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JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN

AG FILE

No. 903

RADIOACTIVE FALL-OUT, RADIOACTIVE SAMPLES, RADIATION AND CONTAMINATION OF PERSONNEL AND PROPERTY

12

DECLASSIFIED BY ACTING CHIEF ISCA
SIGNATURE John R. Bibby E.

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JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN

903 RADIOACTIVE FALL-OUT, RADIOACTIVE SAMPLES, RADIATION, AND CONTAMINATION OF PERSONNEL AND PROPERTY.

For Related Mat see 700 series (Files 700 + 729.3)

AG FILE

1958

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HEADQUARTERS
JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN
APO 437
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

27 June 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL LUEDECKE:

FROM: STAFF SURGEON

SUBJECT: Dosage Increases (as per letter request CTG 7.5)

1. Recommend approval.

2. Consideration of this request and records as submitted on individuals involved indicates that my recent memo on same subject applies in this instance, also.

3. Proposed indorsement attached.

Lechausse

RALPH M. LECHAUSSE
Colonel USAF
Staff Surgeon

Proposed 1st Ind

TO: Commander Task Group 7.5

Approval is granted for request as in paragraph one of basic communication and for individuals listed in paragraph three of same communication.

ENGINEERING SECTION
RADIATION EXPOSURE AS OF 27 JUNE 1958

RANK	NAME	SERIAL NO.	AFSC	JOB	EXPOSURE MR
MSGT			43171D	Line Chief	1868
MSGT			43171D	Flight Chief	2690
TSGT			43171D	Crew Chief	3765
TSGT			43171D	Hanger Chief	3322
TSGT			43171D	Crew Chief	6792
TSGT			43171D	Flight Chief	5554
TSGT			43171D	Engine Build-Up	2307
TSGT			43171D	Crew Chief	4141
SSGT			43171D	Crew Chief	4638
SSGT			43171D	Crew Chief	3502
SSGT			42350	Electrician	2205
SSGT			43151D	Crew Chief	2820
SSGT			43171D	Inspection	7190
SSGT			43171D	Crew Chief	2271
SSGT			43151D	Crew Chief	2419
SSGT			43171D	Crew Chief	3378
SSGT			43171D	Dock Chief	1890
SSGT			43151D	Crew Member	2798
A/1C			43151D	Crew Member	2899
A/1C			43151D	Crew Member	1621
A/1C			43151D	Crew Member	3608
A/1C			53450	Sheet Metal	1921
A/1C			43151D	Crew Member	2278
A/1C			43151D	Crew Member	4238
A/1C			43151D	Crew Member	2765
A/1C			43151D	Dock Member	1940
A/1C			43151D	Crew Member	3541
A/1C			42152	Hydraulic	2386
A/1C			43151D	Crew Member	1869
A/2C			43151D	Crew Member	4509
A/2C			43151D	Crew Member	1921
A/2C			43151D	Crew Member	3721
A/2C			43151D	Crew Member	1968
A/2C			43151D	Crew Member	3808
A/2C			43151D	Dock Member	2207
A/2C			43151D	Crew Member	3084
A/2C			43151D	Dock Member	1880
A/2C			43151D	Crew Member	3736
A/2C			43151D	Crew Member	2869
A/2C			43151D	Dock Member	1718
A/2C			43151D	Dock Member	2894
A/2C			43151D	Dock Member	2890

[redacted] SECTION (CONT'D)

RATE	RATE	SERIAL NO.	AFSC	JOB	[redacted] NO.
A/2C			43250	Engine Build-Up	2115
A/2C			43151D	Crew Member	3317
A/2C			43151D	Crew Member	1744
A/2C			42350	Electrician	2321
A/2C			43151D	Inspection	7987
A/2C			43151D	Crew Member	2194
A/2C			43151D	Crew Member	4160
A/2C			43151D	Crew Member	3571
A/2C			43151D	Crew Member	2518
A/2C			43151D	Crew Member	2998
A/2C			43151D	Crew Member	0854
A/2C			43250	Engine Build-Up	1950
A/2C			43151D	Crew Member	3208

Enclosure # 2

NUCLEAR APPLICATIONS SECT
RADIATION EXPOSURE AS OF 27 J

RANK	NAME	SERIAL NO.	AFSC	J		[illegible]
MSGT			90171	M		3670
TSGT			33170	S		[illegible]
TSGT			33170	I	r	[illegible]
TSGT			33170	M	quip.	3753
				K		
SSGT			33150	S		3677
SSGT			33150	I	quip.	6493
				I		
SSGT			33170	I	r	3031
SSGT			33150	I	quip.	5738
				I		
A/1C			33150	I	ir	2020
A/1C			33150	S		4832
A/2C			33150		quip.	3235
				I		
A/2C			33150	I	irman	4786
A/3C			00010	I		2319
A/3C			00010	I		1667
A/3C			00010	I		4511

Headquarters
TASK GROUP 7.4, PROVISIONAL
United States Air Force
APO 187, San Francisco, California

SMU

1 JUL 1956

SUBJECT: Radiation Exposures for Certain Task Group 7.4 Men

TO: Commander
Joint Task Force SEVEN
APO 437, San Francisco, California

1. Paragraph 6a of Appendix 1 to Annex K to JTF-SEVEN Operation Order No. 1-58 establishes a maximum permissable exposure (MPE) of 5.0r for personnel participating in HARDTACK. We find that adherence to this limitation throughout the lengthened HARDTACK series, among two small groups of our Task Group 7.4 men, would jeopardize the successful performance of our nuclear cloud sampling mission. These two groups of men are the fifteen (15) NCO's and airmen of the Nuclear Applications Section of our Cloud Sampling Element, and the fifty-five (55) B-57B ground crewmen in the same element (ground crewmen of the B-57D's are being rotated by SAC). Inclosure #1 is a listing of the members of the former group together with the exposure of each of the individuals as of 27 June 1958. Inclosure #2 is a similar listing of the second group.

2. It is requested that MPE's of 10.0r and 8.0r be established for the men listed in Inclosure 1 and 2 respectively.

3. We in Task Group 7.4 are conscious of our responsibility to limit the radiation exposure of our men to an absolute minimum consistent with the need to get our job done.

