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March 19, 1958

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ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

"CLEAN WEAPON" DEMONSTRATION AT ENIWETOK
FOR UK AND PRESS OBSERVERS

(4)

Note by the Secretary

The attached memorandum and enclosures for the Chairman, Operations Coordinating Board, are circulated for the information of the Commission. This memorandum was discussed at Meeting 1343 on March 18, 1958.

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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW

1ST REVIEW DATE: 8/12/05
AUTHORITY: 48 CFR 1.101
NAME: [Redacted]
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AUTHORITY: ADD [Redacted]

TERMINATION (CIRCLE NUMBER(S))
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UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.


March 17, 1958

MEMORANDUM for the Chairman, Operations Coordinating Board

Subject: "CLEAN WEAPON" DEMONSTRATION AT ENIWETOK FOR U.K. AND
PRESS OBSERVERS

The U.S. has made several public announcements and statements indicating that an international group of scientific observers will be invited to observe a "clean" shot during the forthcoming Pacific test series. Copies of the more important of these announcements are attached.

The Commission believes it would be possible to conduct such a demonstration and be reasonably convincing to a technically competent, unbiased observer. The Commission believes that some information hitherto considered classified would have to be declassified but that this should not involve declassification of important design information. Any feasible demonstration will, however, be susceptible to claims of "fraud" by observers who do not desire to be convinced or who desire to state that they are unconvinced for propagandist reasons.

 Weather delays of a few days may be expected after the firing is ready before satisfactory weather conditions occur. The shot will extend the duration of the series, including the retention of the danger area, by approximately 3 weeks. Because there is a possibility, though small, that the device would not fire properly, a back-up device of similar design would be readied.

In order to prevent interference with the scheduled test operation and to provide the necessary time for preparation, this demonstration shot should occur about 3 weeks after firing of the last presently scheduled shot of the test series. In brief outline, the proposed demonstration would consist of the following:

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a. A thorough briefing of the U.N. observers prior to their arrival in the EPG. This probably would be conducted at UCRL, Berkeley, California, and will require about one week.

b. The observers should be in the EPG approximately one week prior to firing the "clean" shot to permit their inspection of the techniques to be used in the demonstration.

c. Measurement of total yield would be accomplished by fireball photography.

d. Observers should be permitted to inspect and to ride in stripped-down B-36 aircraft used to collect cloud samples.

e. Fission yield would be determined by radiochemistry at UCRL, Berkeley, in the presence of the observers and possibly with their assistance. A decision has not yet been made as to whether or not samples will be given to the observers.

The conduct of such a demonstration will require that the Joint Task Force remain active in the EPG for at least an additional three weeks. It is estimated that this will involve the expenditure of a minimum of an additional 1 1/2 million dollars out-of-pocket by the DoD. The additional time and money required could exceed these amounts in the event of weather delays. The additional costs for AEC laboratory participation in this demonstration are estimated at approximately \$500,000 to \$1,000,000. These costs do not include the cost of the weapon or of the normal operating expenses of the military units involved.

If the U.N. observers are to be present, it is believed that an international group of news media representatives should also attend this demonstration. The total number of observers should be limited to approximately 45 to permit their accommodation without undue difficulty. It is estimated that about 15 scientific observers, selected by the U.N., should attend to insure that they obtain a complete coverage of the technical phases of the demonstration. This would permit the attendance of approximately 20 representatives of U.S. news media and 10 representatives from the media of other nations. It is considered appropriate that the AEC, in conjunction with the DoD, select the U.S. press representatives, and that the State Department arrange for the selection of news media representatives from other nations.

The AEC recommends that the OCB consider the impact on public opinion of foregoing or carrying out a program substantially as outlined above and recommend as to whether such program should be undertaken.

The AEC recommends further that the OCB note that, if undertaken agencies should proceed immediately with further action as follows:

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a. The AEC and DoD proceed with the necessary technical plans and operational preparations.

b. The State Department determine the manner of submission of the invitation to the U.N. Such invitation should make it clear that the observers should have a reasonably good background in nuclear physics and chemistry.

c. The State Department proceed with the plans for invitation of the news media representatives of other nations, and that these invitations be transmitted simultaneously with the transmission of the invitation to the U.N. observers.

d. The AEC in coordination with the DOD take similar action with respect to U.S. media representatives.

e. The State Department make arrangements to provide interpreters to accompany the U.N. observers throughout the demonstration.

f. The AEC proceed with the preparation of a press release announcing the details of the plan. The release would be made jointly by AEC and DoD immediately prior to, or at the same time, invitations are transmitted for U.N. attendance.

/s/ Lewis L. Strauss
Chairman

ENCLOSURES:

- "A" - President's Press Remarks 26 Feb. 1958
- "B" - Statement Made at President's Press Conference
3 July 1957
- "C" - Press Release dated 15 Sept. 1957

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ENCLOSURE "A"

President's Press remarks 26 February 1958.

Atomic Tests Discussed

Earl H. Foss of The Washington Star -- Last July, Mr. President, you told us that if there were any more atomic weapons test you would invite foreign observers, including three from the Soviet Union. Since then there has been an announcement that this might be supervised by a United Nations group. Have you invited any observers from the Soviet Union, or do you plan to?

Answer: Well, I haven't done anything about it at all yet. As a matter of fact, I don't know exactly the tests in which you would be --- when this practice would be wise; and I haven't talked to Admiral Lewis L. Strauss (Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission) exactly as to that particular matter.

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ENCLOSURE "B"

Statements made at President's Press Conference - July 3, 1957:

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"Incidentally, now we are talking, and very hopefully about, about some kind of suspension of tests. But if, ever under any circumstances there is another test made, I am going to invite any country in the world that wants to come and fire its rockets in the air and see just exactly how much radio (radioactive) fallout there is from those bombs because we are not testing to make at this -- to make bigger bombs, as I have told you before. We are trying to make small bombs, clean bombs, and to develop usefulness in a peaceful world, as well as just weapons of war."

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Question: "Sir, would you elaborate a little more on this statement that you make that future atomic tests are going to be open to any country that wants to come to watch them?"

President: "Well, I said this -- well I don't mean to say you take the men and show them all your formulae, and all that sort of thing as to what you have done. But I said certain people have questioned the proposition that Dr. Lawrence and Dr. Teller brought to me, that eventually you could make completely clean bombs, and that even now you are 96 per cent clean, that is, you have only 4 per cent of radioactivity, radioactive fallout, that you did in the original bomb."

"I say we would be glad to ask any nation there to put its proper instruments in the air to detect whether or not their contention is true."

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ENCLOSURE "C"

U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Washington 25, D. C.

No. 1163
Tel. ST 3-8000
Ext. 307

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
(Sunday, September 15, 1957)

STATEMENT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
AND THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

In the absence of a safeguarded disarmament agreement, preparations are under way by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense for a series of nuclear tests to begin in April, 1958, at the Eniwetok Proving Ground in the Pacific. The United States repeatedly has stated its willingness to suspend nuclear tests as part of a disarmament agreement. Until such an agreement is attained, continued development of nuclear weapons is essential to the defense of the United States and of the Free World.

The forthcoming series will advance the development of weapons for defense against aggression whether air-borne, missile-borne or otherwise mounted. Information on the effects of weapons will be obtained for military and civilian defense use. Test operations will be governed by the declaration made in the Bermuda Communique on March 24, 1957, of the intention of the United States "to conduct nuclear tests only in such manner as will keep world radiation from rising to more than a small fraction of the levels that might be hazardous."

An important objective of the tests will be the further development of nuclear weapons with greatly reduced radioactive fallout so that radiation hazard may be restricted to the military target. This principle was first proved in the Pacific test series of 1956.

A United Nations agency will be invited to designate an international group to observe one of the detonations involving limited fallout and studies are under way to determine the instrumentation which will facilitate their observation without making disclosures which would compromise restricted weapon information in violation of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Observation by news media representatives will be provided for in a manner to be announced later.

As in the past series, a control area surrounding the proving grounds will be established to safeguard air and sea traffic and will be defined well in advance of the commencement of operations.

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Enclosure "C"

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By: Om /ea Date: 8/12/05

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