. It is realized that early action is required to implement the Official Observer Program, therefore we recommend that, if the DOD concurs in the above recommendations, the CJTF-7 be advised to implement the Program as amended, with the understanding that details concerning foreign observer participation will be provided at a later date.

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APPENDIX "F"

DRAFT LETTER TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1. The Commission concurs in the Department of Defense plans, as mentioned in your letter of February 9, 1956, to invite ten members (including five Canadian) of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada -- United States, and five observers each from Canada and the United Kingdom to attend Operation REDWING. With respect to such foreign observers, however, our concurrence is subject to the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission agreeing on the shot or shots to be observed, jointly determining the extent of information to be imparted under the provisions of Section 144b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the measures to be taken to limit the dissemination of information to that agreed upon.

2. Accordingly, we request that the Department of Defense submit its specific proposals concerning the observation of tests by, and the transmission of weapons information to the foreign observers.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 2.6

NW 97200 GA  
By DM LSC Date 7/21/05

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Appendix "F"