2 Incls
1. Roster/NCO'sAirmn (Nuclear Applications)
2. Roster/B-57B Grnd Crew.

WM B. KIEFFER
Colonel, USAF
Commander

SGMD/903 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Radiation Exposures for Certain Task Group 7.4 Men

HEADQUARTERS JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN, APO 437, San Francisco, Calif. 9 JUL 1958

TO: Commander, Task Group 7.4, Provisional, APO 187, San Francisco, California

Approval is granted as requested in paragraph 2 of basic communication for the individuals listed in Inclosures 1 and 2.

2 Incls
n/c

A. R. LUEDECKE
Major General, USAF
Commander

General Luedecke
General Griffith
General Dick
Admiral Tyree
Doctor Ogle
DC/S
Protocol
J-1
J-2
J-3
J-4
J-5
Compt
AG
AGM/R

General Lnedecke
General Griffith
General Dick
Admiral Tyree
Doctor Ogle
DC/S
Protocol
J-1
J-2
J-3
J-4
J-5
Compt
AG
AGM/R

COMD 903
(12 Jul 58) 2d Ind

Headquarters Joint Task Force SEVEN, APO 437, San Francisco, Calif. 15 JUL 1958

TO: Headquarters, Task Group 7.1, APO 437, Box No. 1, San Francisco, Calif.

Approval is granted for additional dosage to a total limit of seven (7) roentgens.

A. R. LUKDECKE
Major General, USAF
Commander

M/R: Hq TG 7.1 originated ltr stating Has accumulated over five roentgens radiation exposure and requested approval to retain up to a limit of seven roentgens. 1st Ind from Hq TG 7.1 recommended approval.

HEADQUARTERS

TASK GROUP 7.5

Joint Task Force 7
APO 435
San Francisco, California

JUN 23 1958

[redacted]

Subject: [redacted]

To: [redacted]
Commander
Joint Task Force [redacted]
APO 437, U. S. Army

1. It is requested that authorization be granted for the below listed individuals to receive exposure in excess of 3.75 roentgens for the first 13 week period of the operation, and up to 10 roentgens for the entire operation.

2. It is imperative that these key men be retained in their present capacities as their work involves recovering and positioning scientific equipment before and after detonations in Pile [redacted] area. This operation would be over before "Q" clearance requirements could be hired, trained, and sent to the [redacted].

3. All of the radiation records of these men have been checked and their lifetime dosages are less than the [redacted]. Every effort will be made to keep the number of men receiving dosages in excess of 3.75 roentgens per 13 weeks and over 5 roentgens for the operation to a minimum.

[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]

Major General A. R. Luedecke - 2 -

JUN 23 1958

[illegible]

FOR THE COMMANDER

JOE B. SANDERS
Deputy Commander

Copies furnished:
HRAIBS, DBM, Wash., D. C.
C. E. Weaver, Rad-Safe, ALO
Chrono
Central

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

General Luedecke
General Griffith
General Dick
Admiral Daspit
Doctor Ogle
DC/S
SJS
J-1
J-2
J-3
J-4
J-5
~~Comptr~~ Richie
~~IG~~ IACFS
MR-Klement
Dep



c. No violation of existing NCRP or AEC recommendations or directives will occur.

d. Paragraph 3 of basic communication is pertinent.

3. Finally, it is pointed out that Mr. Sanders and all concerned are fully aware that compliance with the documents mentioned in 3 c above is ultimately and solely the responsibility of the employer.

RALPH M. LECHAUSSE
Colonel USAF
Staff Surgeon

COMM/903 1st Ind 28 June 1958
SUBJECT: Dosage Increase (27 June 1958)

Headquarters, Joint Task Force SEVEN, APO 437 San Francisco, California

To: Commander, Task Group 7.5, APO 435, San Francisco, California

Approval is granted for request as in paragraph one of basic communication and for individuals listed in paragraph three of same communication.

A. R. LUEDECKE
Major General, USAF
Commander

Copies furnished:
USAEC, DBM, Wash., D. C.
C. Weaver, ALO
Chrono
Central

AFWH FILE COPY

General Luedecke
General Griffith
General Flickinger
Admiral McAfee
Doctor Ogle
DC/S
SJS
J-1
J-2
J-3
J-4
J-5
Compt
AG

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HEADQUARTERS

TASK GROUP 7.5

Joint Task Force 7
APO 435
San Francisco, California

JUN 27 1958

[redacted] 13-326

Subject: [redacted]

To: Major General A. D. [redacted]
Commander
Joint Task Force [redacted]
APO 437, U. S. Army

1. It is requested that authorization be granted for the below listed individuals to receive exposure in excess of 3.75 roentgens for the first 13 week period of the operation, and up to 20 roentgens for the entire operation.

2. It is imperative that these key men be retained in their present capacities as their work involves recovering and positioning scientific equipment before and after detonations in FULL [redacted] areas. This operation would be over before "E" element replacements could be hired, trained, and sent to the [redacted].

3. All of the radiation records of these men have been checked and their lifetime dosages are less than the MPD. Every effort will be made to keep the number of men receiving dosages in excess of 3.75 roentgens per 13 weeks and over 5 roentgens for the operation to a minimum.

[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]

TEST A

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

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[redacted] - 2 -

JUN 27 1958

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Copies furnished:
[redacted], HQ, Wash., D. C.
S. Hoover, ALO
Chrono
Central

903
1.3

Headquarters
TASK GROUP 7.4, PROVISIONAL
United States Air Force
APO 187, San Francisco, California

SAUC

19 JUN 1958

SUBJECT: Letter of Transmittal

TO: Comdr, VF-26 Squadron

CJTF-SEVEN
ATTN: Rad-Safe Officer

Forwarded for your information.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
Memo for Record,
Subj: Contaminated P2V,
dated 9 June 1958

JOSEPH K. BYRNE
Lt Colonel, USAF
Deputy Director of Operations

Headquarters
TASK GROUP 7.4, PROVISIONAL
United States Air Force
APO 187, San Francisco, California

13 JUN 1958

SAVO

SUBJECT: Letter of Transmittal

TO: Comdr, VP-26 Squadron
CJTF-SEVEN
ATTN: Intel-Info Officer

Forwarded for your information.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
Memo for Record,
Subj: Contaminated PTV,
dated 9 June 1958

JOSEPH K. KYRK
Lt Colonel, USAF
Deputy Director of Operations

Headquarters
TASK GROUP 7.3, PROVISIONAL
United States Air Force
APO 187, San Francisco, California

SVSO

JUN 9 - 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

SUBJECT: Contaminated PBY

1. The following information concerns Navy PBY aircraft no. 1116 whose mission was Rad-Safe Reconnaissance and Barrier Patrol at Eniwetok on 27 May 1958. This aircraft was being vectored by JTF-7 Rad-Safe in order to obtain the exact path of a radio active cloud. The aircraft commander's instructions included a requirement to turn out of any radiation field exceeding 3 roentgens per hour. Prior to flying the mission the air vents on the aircraft had been closed. Instructions were being passed by the RADC by radio from JTF-7 Rad-Safe to the PBY, and radiation intensities were being relayed in the same way from the aircraft to JTF-7 Rad-Safe.

2. Because a portion of the cloud, believed to be 15 miles distant, was actually 7 miles distant the PBY began observing an early rise on its radios equipment. The pilot turned out but in doing so penetrated a very small cloud. On emerging it was noted that the aircraft had become contaminated in that the radiation level held constant. A reading of 8,000 mr/hr was noted in the nose of the aircraft. The aircraft commander requested permission to return to "FRED" Island and permission was granted.

3. On landing, the aircraft was monitored and found to be contaminated as follows:

Exterior	27/0900K
a. Nose area	5,000 mr/hr (Gamma)
b. Bombay area	600 mr/hr (Gamma)
c. Left Recip Engine	8,000 mr/hr (Gamma)
d. Right Recip Engine	5,000 mr/hr (Gamma)
e. Left wheel well	400 mr/hr (Gamma)
f. Right wheel well	300 mr/hr (Gamma)
g. Left jet engine	800 mr/hr (Gamma)
h. Right jet engine	700 mr/hr (Gamma)
i. Tail area	120 mr/hr (Gamma)

2d Ind, Hq TG 7.4, Subj: Contaminated P2V

The aircraft was isolated and allowed to decay. Because of the high exterior intensities, interior monitoring was postponed. The crew was processed through the personnel decontamination center and monitoring revealed that their clothing and exposed skin were contaminated to levels of 7 mr/hr or less. Normal personnel decontamination reduced all contamination to background level and the crew was released. Film-badges were taken immediately to Task Unit 6 of TG 7.1 for processing to determine exposure. A second monitoring of the aircraft six and a half hours later revealed the following.

Exterior	27/1530K
a. Nose	800 mr/hr (Gamma)
b. Bombay	140 mr/hr (Gamma)
c. Left Recip Engine	1,200 mr/hr (Gamma)
d. Right Recip Engine	1,400 mr/hr (Gamma)
e. Left wheel well	60 mr/hr (Gamma)
f. Right wheel well	60 mr/hr (Gamma)
g. Left jet engine	180 mr/hr (Gamma)
h. Right jet engine	125 mr/hr (Gamma)
i. Tail	16 mr/hr (Gamma)
j. Radar dome forward	2,600 mr/hr (Gamma)
Interior	
a. Radar well	280 mr/hr (Gamma)
b. Forward cockpit	200 mr/hr (Gamma)
c. Flight deck	60 mr/hr (Gamma)
d. Radio compartment	20 mr/hr (Gamma)
e. After station	12 mr/hr (Gamma)
f. Bow observers station	500 mr/hr (Gamma)
g. Bombay	60 mr/hr (Gamma)

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3 WO, Hq TF 7.4, Subj: Contaminated P2V

At 1800 hours the aircraft was moved to the decontamination area and cleaned with 5,000 gallons of high pressure water at 115°F. A final monitoring of the aircraft indicated the following:

<u>Exterior</u>	IM/USCOM
a. Nose	9 mr/hr (Gamma)
b. Bombay	21 mr/hr (Gamma)
c. Left Recip engine	120 mr/hr (Gamma)
d. Right Recip engine	150 mr/hr (Gamma)
e. Left wheel well	12 mr/hr (Gamma)
f. Right wheel well	14 mr/hr (Gamma)
g. Left jet engine	22 mr/hr (Gamma)
h. Right jet engine	23 mr/hr (Gamma)
i. Tail	20 mr/hr (Gamma)
j. Radar dome forward	100 mr/hr (Gamma)
<u>Interior</u>	
a. Bombay	14 mr/hr (Gamma)
b. Radar well	20 mr/hr (Gamma)
c. Forward cockpit	80 mr/hr (Gamma)
d. Flight deck	12 mr/hr (Gamma)
e. Radio compartment	4 mr/hr (Gamma)
f. After station	6 mr/hr (Gamma)
g. Bow observers station	60 mr/hr (Gamma)

The aircraft was released to Commander Hart with the advice that although the radiation levels were greatly reduced they still exceeded in some cases the recommended levels established by Appendix 1 to Annex K to JTF-7 Operation Plan Number 1-58, dated 8 February 1958 (i.e. 7mr/hr [Beta and Gamma] on the interior and 7 mr/hr [Gamma] on the exterior, measured at 6 inches from the surface). Radioactive decay would, in a matter of 48 to 72 hours appreciably reduce the interior contamination. Use of the aircraft would depend entirely on operational requirements.

SUBJ: Contaminated PPE

Film badge analysis indicated the following exposures:

Film Badge No. 26784	873 mr
Film Badge No. 26793	873 mr
Film Badge No. 26905	980 mr
Film Badge No. 26763	546 mr
Film Badge No. 26871	399 mr
Film Badge No. 26769	221 mr
Film Badge No. 26969	157 mr
Film Badge No. 26906	95 mr
Film Badge No. 26870	69 mr
Film Badge No. 26872	158 mr

LeDewly E. Allen Jr.

LEDEWIX E. ALLEN JR.
Captain, USAF
Nuclear Research Officer

GMD/903 1st Ind [illegible] June 1958
SUBJECT: Dosage Increases (Jun 23, 58)

COMMANDER, JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN, APO [illegible], San Francisco, California.

TO: Commander, Task Group 7.5, APO [illegible], San Francisco, California

Approval is granted for request as stated in paragraph 1 of basic communication and for the individuals listed in paragraph 3 of basic.

A. R. LUEDECKE
Major General, USAF
Commander

Copies furnished:
USAEC, DBM, Wash., D.C.
G. H. Weaver, Rad-Safe, ALO

- General Luedecke
- General Griffith
- General Dick
- Admiral Tyree
- Doctor Ogle
- DC/S
- Protocol
- J-1
- J-2
- J-3
- J-4
- J-5
- Compt
- AG
- AGMD

AGMD FILE COPY

[redacted]

Headquarters
Task Unit 7.1.3, Task Group 7.1
APO 437, P. O. Box 3
San Francisco, California

TU 3 58 025? APR 12 1958

SUBJECT: Radiation Dose Limits for Operation HARDTACK (U)

THRU: Commander
Task Group 7.1
APO 437
San Francisco, California

TO: Commander
Joint Task Force SEVEN
APO 437
San Francisco, California

1. It is requested that personnel of Projects 1.9 and 3.6 be authorized the increase in radiation exposure limit to 5.0 r per 13 - week period. These two projects will participate on the CACTUS and KOA events, and the increase in radiation exposure limits is considered necessary in this case to permit effective recovery of project data.

2. Inclosure (1) includes the approval by the U.S.A.F., Air Research and Development Command of such an increase in radiation Dosage for Projects 1.9 and 3.6 personnel to 5.0 r per 13 - week period.

Doesn't mean a thing Lichaness

1 Incl:
Ltr SWRS HQ, AFSWC, dtd 23 Jan 58, same subj. with 1st Ind

K. D. Coleman
K. D. COLEMAN
Colonel, USAF
Commander

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[redacted]



[redacted]

903

ROSTER OF PERSONNEL EXPOSED TO WHOLE BODY [illegible]
(1 January 1958 through 31 March 1958)

HEADQUARTERS JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN

NAME	Exposure mr Gamma	NAME	Exposure mr Gamma
	20		
	20		
	20		
	20		
	20		
	20		
	20		
	20		
	20		
	20		
	20		
	20		
	85		
	40		
	20		
	20		
	30		
	20		
	20		
	20		
	20		
	40		
	20		
	20		
	20		
	20		
	20		
	20		

[redacted]

103
2-3

28 April 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander Task Group 7.4

SUBJECT: Radar Tracking of Sampling Aircraft for Pinon

1. This will confirm conversations held between Colonel Wignall, Dr. R. Batsel and myself on the tracking plan. The purpose of providing for a tracking system is fundamentally to add plausibility that the sampling mission was conducted in a straight-forward manner. It will not be the intent, however, to try to indicate to the U.N.Observers or to the press, that the tracking system is a Proof that the sampling mission was in fact carried out as shown.

2. To appropriately accomplish the radar tracking scheme, it is requested that TG 7.4 provide a briefing on the radar system to the observers on D-1 or D-2 to familiarize them with the system and equipment. As part of the briefing it would be desirable to have one of the B-57 B sampling aircraft make a take-off, fly a short pattern, and land so the observers can see how the system operates.

3. On shot day, if the U.N. observers desire it, they will be permitted to track the sampling aircraft as they carry out their mission. Selected members of the press should be allowed to be in the AOC in the gallery during this period. The radars should be set for a range, probably 150 miles, such that the planes in flight will not pass off the scope. All radars should be set up the same way. It also would be desirable to plot on the large plotting board a continuous track of the courses followed by the aircraft from take-off to landing.

4. We would apprreciate your comments on the above proposal.

G. W. JOHNSON
Technical Director,
Pinon

cc: CJTF 7
CTG 7.1
CTU-2
R. Batsel
P. Bankhart
R. Southwick
G. Johnson

[redacted]

8.3

1217-JFE

(12 Apr 58) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Radiation Dose Limits for Operation HARDTACK (U)

HEADQUARTERS, TASK GROUP 7.1, JTF SEVEN, APO 437, San Francisco, California
3 May 1958.

TO: Commander, Joint Task Force SEVEN, APO 437, San Francisco, California

1. Recommend approval.

2. This matter has been thoroughly discussed with the program directors and the project personnel. Considering the location of the recovery stations and the limited time available for recovery prior to the next shots in the same areas, plus the probable contamination that will result from detonation of the two devices, it is felt that the increase in the 13 week exposure limit is justified in order to guarantee recovery of the scientific data by the personnel involved. There is a strong possibility that the value of the programs will be seriously impaired if the dosage limitation is not raised.

3. Every effort will be made to keep the exposures well under the limit requested. Radiological safety personnel of this organization will maintain a close contact with personnel concerned and follow cumulative dosage totals in detail to assure the safety of the individuals participating.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

GORDON L JACKS
Major Cml C
Commander, TU-6

DISTRIBUTION:
1 & 2 - Addressee
3 - CTG 7.1
4 - CTU-6
5 & 6 - M&R

[redacted]

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS
TASK GROUP 7.1
Joint Task Force SEVEN
P. O. Box 1663
Los Alamos, New Mexico

11 March 1958

SUBJECT: Task Group 7.1 Radiological Safety Regulations for Operation HARDTACK

TO: Distribution

1. Transmitted herewith is a copy of the radiological safety regulations that will apply to all Task Group 7.1 personnel during Operation HARDTACK.

2. Your attention is invited to that portion of the regulations concerning film badges. Each individual in the Task Group will be issued a film badge that is to be worn at all times. Dog-tag chains will be provided for a convenient means of wearing the badges. If preferred, individuals may attach the film badge to the security badge rather than using the dog-tag chain Film badges will be exchanged periodically by all personnel. In addition, upon return from any mission in a contaminated area, badges should be exchanged at the Rad-Safe Center.

3. It is realized that these regulations will not cover all cases that may arise, personnel assigned to Task Unit 6 will be available to advise and assist in handling the problem.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

GORDON L. JACKS
Commander
Task Unit 6

1 Incl
Rad-Safe Regulations

GLJ/py
DISTRIBUTION:
Total

RAD-SAFE REGULATIONS

I. RESPONSIBILITIES.

A. The Commander, Joint Task Force SEVEN, is responsible for all radiological safety during Operation HARDTACK. The responsibility for general on-site (Eniwetok and Bikini Atolls) radiological safety operations has been delegated to the Commander, Task Group 7.1.

B. The Commander, Task Unit 6, Task Group 7.1, will exercise overall supervision and control for CTG 7.1 on all radiological safety matters.

C. Task Unit Commanders are responsible for the radiological safety of members of their task units. In addition, during operations in contaminated areas, project and party leaders are responsible for radiological safety of the parties and for compliance with these regulations.

II. RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY OPERATIONS.

A. TU-6 rad-safe support services will include:

1. Continuing surveys of the radiological situation at EPG, to include plotting and briefing facilities capable of portraying past and current radiological situations. Reports and maps will be prepared for distribution.

2. Monitoring assistance, training, and advice as requested.

3. Maintenance and issue of monitoring instruments and protective clothing as required.

4. Personnel dosimetry and records service (to include all of JTF SEVEN).

5. Decontamination facilities for personnel, vehicles, and equipment.

B. Exposure Guides and Dosage Control.

1. The total permissible exposures to participating personnel are as follows:

a. Gamma: 3.75 roentgens per consecutive 13-week period, with a maximum of 5.0 roentgens for the Operation. Personnel whose previous radiation dose history indicates that their total accumulated dose to 1 January 1958 is in excess of or equal to 5(N-18) roentgens, where N is the age on 1 January 1958, will under no circumstances be allowed to exceed the 5.0 R maximum for the Operation.

b. Alpha: 10,000 exposure units for any consecutive 13-week period computed by multiplying the average air concentration in the area of exposure in d/m/M3 by the hours of exposure. This is to be used in all cases where personnel are not using respiratory protection in an alpha-contaminated area. Natural alpha background is not included in the 10,000 units.

2. The tolerance level for vehicle contamination will be as follows:

a. 7 mr/hr gamma plus beta inside and 7 mr/hr gamma only outside.

b. 500 c/m/55cm^2 fixed alpha. By "fixed" alpha is meant that no change in the alpha contamination level can be observed by swiping a 100cm^2 area. (55cm^2 is the area of the normal "Pee Wee" probe.)

c. 200 c/m/55cm^2 removable alpha.

3. The tolerance level for personnel contamination will be as follows:

a. 7 mr/hr gamma plus beta for outer clothing and shoes, 1 mr/hr gamma on skin or personal clothing. Personnel decontamination will be performed when these levels are exceeded.

4. The tolerance level for equipment removed from contaminated areas will be as follows:

a. 7 mr/hr gamma only.

b. 500 c/m/55cm^2 fixed alpha. Decontamination will be performed in the field with portable decontamination equipment prior to return to the main decontamination station if the level exceeds 5,000 c/m/55cm^2.

5. In the event that reasonable decontamination procedures cannot reduce contamination levels below those levels listed above, CTU-6 will issue appropriate instructions.

6. All personnel will be issued film badges and charge-a-plates on arrival at EPG. The film badge will be worn at all times. In addition, badges will be exchanged after each entry into a contaminated area (exceptions to this will be made in the case of continuing access permits. See below). Lost badges should be reported immediately to TU-6. On return to home station badges will be turned in as part of the EPG check out procedures.

7. TU-6 will process film badges and submit dosage records to Task Unit Commanders on a daily basis. In addition, special reports will be issued on all personnel reaching or exceeding the 3.0 roentgen cumulative dose total. Dosage information may be obtained informally at any time by calling the photo-dosimetry section at the TU-6 Rad-Safe Center.

C. Entry into Contaminated Areas.

1. Radex (radiological exclusion) areas are defined as follows:

a. Full Radex Area: Contamination level of 100 mr/hr or higher.

b. Limited Radex Area: Contamination level of 10 mr/hr but less than 100 mr/hr.

c. Non Radex Area: Contamination level less than 10 mr/hr.

2. Entry into a full radex area will require full protective clothing. In addition, a qualified monitor must accompany any party entering a full radex area. Entry into a limited radex area will require such protective clothing and monitoring support as is deemed necessary by the plotting and briefing section, TU-6.

3. Entry of personnel into contaminated areas (full and limited radex) will require access permits. The access permit will signify that all rad-safe procedures have been complied with. These access permits will be issued to party monitors or party leaders by the plotting and briefing section TU-6 at Rad-Safe Center.

4. Recovery and construction parties will be allowed to enter contaminated areas as desired dependent upon the current radiological situation. Actual control of early entry on D-Day will be exercised by the J-3 Section, Task Group 7.1.

5. Check points for control of entry into contaminated areas will be established by TU-6 as required. Normally, check points will be maintained at the Air Dispatcher's Office and the marine landing. Personnel departing for contaminated areas should have access permits prior to passing the check points. Upon return from a contaminated area, personnel and equipment will be monitored at the check points. Personnel or equipment found to be contaminated above the tolerance levels will be directed to the appropriate decontamination station. All personnel should proceed to the Rad-Safe Center to exchange film badges upon return from a contaminated area.

6. Task Unit Commanders may arrange for continuing access permits into contaminated areas for personnel in their Task Units. These continuing access permits are designed to allow frequent entry to and exit from a contaminated area without following all radiological safety regulations on each and every entry and exit. All requests for continuing access permits will be approved by CTU-6. These permits may be withdrawn at any time, depending on the radiological situation. In general, continuing access permits will be good only until another device is fired or certain individual cumulative dosage totals are reached.

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8. Party monitors, and any others deemed necessary, shall be briefed by the TU-6 plotting and briefing section prior to receipt of an access permit.

9. TU-6 will train monitors for the various projects as required.

10. When eating or smoking in any contaminated area, sensible sanitary precautions should be taken.

III. MISCELLANEOUS.

A. All radioactive material brought into the Eniwetok Proving Ground, with the exception of Source and Special Nuclear Material will be registered by project leaders with CTU-6. Information concerning the nature of the radioactive material,

source strength, and location (by building) is required. This information is desired primarily for the protection of the fire department in the event of fire.

B. No contaminated material will be removed from the EPG without the prior approval of CTG 7.1. All such materials or equipment which are to be removed will be monitored, packaged, labeled and loaded so as to satisfy pertinent regulations concerning shipment of radioactive materials. Such material that will travel by commercial means or unescorted shipment on MATS must be packaged in accordance with Interstate Commerce Commission regulations. TU-5 personnel will assist project and J-4 personnel in determining the packaging requirements.

C. Task Unit Commanders are responsible for providing CTG-5 with lists of qualified monitors within their Task Units. CTG 5 will assist the Task Unit Commanders in qualifying personnel if so desired.

HEADQUARTERS
TASK GROUP 7.1
Joint Task Force SEVEN
P. O. Box 1663
Los Alamos, New Mexico

11 March 1958

SUBJECT: Task Group 7.1 Radiological Safety Regulations for Operation HARDTACK

TO: Distribution

1. Transmitted herewith is a copy of the radiological safety regulations that will apply to all Task Group 7.1 personnel during Operation HARDTACK.

2. Your attention is invited to that portion of the regulations concerning film badges. Each individual in the Task Group will be issued a film badge that is to be worn at all times. Dog-tag chains will be provided for a convenient means of wearing the badges. If preferred, individuals may attach the film badge to the security badge rather than using the dog-tag chain. Film badges will be exchanged periodically by all personnel. In addition, upon return from any mission in a contaminated area, badges should be exchanged at the Rad-Safe Center.

3. It is realized that these regulations will not cover all cases that may arise, personnel assigned to Task Unit 6 will be available to advise and assist in handling the problem.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

GORDON L. JACKS
Commander
Task Unit 6

1 Incl
Rad-Safe Regulations

GLJ/py
DISTRIBUTION:
Total

RAD-SAFE REGULATIONS

I. RESPONSIBILITIES.

A. The Commander, Joint Task Force SEVEN, is responsible for all radiological safety during Operation HARDTACK. The responsibility for general on-site (Eniwetok and Bikini Atolls) radiological safety operations has been delegated to the Commander, Task Group 7.1.

B. The Commander, Task Unit 6, Task Group 7.1, will exercise overall supervision and control for CTG 7.1 on all radiological safety matters.

C. Task Unit Commanders are responsible for the radiological safety of members of their task units. In addition, during operations in contaminated areas, project and party leaders are responsible for radiological safety of the parties and for compliance with these regulations.

II. RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY OPERATIONS.

A. TU-6 rad-safe support services will include:

1. Continuing surveys of the radiological situation at EPG, to include plotting and briefing facilities capable of portraying past and current radiological situations. Reports and maps will be prepared for distribution.

2. Monitoring assistance, training, and advice as requested.

3. Maintenance and issue of monitoring instruments and protective clothing as required.

4. Personnel dosimetry and records service (to include all of JTF SEVEN).

5. Decontamination facilities for personnel, vehicles, and equipment.

B. Exposure Guides and Dosage Control.

1. The total permissible exposures to participating personnel are as follows:

a. Gamma: 3.75 roentgens per consecutive 13-week period, with a maximum of 5.0 roentgens for the Operation. Personnel whose previous radiation dose history indicates that their total accumulated dose to 1 January 1958 is in excess of or equal to 5(N-18) roentgens, where N is the age on 1 January 1958, will under no circumstances be allowed to exceed the 5.0 R maximum for the Operation.

b. Alpha: 10,000 exposure units for any consecutive 13-week period computed by multiplying the average air concentration in the area of exposure in d/m/M3 by the hours of exposure. This is to be used in all cases where personnel are not using respiratory protection in an alpha-contaminated area. Natural alpha background is not included in the 10,000 units.

2. The tolerance level for vehicle contamination will be as follows:

a. 7 mr/hr gamma plus beta inside and 7 mr/hr gamma only outside.

b. 500 c/m/55cm^2 fixed alpha. By "fixed" alpha is meant that no change in the alpha contamination level can be observed by swiping a 100cm^2 area. (55cm^2 is the area of the normal "Pee Wee" probe.)

c. 200 c/m/55cm^2 removable alpha.

3. The tolerance level for personnel contamination will be as follows:

a. 7 mr/hr gamma plus beta for outer clothing and shoes, 1 mr/hr gamma on skin or personal clothing. Personnel decontamination will be performed when these levels are exceeded.

4. The tolerance level for equipment removed from contaminated areas will be as follows:

a. 7 mr/hr gamma only.

b. 500 c/m/55cm^2 fixed alpha. Decontamination will be performed in the field with portable decontamination equipment prior to return to the main decontamination station if the level exceeds 5,000 c/m/55cm^2.

5. In the event that reasonable decontamination procedures cannot reduce contamination levels below those levels listed above, CTU-6 will issue appropriate instructions.

6. All personnel will be issued film badges and charge-a-plates on arrival at EPG. The film badge will be worn at all times. In addition, badges will be exchanged after each entry into a contaminated area (exceptions to this will be made in the case of continuing access permits. See below). Lost badges should be reported immediately to TU-6. On return to home station badges will be turned in as part of the EPG check out procedures.

7. TU-6 will process film badges and submit dosage records to Task Unit Commanders on a daily basis. In addition, special reports will be issued on all personnel reaching or exceeding the 3.0 roentgen cumulative dose total. Dosage information may be obtained informally at any time by calling the photo-dosimetry section at the TU-6 Rad-Safe Center.

C. Entry into Contaminated Areas.

1. Radex (radiological exclusion) areas are defined as follows:

a. Full Radex Area: Contamination level of 100 mr/hr or higher.

b. Limited Radex Area: Contamination level of 10 mr/hr but less than 100 mr/hr.

c. Non Radex Area: Contamination level less than 10 mr/hr.

2. Entry into a full radex area will require full protective clothing. In addition, a qualified monitor must accompany any party entering a full radex area. Entry into a limited radex area will require such protective clothing and monitoring support as is deemed necessary by the plotting and briefing section, TU-6.

3. Entry of personnel into contaminated areas (full and limited radex) will require access permits. The access permit will signify that all rad-safe procedures have been complied with. These access permits will be issued to party monitors or party leaders by the plotting and briefing section TU-6 at Rad-Safe Center.

4. Recovery and construction parties will be allowed to enter contaminated areas as desired dependent upon the current radiological situation. Actual control of early entry on D-Day will be exercised by the J-3 Section, Task Group 7.1.

5. Check points for control of entry into contaminated areas will be established by TU-6 as required. Normally, check points will be maintained at the Air Dispatcher's Office and the marine landing. Personnel departing for contaminated areas should have access permits prior to passing the check points. Upon return from a contaminated area, personnel and equipment will be monitored at the check points. Personnel or equipment found to be contaminated above the tolerance levels will be directed to the appropriate decontamination station. All personnel should proceed to the Rad-Safe Center to exchange film badges upon return from a contaminated area.

6. Task Unit Commanders may arrange for continuing access permits into contaminated areas for personnel in their Task Units. These continuing access permits are designed to allow frequent entry to and exit from a contaminated area without following all radiological safety regulations on each and every entry and exit. All requests for continuing access permits will be approved by CTU-6. These permits may be withdrawn at any time, depending on the radiological situation. In general, continuing access permits will be good only until another device is fired or certain individual cumulative dosage totals are reached.

7. Projects will provide their own monitors for entry into contaminated areas. In the event monitors cannot be provided by the project, arrangements will be made with TU-6 for supply of the required monitors. Monitors assigned to individuals or groups working in contaminated areas or with contaminated equipment during recovery operations will act in an advisory capacity to keep the recovery party leader informed of radiation intensities at all times. Since the party leader is responsible for the radiological safety of all members of his party he is expected to accept the monitor's advice and act accordingly. It is the responsibility of both the leader and the members of the recovery party to adhere to the limits established in these regulations.

8. Party monitors, and any others deemed necessary, shall be briefed by the TU-6 plotting and briefing section prior to receipt of an access permit.

9. TU-6 will train monitors for the various projects as required.

10. When eating or smoking in any contaminated area, sensible sanitary precautions should be taken.

III. MISCELLANEOUS.

A. All radioactive material brought into the Eniwetok Proving Ground, with the exception of Source and Special Nuclear Material will be registered by project leaders with CTU-6. Information concerning the nature of the radioactive material,

source strength, and location (by building) is required. This information is desired primarily for the protection of the fire department in the event of fire.

B. No contaminated material will be removed from the EFG without the prior approval of CTG 7.3. All such materials or equipment which are to be removed will be monitored, packaged, labeled and loaded so as to satisfy pertinent regulations concerning shipment of radioactive materials. Such material that will travel by commercial means or unescorted shipment on MATS must be packaged in accordance with Interstate Commerce Commission regulations. TU-6 personnel will assist project and J-4 personnel in determining the packaging requirements.

C. Task Unit Commanders are responsible for providing CTU-6 with lists of qualified monitors within their Task Units. CTU 6 will assist the Task Unit Commanders in qualifying personnel if so desired.

HEADQUARTERS
TASK GROUP 7.1
Joint Task Force SEVEN
P. O. Box 1663
Los Alamos, New Mexico

11 March 1958

SUBJECT: Task Group 7.1 Radiological Safety Regulations for Operation HARDTACK

TO: Distribution

1. Transmitted herewith is a copy of the radiological safety regulations that will apply to all Task Group 7.1 personnel [redacted]

2. Your attention is invited to the portion of the regulations concerning film badges. Each individual in the Task Group will be issued a film badge that is to be worn at all times. Dog-tag chains will be provided for a convenient means of wearing the badges. If preferred, individuals may attach the film badge to the security badge rather than using the dog-tag chain. Film badges will be exchanged periodically by all personnel. In addition, upon return from any mission in a contaminated area, badges should be exchanged at the Rad-Safe Center.

3. It is realized that these regulations will not cover all cases that may arise, personnel assigned to Task Unit 6 will be available to advise and assist in handling the problem.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

GORDON L. JACKS
Commander
Task Unit 6

1 Incl
Rad-Safe Regulations

GLJ/py
DISTRIBUTION:
Total

RAD-SAFE REGULATIONS

I. RESPONSIBILITIES.

A. The Commander, Joint Task Force SEVEN, is responsible for all radiological safety during Operation HARDTACK. The responsibility for general on-site (Eniwetok and Bikini Atolls) radiological safety operations has been delegated to the Commander, Task Group 7.1.

B. The Commander, Task Unit 6, Task Group 7.1, will exercise overall supervision and control for CTG 7.1 on all radiological safety matters.

C. Task Unit Commanders are responsible for the radiological safety of members of their task units. In addition, during operations in contaminated areas, project and party leaders are responsible for radiological safety of the parties and for compliance with these regulations.

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1. The total permissible exposures to participating personnel are as follows:

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b. Alpha: 10,000 exposure units for any consecutive 13-week period computed by multiplying the average air concentration in the area of exposure in d/m/M3 by the hours of exposure. This is to be used in all cases where personnel are not using respiratory protection in an alpha-contaminated area. Natural alpha background is not included in the 10,000 units.

2. The tolerance level for vehicle contamination will be as follows:

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b. 500 c/m/55cm^2 fixed alpha. By "fixed" alpha is meant that no change in the alpha contamination level can be observed by swiping a 100cm^2 area. (55cm^2 is the area of the normal "Pee Wee" probe.)

c. 200 c/m/55cm^2 removable alpha

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a. 7 mr/hr gamma only.

b. 500 c/m/55cm^2 fixed alpha. Decontamination will be performed in the field with portable decontamination equipment prior to return to the main decontamination station if the level exceeds 5,000 c/m/55cm^2.

5. In the event that reasonable decontamination procedures cannot reduce contamination levels below those levels listed above, CTU-6 will issue appropriate instructions.

6. All personnel will be issued film badges and charge-a-plates on arrival at EPG. The film badge will be worn at all times. In addition, badges will be exchanged after each entry into a contaminated area (exceptions to this will be made in the case of continuing access permits. See below). Lost badges should be reported immediately to TU-6. On return to home station badges will be turned in as part of the EPG check out procedures.

7. TU-6 will process film badges and submit dosage records to Task Unit Commanders on a daily basis. In addition, special reports will be issued on all personnel reaching or exceeding the 3.0 roentgen cumulative dose total. Dosage information may be obtained informally at any time by calling the photo-dosimetry section at the TU-6 Rad-Safe Center.

C. Entry into Contaminated Areas.

1. Radex (radiological exclusion) areas are defined as follows:

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3. Entry of personnel into contaminated areas (full and limited radex) will require access permits. The access permit will signify that all rad-safe procedures have been complied with. These access permits will be issued to party monitors or party leaders by the plotting and briefing section TU-6 at Rad-Safe Center.

4. Recovery and construction parties will be allowed to enter contaminated areas as desired dependent upon the current radiological situation. Actual control of early entry on D-Day will be exercised by the J-3 Section, Task Group 7.1.

5. Check points for control of entry into contaminated areas will be established by TU-6 as required. Normally, check points will be maintained at the Air Dispatcher's Office and the marine landing. Personnel departing for contaminated areas should have access permits prior to passing the check points. Upon return from a contaminated area, personnel and equipment will be monitored at the check points. Personnel or equipment found to be contaminated above the tolerance levels will be directed to the appropriate decontamination station. All personnel should proceed to the Rad-Safe Center to exchange film badges upon return from a contaminated area.

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C. Task Unit Commanders are responsible for providing CTU-5 with lists of qualified monitors within their Task Unit's. CTU-5 will assist the Task Unit Commanders in qualifying personnel if so desired.

[redacted]

File 556 -
Rmk

J3-H-674 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Request of HARDTACK Project 3.4 for Change in Radiation Dosage Limit (U)

HEADQUARTERS TASK GROUP 7.1 Joint Task Force SEVEN, P. O. Box 1663, Los Alamos, New Mexico, 17 February 1958

TO: Commander
Joint Task Force SEVEN
Arlington Hall Station
Arlington 12, Virginia

Concur in paragraph 4 of basic letter.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

E. A. Lucke

E. A. LUCKE
J-3
Plans & Operations

EAL/rjd
DISTRIBUTION:
2 - CJTF SEVEN
1 - FC/AFSWP (Pickett) w/o basic
1 - CTG 7.1 (Shuster) w/o basic
1 - Project 3.4 Long Beach Naval Shipyard (Murray) c/o Code 242 w/o basic
1 - COM, Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, Va., ATTN: UERD for Code 270 w/o basic
2 - M&R,LASL w/o basic
1 - J-3 (files)

Copy our 24 Jan 58 reply to COM Norfolk Naval Shipyard for info re FC 21 Feb 58 letter

[redacted]

[redacted]

I-0752-58

HEADQUARTERS
TASK GROUP 7.1
Joint Task Force SEVEN
P. O. Box 1663
Los Alamos, New Mexico

11 March 1958

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FOR THE COMMANDER:

GORDON L. JACKS
Commander
Task Unit 6

1 Incl
Rad-Safe Regulations

GLJ/py
DISTRIBUTION:
Total

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2. The tolerance level for vehicle contamination will be as follows:

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7. TU-6 will process film badges and submit dosage records to Task Unit Commanders on a daily basis. In addition, special reports will be issued on all personnel reaching or exceeding the 2.0 roentgen cumulative dose total. Dosage information may be obtained informally at any time by calling the photo-dosimetry section at the TU-6 Rad-Safe Center.

C. Entry into Contaminated Areas.

1. Radex (radiological exclusion) areas are defined as follows:

a. Full Radex Area: Contamination level of 100 mr/hr or higher.

b. Limited Radex Area: Contamination level of 10 mr/hr but less than 100 mr/hr.

c. Non Radex Area: Contamination level less than 10 mr/hr.

2. Entry into a full radex area will require full protective clothing. In addition, a qualified monitor must accompany any party entering a full radex area. Entry into a limited radex area will require such protective clothing and monitoring support as is deemed necessary by the plotting and briefing section, TU-6.

3. Entry of personnel into contaminated areas (full and limited radex) will require access permits. The access permit will signify that all rad-safe procedures have been complied with. These access permits will be issued to party monitors or party leaders by the plotting and briefing section TU-6 at Rad-Safe Center.

4. Recovery and construction parties will be allowed to enter contaminated areas as desired dependent upon the current radiological situation. Actual control of early entry on D-Day will be exercised by the J-3 Section, Task Group 7.1.

5. Check points for control of entry into contaminated areas will be established by TU-6 as required. Normally, check points will be maintained at the Air Dispatcher's Office and the marine landing. Personnel departing for contaminated areas should have access permits prior to passing the check points. Upon return from a contaminated area, personnel and equipment will be monitored at the check points. Personnel or equipment found to be contaminated above the tolerance levels will be directed to the appropriate decontamination station. All personnel should proceed to the Rad-Safe Center to exchange film badges upon return from a contaminated area.

6. Task Unit Commanders may arrange for continuing access permits into contaminated areas for personnel in their Task Units. These continuing access permits are designed to allow frequent entry to and exit from a contaminated area without following all radiological safety regulations on each and every entry and exit. All requests for continuing access permits will be approved by CTU-6. These permits may be withdrawn at any time, depending on the radiological situation. In general, continuing access permits will be good only until another device is fired or certain individual cumulative dosage totals are reached.

7. Projects will provide their own monitors for entry into contaminated areas. In the event monitors cannot be provided by the project, arrangements will be made with TU-6 for supply of the required monitors. Monitors assigned to individuals or groups working in contaminated areas or with contaminated equipment during recovery operations will act in an advisory capacity to keep the recovery party leader informed of radiation intensities at all times. Since the party leader is responsible for the radiological safety of all members of his party he is expected to accept the monitor's advice and act accordingly. It is the responsibility of both the leader and the members of the recovery party to adhere to the limits established in these regulations.

8. Party monitors, and any others deemed necessary, shall be briefed by the TU-6 plotting and briefing section prior to receipt of an access permit.

9. TU-6 will train monitors for the various projects as required.

10. When eating or smoking in any contaminated area, sensible sanitary precautions should be taken.

III. MISCELLANEOUS.

A. All radioactive material brought into the Eniwetok Proving Ground, with the exception of Source and Special Nuclear Material will be registered by project leaders with CTU-6. Information concerning the nature of the radioactive material,

source strength, and location (by building) is required. This information is desired primarily for the protection of the fire department in the event of fire.

B. No contaminated material will be removed from the EFG without the prior approval of CTG 7.2. All such material or equipment which are to be removed will be monitored, packaged, labeled and loaded so as to satisfy pertanent regulations concerning shipment of radioactive materials. Such material that will travel by commercial means or unescorted shipment on MATS must be packaged in accordance with Interstate Commerce Commission regulations. TU-5 personnel will assist project and J-4 personnel in determining the packaging requirements.

C. Task Unit Commanders are responsible for providing CTU-5 with lists of qualified monitors within their Task Units. CTU 5 will assist the Task Unit Commanders in qualifying personnel if so desired.

[redacted]

FCWTl 960.4 A6
SUBJECT: Request of HARDTACK Project 3.4 for Change in Radiation Dosage Limit

Copies furnished (Cont'd):
Dr. Murray, Project Officer, Project 3.4, Long Beach Naval Shipyard, c/o Code 942
COM, Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, Va., ATTN: UERD for Code 270

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

[redacted]

[redacted]

RN 197536
903
0-3

HEADQUARTERS FIELD COMMAND
ARMED FORCES SPECIAL WEAPONS PROJECT
SANDIA BASE, ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO

FCWT 960.4 AS

11 FEB 1958

SUBJECT: Request of HARDTACK Project 3.4 for Change in Radiation Dosage Limit (U)

THRU: Commander
Task Group 7.1
P.O. Box 1663
Los Alamos, New Mexico

TO: Commander
Joint Task Force SEVEN
Washington 25, D. C.

1. Reference is made to Commander, Norfolk Naval Shipyard Confidential letter 78/8570 (272) (HARDTACK) dated 17 January 1958.

2. At the suggestion of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, reference (a), which requests that the radiation dosage limit for Project 3.4 personnel be raised to 4 r, was forwarded direct to Commander, JTF 7 instead of through established channels via (1) Commander, Field Command, AFSWP and (2) Commander, Task Group 7.1.

3. As a result of subsequent action by Commander, FC, AFSWP, