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ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

JOINT AEC-DOD INFORMATION PLAN FOR
OPERATION REDWING

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Report to the General Manager
by the Director of Information Services

THE PROBLEM

1. To consider a Joint AEC-DOD Information Plan for Operation REDWING.

SUMMARY

2. At Meeting 1135 on October 5, 1955, after consideration of AEC 787/3, the Commission noted that a public information plan for Operation REDWING would be prepared and submitted for Commission consideration. The Joint Information Plan of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense of Operation REDWING, attached as Appendix "B", is submitted in accordance with the Commission's action referred to above. The attached Joint Plan is being considered concurrently in the Department of Defense.

STAFF JUDGMENTS

3. The Divisions of Military Application, Security, Classification, Biology and Medicine, and International Affairs and the General Counsel concur in the recommendation of this paper.

[REDACTED]

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW	
1ST REVIEW DATE: <u>08/27/01</u>	DETERMINATION (CIRCLE NUMBER(S))
AUTHORITY: <u>DAAC/ADP/DAAD</u>	1. CLASSIFICATION RETAINED
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2ND REVIEW DATE: <u>11/3/01</u>	3. CONTAINS NO DOE CLASSIFIED INFO
AUTHORITY: <u>ADP</u>	4. COORDINATE WITH:
NAME: <u>Thery Austin</u>	5. CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED
	6. CLASSIFIED INFO BRACKETED
	7. OTHER (SPECIFY): <u>LA 215-239</u>

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RECOMMENDATION

4. The General Manager recommends that the Atomic Energy Commission:

a. Approve the AEC-DOD Joint Information Plan for Operation REDWING (attached as Appendix "B");

b. Authorize the establishment of a Joint Test Information Office as provided in the Information Plan;

c. Note that the Joint Test Information Office will prepare, as deemed necessary by the Commission and the Department of Defense, announcements that a shot has taken place on a certain date at any time subsequent to the detonation;

d. Note that when announcements of detonations are issued, the yield will be stated in terms of "kiloton range" or "megaton range";

e. Note that if all detonations were to be announced, the revelation of the total number will require declassification from Confidential, Defense Information;

f. Note that the Plan provides for subsequent addition of special information projects which may include an uncleared observer program;

g. Note that the plan includes provision for reporting fall-out, including readings in the U.S. if necessary;

h. Note that in view of possible international repercussions of such nature as to affect the national interest, a flexible procedure is established to take additional informational actions as deemed necessary;

i. Note that official background material and reporting of spot news is to be prepared to respond to the extent possible to the expected requests from U.S. media and as a means for having material available, if necessary, to combat unfavorable reaction abroad;

k. Note that the Joint Information Plan for Operation REDWING is before the Department of Defense for approval; and

l. Note that a letter notifying the JCAE of the Information Plan will be transmitted after coordination of the plan with other Executive Agencies.

[REDACTED]

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APPENDIX "A"

BACKGROUND AND DISCUSSION

BACKGROUND

1. The AEC and the Department of Defense, in previous weapons tests in the Pacific, have sought to hold information activities to a low key preceding and during operations but after the tests have provided considerable official reporting such as the news conference after GREENHOUSE, and, in the case of SANDSTONE, GREENHOUSE and IVY, the release of documentary films.

2. With each succeeding announcement of a new test series, demands from U. S. and overseas news media to cover tests has become more persistent. This general Information Plan for Operation REDWING would be in effect at all times except a period during which correspondents might be admitted. If correspondents should be admitted a special information plan would be effective.

3. In the CASTLE series there was authorization for compilation of a comprehensive public reporting record for all media for use after the series had concluded. However, the incident of heavy contamination of the Japanese fishing boat and the subsequent unfavorable reaction abroad caused the abandonment of plans to process the material that had been gathered by Joint Task Force Seven.

4. In the interval since Operation CASTLE, interest in and concern over the subject of radioactive fallout resulting from nuclear weapons tests has increased in the United States

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and in the world. This concern was heightened by the death of a Japanese seaman and it is probable that unfriendly interests will revive this incident during Operation REDWING. The world concern over fallout led to the adoption early in December 1955 by the United Nations General Assembly of a resolution setting up a U.N. Scientific Committee to receive and publish reports from member nations of occurrence and hazards of ionizing radiation originating from tests.

5. The National Academy of Sciences may issue one or more progress reports in the first half of April on its current study of radiation hazards. The Division of Biology and Medicine also advises that it is likely that by the first part of July, Academy reports will be issued on the Pathology Conference and, possibly, the Genetics Conference and that some of the other reports undoubtedly will appear before Operation REDWING is completed,

6. The United Nations Scientific Committee on Radiation is holding its first sessions as this paper is written. The Executive Board of the World Health Organization will recommend a "comprehensive program" of research and study for protection against the effects of atomic radiation to the World Health Assembly scheduled to open in Geneva, Switzerland on May 8, 1956.

7. Concurrent with the attention to radiation hazards, proposals for a moratorium on nuclear weapons testing have been revived, notably at the last meeting of the United Nations Trusteeship Council. The Trusteeship Council meets again early in June, 1956. In January, the pro-American elements in the Japanese Diet were forced to go along with a resolution

[REDACTED]

calling for cessation of tests but were able to get it watered down to an appeal to the United Nations and to include all nations capable of conducting tests.

8. Also, during March, 1956, the United Nations Disarmament Commission Subcommittee is holding session. Test activity cannot be forecast with any certainty. However, beginning in April there will be British tests. Operation REDWING begins in May and will extend well into the summer.

9. Meantime, the military requirements for nuclear weapons have grown and the diversity of their application calls for increasing research and development. In Operation REDWING, for example, it is necessary to proof test an atomic warhead for air-to-air missiles to be used in air defense.

10. In Operation REDWING, as in previous tests, the Information Plan must insure that all information officially released will be issued within the limits of national security and that advance precautions will be taken to prevent inadvertent disclosure by test personnel or observers of information adverse to the security or general interests of the United States.

11. Official issuances through March 1, 1956, have been the initial joint AEC - Department of Defense announcement and statement by the Chairman of the AEC issued January 12, 1956 and the announcement of the Danger Area, issued March 1, 1956 (attached as Annex to Appendix "A"). With the exception of editorial criticism in Great Britain, the first two were treated relatively routinely abroad, with considerable emphasis on the statement that the detonations would be smaller in yield than in 1954.

DISCUSSION

12. The proposed Information Plan for Operation REDWING provides for the preparation of more material for official reporting before and during operations than for previous tests. The plan has been deliberately worded so as not to fix rigid policies, but to allow flexibility in the handling of situations as they may develop. Successful execution of this Plan calls for rapid and skilled coordination among JTF-7, the AEC, DOD and other government agencies.

13. The Commission and the Office of the Secretary of Defense shall approve all public issuances provided for in the Information Plan.

14. The specific new information activities planned for use as deemed necessary, are:

a. Reporting of fallout from the Pacific area and in the continental United States.

b. Official reporting, particularly concerning the safety aspects of Operation REDWING, during the pre-test and operational period.

c. Post-shot announcements of detonations with a brief generalized description of class of yield such as "Kiloton" or "megaton" range. However, implementation would depend on the circumstances in each case. Necessary notifications by JTF to halt commercial flights through the Danger Area constitute notices of some expected detonations.

ANNEX TO APPENDIX "A"

OFFICIAL ISSUANCES ON OPERATION REDWING
THROUGH MARCH 1, 1956

STATEMENT BY THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
AND THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

In the absence of effective international agreement safeguarded by adequate inspection to limit or control armaments, the United States Government continually endeavors to maintain the most modern efficient military strength for purposes of peace. Pursuant to this course, preparations are underway for a series of nuclear tests to begin in the spring at the Eniwetok Proving Grounds. One of the important purposes of this series will be the further development of methods of defense against nuclear attack.

Air and sea traffic will be notified through normal channels of the details of the control area well in advance of the commencement of operations.

Operations will be conducted by Joint Task Force 7, commanded by Rear Admiral B. Hall Hanlon, USN. Dr. Alvin C. Graves, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, is Deputy Commander for Scientific Matters.

STATEMENT BY LEWIS L. STRAUSS,
CHAIRMAN OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

Chairman Lewis L. Strauss of the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission today made the following statement, in response to published speculation and inquiries by news correspondents:

The forthcoming series of nuclear tests at the Eniwetok Proving Grounds, as announced today by the Commission and the Department of Defense, will involve weapons generally smaller in yield than those tested during the 1954 test series.

It is anticipated that the energy release of the largest test will be substantially below that of the maximum 1954 test.

AEC ANNOUNCES DANGER AREA IN PACIFIC FOR NUCLEAR TESTS

As part of the safety precautions for the forthcoming nuclear tests at the Eniwetok Proving Ground, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission today issued public notice of the danger area which will be established in the North Pacific Ocean effective April 20, 1956.

This notice is being given the widest possible distribution through marine, aviation, and international organizations.

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
The area is generally rectangular in shape and comprises roughly 375,000 nautical square miles. While slightly smaller than the danger zone used in the latter part of the 1954 series, it is many times larger than the initial area used in 1954 and has been reoriented slightly for increased safety.

Lewis L. Strauss, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, has announced that the forthcoming series of tests will involve weapons generally smaller in yield than those tested during the 1954 test series. It is anticipated that the energy release of the largest test will be substantially below that of the maximum 1954 test.

There will be a post operation radiological survey of the control area. Although it is estimated that most, if not all, of the area will be released from control by the end of August 1956, it is not now possible to fix a final effective date.

Effective April 20, all ships, aircraft and personnel are cautioned to remain clear of the area enclosed by the following geographic coordinates:

18° 30' N 158° 00' E - 18° 30' N 172° 00' E - 11°
30' N 172° 00' E - 11° 30' N 166° 16' E - 10°
15' N 166° 16' E - 10° 15' N 158° 00' E extending
North to 18° 30' N 158° 00' E.



ENIWETOK PROVING GROUND CONTROL AREA

-221

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APPENDIX "B"

JOINT AEC-DOD OPERATION REDWING
INFORMATION PLAN

A. PURPOSE

1. Consistent with national policy and security requirements of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense, to establish policies and procedures for the compilation, control, review and issuance of public information related to Operation REDWING at the Commission's Pacific Proving Ground scheduled to begin about May 1, 1956.

2. These policies and procedures, based on previous tests and events and public reaction which occurred during and after Operation CASTLE in 1954, are designed:

a. To prepare for public issuance as much information as may be necessary to retain and improve public support in the United States for nuclear test activities and to offset unfavorable developments elsewhere that may arise in connection with Operation REDWING, especially as related to radiation effects.

b. To provide for swift action to issue official factual reports on emergencies, should any arise, when such action is necessary to dispel rumor or speculation harmful to the success of the operation or the interests of the United States.

c. To establish in the AEC Division of Biology and Medicine a system for fast compilation in Washington for public release, if needed, of fall-out data in the Pacific area and, in cooperation with the United States Public Health Service, in the United States.

3. If an uncleared observer project is approved, a special public information plan will govern its information activities.

B. RESPONSIBILITY

4. The responsibility for the preparation and issuance of all public information materials of Operation REDWING rests with the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

a. When ~~appropriate~~^{appropriate}, the AEC and DOD will consult with the Department of State, United States Information Agency and appropriate government coordinating bodies on the timing and issuance of official information concerning Operation REDWING.

b. Statements approved by AEC and DOD before or during the operational period may be issued by the Commander, JTF-7 in Honolulu simultaneously with release in Washington.

c. Commander, Joint Task Force Seven, is responsible for the inclusion in operational reports of sufficient data and descriptive material as may be necessary for the compilation in Washington of public announcements concerning Operation REDWING. (See Annex "A" to Information Plan).

5. Commander, Joint Task Force Seven is responsible, within the limitations of Paragraph 3, "Public Information" of Annex B, CJTF-7, Operation Plan No. 1-56 (attached as Annex "B" to Information Plan), for implementing within JTF-7 public information policies consistent with this Information Plan.

6. Commander, Joint Task Force Seven is responsible also for supporting any additional or special information activities that may be authorized by the AEC and DOD and for recommending such other information activity as will assist him in carrying out his duties.

7. Within the Atomic Energy Commission, the Division of Information Services will be responsible for coordinating review of REDWING public information material. All public information material coming first to the AEC will be submitted to the DOD for review prior to issuance.

8. Within the Department of Defense, in accordance with Directives numbered S-5400.2 dated 22 September 1952 and 5230.4 dated 26 November 1952, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Legislative and Public Affairs, will be responsible for coordination and review of REDWING public information matters.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

All public information material coming first to DOD will be submitted for AEC review prior to issuance.

C. ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURES

9. To carry out this Information Plan, there shall be set up in Washington, as soon as possible, a Joint Test Information Office headed by a Project Director designated by the AEC and a Deputy Project Officer designated by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Legislation and Public Affairs.

a. The Joint Test Information Office shall be under the direct supervision of the General Manager of the AEC and all public information announcements, after coordination as provided in this Plan, shall be issued by this Office through AEC and DOD channels except as the Commission or the Office of the Secretary of Defense may direct.

b. The AEC and the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Legislative and Public Affairs will assign such additional personnel to the Joint Test Information Office in Washington as may be required.

10. Members of the AEC Public Information staff and of the staff of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Legislative and Public Affairs shall be assigned to the staff of Commander, JTF, as Information Advisers.

11. In order to have available the material that may be needed for official issuances:

a. The Commander, JTF-7, will include in his operational reports the data detailed in Annex "A" to this Information Plan.

b. The Division of Biology and Medicine, AEC, will compile fast readings of fall-out in the U.S. from reports received from 11 AEC installations and from 20 U.S. Public Health Service stations which are cooperating in this project. These stations will be permitted, upon inquiry, to give the fall-out readings from day to day, in accordance with specific instructions to be drafted by the Divisions of Biology and Medicine and Information Services.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

c. The New York Operations Office will compile data resulting from the information collected by its monitoring network. The AEC Division of Information Services will consolidate these records for use of the agencies concerned.

d. The Joint Test Information Office will evaluate the data received under a, b, and c and recommend what information action, if any, should be taken, beyond the announcements permitted under b.

12. With the aim of countering, if necessary, adverse reaction abroad before and during Operation REDWING and in view of the scheduled sessions of the United Nations Disarmament Commission Subcommittee:

a. The United States Information Agency will be requested to prepare for AEC and DOD weekly surveys of foreign reaction relating to Operation REDWING.

b. The Joint Test Information Office, the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Legislative and Public Affairs and the Public Information Service, AEC, will record requests for more information relating to Operation REDWING. The Joint Tests Information Office will consolidate these records for use of the agencies concerned.

c. The information gathered under a and b will be evaluated periodically by the AEC and DOD to determine if any information action not scheduled in this Plan is warranted. Recommendations for action will be referred to the appropriate authorities.

13. In the interest of as complete official reporting as may be practicable in responding to expected requests from news media, even if an uncleared observer project is approved, and to combat unfavorable reaction in the U.S. and elsewhere, the Joint Test Information Office is to prepare for Joint AEC-DOD issuance, beginning immediately and continuing to the end of Operation REDWING, various types of informational material which may include:

a. Background information on previous overseas and continental test series; JTF criteria, controls and operational procedures; discussion of radiation effects; material on monitoring and fall-out reporting; details of improved weather forecasting; methods of dissemination of radiation warnings, etc.

[REDACTED]

b. Where possible, material for visual media should be prepared along with that for other media.

14. Operational information in the reports of Commander, JTF-7, subsequent to each detonation will be used to determine if a public announcement should be issued to cover the type of burst (air or ground), generalized description of explosive force as "megaton" or "kiloton" range, area of detonation (Eniwetok or Bikini) and statement on safety or casualties.

15. Prior to issuance of any public information AEC and DOD will, if practicable, notify the Commander, JTF-7, of the time and date of issuance and the text of the material.

D. SECURITY OF INFORMATION

16. Unless variances are specifically approved by the Commission and the Department of Defense, material publicly issued shall conform to the AEC-DOD Declassification Guides.

17. The Joint Task Force may disseminate to all individuals in the Joint Task Force the publicly issued official statements relating to the test series for guidance with the caution that NO information beyond the content of the official statements is to be made public by statement, letter, interview or conversation except those topics listed under paragraph 12 b, JTF-7 Security Memorandum Number 205-2, dated 3 October 1955. (The Security Memorandum is attached as Annex "C")

E. ISSUANCE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION AT CONCLUSION OF TESTS AND IN POST-OPERATIONAL PERIOD

18. The Joint Test Information Office will prepare an announcement of the conclusion of the REDWING series for AEC-DOD approval and issuance in Washington.

[REDACTED]

19. Following the operation, the AEC and DOD will consult with the appropriate coordinating bodies of the Government to determine whether further public reporting on Operation REDWING is in the national interest. The AEC and DOD will jointly approve whatever public reporting program is agreed upon.

20. Information proposed for public issuance by individuals or organizations after completion of the operational period for Operation REDWING will be submitted for review and coordination by AEC and DOD as follows:

a. All AEC units, contractors and official observers will submit any proposed informational material to the Division of Information Services through their normal administrative channels.

b. Military and civilian units, organizations and individuals responsible to the military services will submit their material through their normal organizational channels to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Legislative and Public Affairs, for review by AEC and DOD, Washington.

F. POSSIBLE EMERGENCY ANNOUNCEMENTS

21. The Commander, JTF-7, will recommend to AEC and DOD announcements he deems necessary to serve the public interest and operating requirements of JTF-7 in the event of emergencies such as dangerous fall-out on a populated area; evacuation of personnel or natives or unusual and severe accidents to JTF-7 personnel.

a. Casualties to military personnel may be reported by the Service concerned in accordance with Department of Defense Directive No. 5410.1, dated 22 October 1952, and may be announced only after approval by the Office of Public Information, DOD and AEC.

ANNEX "A" TO APPENDIX "B"

UNDERSTANDINGS AND SPECIFICATIONS RE DATA IN
CJTTF-7 OPERATIONAL REPORTS FOR PUBLIC REPORTING

1. To carry out the purposes of the Joint AEC-DOD Information Plan for Operation REDWING and specify the data required, the Commander, JTF-7, has been requested to provide in his operational reports the following information:

a. Details of any search report other than "all clear" should be transmitted at once and should include the facts on whether a vessel or plane was found in or outside the danger area; time; location with reference to the danger area; size and type of vessel or plane with estimated number of persons aboard; probable nationality; action taken by JTF and result of this action.

b. If for any reason, all monitor stations are not activated on any given shot, reasons therefor should be transmitted.

c. If for any reason, all scheduled monitoring and cloud tracking flights are not carried out, reasons therefor should be transmitted.

d. Projected path of cloud should be transmitted and subsequent reports should give details of any significant deviation from the predicted path.

e. Present calculations are that fallout will not be significant on any inhabited atoll and no necessity for evacuating natives is expected. However, monitoring is scheduled to be activated on 16 islands. Any unexpected development requiring any safety action - whether or not fallout does prove to be significant - should be reported fully, giving numbers of persons involved, fallout readings, and stating what action - whether precautionary or remedial - was taken.

f. Principal data on the amount and distribution of fallout, including readings from the aerial surveys and from the ground monitoring stations.

2. The Joint AEC-DOD Information Office in Washington in the absence of any specific mention to the contrary in the operations reports WILL PROCEED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT: (a) air and sea search was made prior to each shot and the danger area reported officially "all clear"; (b) all monitor stations - manned and automatic - were activated, and (c) all scheduled monitoring and cloud tracking flights were carried out as planned.

ANNEX "B" TO APPENDIX "B"

CJTF-7 NO. 1-56, OPERATION PLAN ANNEX B - CONCEPT OF
INTELLIGENCE SECURITY AND PUBLIC INFORMATION,
PARAGRAPH 3

"3. Public Information

a. Joint Task Force Seven does not release any public information.

b. Releases to the press in regard to JTF-7 operation and activities are made only by AEC or DOD.

c. Personnel of the Joint Task Force are prohibited from releasing any information for publication, in regard to the JTF or its activities. They must neither confirm or deny any articles appearing in the press. Queries from the press or elsewhere will be referred to the DOD or AEC.

d. AEC-DOD releases, when made, will be disseminated to units of JTF-7 through normal communication channels at the earliest possible time."

ANNEX "C" TO APPENDIX "B"

HEADQUARTERS
JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN
Washington 25, D. C.

STANDING OPERATIONS PROCEDURE)
NUMBER 205-2)

3 October 1955

SECURITY

BASIC SECURITY INDOCTRINATION

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1. RESCISSION. This SOP rescinds Security Memoranda 2 and 3, Headquarters, Joint Task Force SEVEN, dated 11 February 1954 and 15 August 1953, respectively. These memoranda will be removed from the files and destroyed.

2. REFERENCE. Bases for this SOP are Department of Defense and Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) directives:

- a. OPNAV Instruction 5510.1A
- b. Army Regulation 380-5, 7 December 1954

- c. Air Force Regulation 205-1, 15 December 1953
d. Air Force Manual 205-5, May 1955
e. United States Atomic Energy Commission: General Manager Security Bulletins; Volume 2000 (Security)

3. PURPOSE. The basic aim is to educate all JTF SEVEN personnel in the security fundamentals that pertain to JTF SEVEN operations. The final goal is to impress upon all a strong feeling for security on and off the job.

4. SCOPE. This SOP applies to all personnel who are either assigned or attached to Headquarters, Joint Task Force SEVEN or any of its subordinate units.

5. DEFINITIONS.

a. Access - The authority and opportunity to obtain knowledge of classified matter.

b. Classified Information - Official information that must be protected in the interest of national defense and is classified for this purpose by a proper authority.

c. Classified Matter (Material) - Matter in any form or of any nature on or in which classified information is recorded or embodied. The words "classified matter" and "classified material" mean the same thing.

d. Classification - Defense information or material is classified when it is assigned to one of the following categories depending on the degree of protection required:

- (1) TOP SECRET - Classification for defense information whose security aspect is paramount. Its disclosure to unauthorized personnel could result in exceptionally grave damage to the United States.
- (2) SECRET - Classification for defense information whose unauthorized disclosure could result in serious damage to the United States.
- (3) CONFIDENTIAL AND CONFIDENTIAL--MODIFIED HANDLING AUTHORIZED--Classification for defense information whose unauthorized disclosure could be prejudicial to the defense interests of the nation. Confidential--Modified Handling Authorized is defense information that pertains to combat or combat-related operations which may be protected by safeguards that normally would not be adequate for CONFIDENTIAL information.

f. Clearance - An administrative determination that an individual is eligible, from a security standpoint, for access to classified matter of a specified category: Top Secret, Secret, or Confidential.

g. Compromise - A loss of security that results from an unauthorized person obtaining knowledge of classified matter.

h. Handling - This term includes preparation, processing, transmission, and custody of classified matter.

i. Marking - The physical act of indicating on classified matter its assigned classification and any special limitations or instructions.

j. "Need to Know" - The requirement that the dissemination of classified matter be limited strictly to those persons who are properly cleared and need classified information to perform their official duties.

k. Security - The result of measures taken by individuals or a unit to guard against espionage, observation sabotage, communications intercept, annoyance, or surprise. Security is the protection of classified matter to prevent unauthorized persons from obtaining information of direct or indirect military value.

l. "Restricted Data" (AEC) - As defined by Public Law 703-83rd Congress (Atomic Energy Act of 1954), Restricted Data means all data concerning design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons; the production of special nuclear material; or the use of special nuclear material in the production of energy; but shall not include data declassified or removed from the Restricted Data category by the Atomic Energy Commission.

SECTION II

BASIC SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY

6. SECURITY IS A PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY!

a. Joint Task Force SEVEN's mission to conduct overseas atomic tests. In the interest of national security, the details of these tests and the scientific data obtained from them are not publicized. Such information must be protected because of its vital nature, so it becomes classified information.

b. As a member of Joint Task Force SEVEN, you will have access to sensitive information concerning atomic energy and AEC operations. Your presence at the Pacific Proving Ground alone will expose you to classified information. The loss of this information to other nations, whether accidental or deliberate, could cause grave damage to the United States. To be assigned to JTF SEVEN, you must have or be eligible for a security clearance. But your personal responsibility toward security does not stop with this purely administrative determination. Your responsibility does not end when you lock your safe; leave your office, station, or ship. Security and security consciousness must be a part of your make-up everywhere, always. This obligation has no middle ground--all must be alert to protect classified matter in thought, talk, and action.

7. LOOSE TALK. Loose talk is any remark made directly to or within the hearing of anyone not authorized such information. Don't talk about classified matters with people just because you

[REDACTED]

know or work with them. Every Security regulation that governs us is very specific on this point: only those who have a clearance and a "need to know" shall be given classified information. It's easy to see that your wife, sweetheart, parents brother, sister, or friends rarely are authorized such access - let alone have a "need to know" what you see, do, or hear. But close friends and associates right within JTF SEVEN aren't necessarily privileged to receive classified information either, merely because they have a clearance. A frequent breach of security stems from talking with someone about classified information just because he or she is cleared.

8. TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS.

a. Do not discuss classified information over the telephone. You may refer to classified material over the phone, provided your references do not disclose classified information. For instance, you may refer to file numbers, dates, and subject--if the subject itself is unclassified. But you must be very careful not to reveal classified information. Always assume that your line may be tapped; your conversation may be monitored and recorded by almost anyone. Don't try to outsmart whomever may be eavesdropping with so called "double-talk". You fool no one but yourself.

b. An exception to the foregoing rule is that you may transmit SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL information over communications circuits that are specifically approved by your commander. However, you are still responsible to make sure that the circuit you use is approved for such transmission. TOP SECRET information may not be discussed over the telephone under any circumstances.

9. CONCEIT AND BOASTING. Conceit and boasting are principal causes of security violations. By itself, conceit is harmless. But conceit leads to boasting and boasting is not always harmless. A man usually boasts because he wants to impress others. He wants to show everyone that he is "in the know", "on the inside", has the "big picture". To prove his importance, the braggard may blurt out classified information.

10. NEWSPAPER AND MAGAZINE ARTICLES. Because a newspaper or magazine prints an article about our activities does not authorize you to write or talk about that information. Your denial or confirmation of such an article can either invalidate or verify unevaluated information. By adding to these accounts, you may reveal details our government feels need safeguarding. Here again, boasting enters the picture. Don't try to prove that you are "in the know".

11. YOUR FAMILY. During your assignment with JTF SEVEN, you may have to pass certain unclassified movement information to your wife or family to solve household and personal problems. This information is usually spelled out in unclassified travel orders: the date when you as an individual are to leave, by what method, your destination. Keep all you tell your wife or family in this respect on a personal basis. Once you link your departure, the reason for it, or any other related information to JTF SEVEN activities, you may violate security. Use common sense in this respect. Explain to your wife or family that although what you tell them is not classified, they should not discuss it with friends and neighbors, at social gatherings or

public places -- or even among other JTF SEVEN wives. Your wife, your family will understand that apparently harmless information could be used against our nation's best interests.

12. PERSONAL CORRESPONDENCE.

a. Classified information is properly transmitted as official correspondence. Official channels are designed to protect that information according to the classification assigned to the correspondence. Be particularly careful of what you write in your personal letters. Do not write about JTF SEVEN operations or atomic energy technical data. To help you recognize prohibited topics, here are a few examples:

TOPICS RELATING TO JTF SEVEN ACTIVITIES PROHIBITED IN PERSONAL LETTERS

- Code name of operation
- Personnel strength and detailed organization
- Location of buildings, facilities, power plants, docks, airfields
- Types of numbers of vessels
- Types of numbers of aircraft
- Types of numbers of equipment
- Time of beginning or end of test series
- Number and time (date) of shots in test series
- That you saw a shot
- Detailed movements within forward operational area
- Any preparations for tests
- Any dates of scheduled tests
- Anything observed about tests
- Anything heard about tests
- Anything done in connection with tests
- Any test results
- Presence or visits of official observers
- Any information about security violations
- Any information about security safeguards

b. Here are some examples of what you may write in your personal letters as long as there is no reference to the preceding prohibited topics:

- Your health and welfare
- Recreation and sports activities
- General remarks about the weather
- Food and billets
- Where you are located (Eniwetok or Bikini Atoll, Marshall Islands)
- Associates and friends
- Club or church activities
- Other matters of a personal nature

c. Write each letter with the thought: "Does this letter say anything my security officer would not pass?" The list of prohibited topics gives only a few items that may not be discussed in personal correspondence. If you have any doubts, consult your security officer. In addition to keeping your letters personal, ask your correspondents not to give publicity to your letters, particularly not to give them to the press for publication.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

13. DIARIES AND SCRAP BOOKS. Personal records, diaries, scrap books or papers containing facts or opinions, either personal or official, that relate to classified matter are a threat to security. Do not keep private records, diaries, scrap books, or papers that contain classified information. Don't collect as souvenirs or convert to your personal use any classified matter.

14. CONTRABAND.

a. Certain personally owned items could be used as instruments for espionage, sabotage, or to demoralize personnel. They are prohibited in the Eniwetok-Bikini operational area. When you are ordered to the Pacific Proving Ground, do not take with you; have anyone send you; or have in your possession while there, any of these items:

- (1) photographic equipment, such as cameras, film, etc.
- (2) equipment designed for either visual or electrical communications
- (3) optical equipment, such as binoculars and telescopes
- (4) materials with explosive capabilities
- (5) weapons, except ordinary pocket and sheath knives
- (6) drugs, except as prescribed by a physician
- (7) intoxicating beverages

b. As soon as you arrive in Eniwetok, you will undergo a baggage search. Unless your commander specifically authorized in your travel orders, or in a separate letter, that you carry a certain contraband item, any contraband item found in your possession will be confiscated. Confiscated contraband will be turned over to your task group commander for disposition.

c. Should you receive any of these items through the mails, take them immediately to your security officer for proper disposition. You should then advise the donor not to mail you any of these items while you are at the Pacific Proving Ground. To avoid embarrassment, tell your family and friends about this prohibition before you leave.

15. YOUR SECURITY OFFICER. A security officer is designated for each organization and unit within JTF SEVEN. Part of his job is to help you carry out your security responsibility. Consult him when you need information or must resolve a security problem. Learn his name; jot down his telephone number; remember where his office is. He will be "in" to you any time you need him. Don't take chances. Ask questions.

16. REPORTING SECURITY VIOLATIONS. It is each person's responsibility to report security infractions. Make a report to your security officer if you have knowledge of a security violation; find classified papers or material in public places; overhear a conversation in public places concerning classified matter; or discover the loss of classified matter. Don't hesitate to report if you have committed a security violation. A prompt report may prevent a minor incident from becoming serious.

[REDACTED]

SECTION III

SAFEGUARDING SECURITY INFORMATION

17. PURPOSE. The instructions in this section are general in nature. They are written to cover broadly how and why each of us must safeguard classified matter. Persons who must handle classified material and Restricted Data are directed to read and stay current with their respective service security regulations or AEC security regulations, as well as JTF SEVEN security directives.

18. TRANSMISSION OF CLASSIFIED MATTER.

a. Classified information should not be removed from a headquarters or an office unless absolutely necessary; then, it may be removed only with your commander's permission. When a person has to carry classified matter, he is responsible to safeguard it properly until he can turn it over to an authorized person. When a person turns classified matter over to another for storage or safe-keeping, he must assure that:

- (1) the person is authorized to accept the classified matter.
- (2) adequate storage facilities are available
- (3) proper receipts are obtained for the matter

b. Joint Task Force SEVEN Liaison Officers, Courier Transfer Stations, or the Adjutant General's office on military bases are suitable places where Armed Forces personnel may store classified matter temporarily should it be necessary. AEC personnel should store classified matter in this instance according to AEC instructions. Under no circumstances should one entrust classified matter to hotel clerks, bell hops, pullman porters, train conductors, airplane stewards, BOQ clerks, baggage men, etc.

c. Top Secret matter (Restricted Data and Non-Restricted Data) must be carried by an officially designated courier; it may not be sent through the mails. Only officers, warrant officers, or specially designated civilians may act as Top Secret Couriers for JTF SEVEN.

d. Secret and Confidential matter (Restricted Data and Non-Restricted Data) may be sent by courier or by registered mail, either ordinary or air mail, as long as the material never leaves official United States mail channels

e. To insure adequate control, receipts must be used with all Top Secret and Secret matter. Top Secret matter must be processed through the Top Secret Control Office. Confidential matter may require a receipt at the discretion of the sender. An exception is that Confidential Restricted Data must be receipted for.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

19. STORAGE OF CLASSIFIED MATTER.

a. When classified matter is not actually in use or under the direct observation of a responsible person, it must be stored according to AEC or service directives as they apply to the various elements of the Task Force. Local conditions and storage facilities differ within the Task Force. To allow for certain variations among the armed forces and AEC policies on the storing of classified matter, no specific standards have been established by the Commander, Joint Task Force SEVEN. Instead, he requires that each task group commander meets the minimum requirements of his respective service regulations.

b. You will frequently see "For Official Use Only" (AEC- Official Use Only) stamped on certain documents or material. The term is not a classification. It merely identifies certain official information that is unclassified, but still needs protection. Matter marked "For Official Use Only" is stored in either a locked safe, a locked file cabinet, a locked room, or a guarded building or area.

20. SAFE AND CABINET SECURITY. Persons who have custody of or responsibility for classified material must inspect their offices or areas to insure that all classified matter is properly protected at all times. In each headquarters or each office a responsible person should be designated to make inspections of specific rooms or areas at the end of each working day to insure that no classified material has been left out and that each container has been locked.

21. RESPONSIBILITY. Although each commander is responsible for security within his command, the President, by executive order made us individually responsible for the protection of classified matter. Besides current Armed Forces Security directives, some of the existing laws and statutes that apply to all of us are the Atomic Energy Act of 1954; Sections 793-798, U.S. Code, Title 18; the Espionage Act of 1954; and Sections 4 and 21, Internal Security Act of 1950. Heavy penalties, including death, life imprisonment, or fines up to \$20,000 may be imposed for security violations. These documents are located in your security office. Ask to read them.

SECTION IV

ATOMIC ENERGY "RESTRICTED DATA"

22. GENERAL PROVISIONS. Restricted Data may be in the form of documents, information, equipment, instruments, material, or matter of any kind. Clearance requirements for access to Restricted Data held by the military services are the same as for other classified information. But persons who need Restricted Data held by the Atomic Energy Commission, its contractors, or by contractor employees must be certified for such access in addition to their military security clearances.

23. DISSEMINATION. Restricted Data is entrusted to only those persons who need it to perform their official duties. They must be cleared under applicable security regulations for access to the degree of classification (Top Secret, Secret, Confidential) that the Restricted Data has been assigned. As in

[REDACTED]

the case of other classified matter, no one is entitled to know or have Restricted Data solely because of his rank or position.

24. MARKING AND CLASSIFICATION. Restricted Data must carry a classification of Top Secret, Secret, or Confidential. All matter containing Restricted Data is plainly marked or stamped as such not less than once on each page containing Restricted Data, on the front cover, title page, first page, last page, and back cover. A tag or sticker marked "Restricted Data" is attached to matter that cannot be marked or stamped. Whatever classification is assigned to Restricted Data is marked or stamped in the same manner prescribed for other classified defense information:

SECRET
RESTRICTED DATA
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954

SECTION V

CONCLUSION

25. SUMMARY. Whenever you have custody of classified matter, guard it closely. Do not leave classified information lying about where unauthorized persons may see it--or steal it. Keep classified matter under constant surveillance until you can turn it over to an authorized person. Or hold that matter until you can store it properly. Curb loose talk. Speak to only those persons you know have the "right" and "need to know" classified information. Remember not to discuss classified information over the telephone, in a public place, or within the hearing of an unauthorized person. Keep classified information out of your letters, diaries, or scrapbooks; to be safe, do not permit them to be publicized. Should you go to Eniwetok or Bikini, leave behind any contraband items; if you receive contraband through the mail, turn it over to your security officer immediately. Keep in mind that Restricted Data is especially sensitive and is always classified. Treat it accordingly. Report security violations to your security officer promptly; if you have a security problem, consult him. Finally, let security consciousness become second nature to you, for security is an individual responsibility.

26. SECURITY EXAMINATION. Now that you have read this publication, your security officer will either test you on its contents or cause you to sign a certificate of compliance. The object of the test is to further familiarize newly assigned persons with their security fundamentals they need most. There is no intent to weigh your knowledge. The test is an "open book" examination. You may refer to this SOP to answer any of the questions. After you complete the test, your security officer will correct it and instruct you on the questions you miss. If you have any doubt or question about the examination, or this SOP, speak to the security officer during your critique.

/s/ B. HALL HANLON
RADM, U. S. Navy
Commander

Annex "C" to
Appendix "B"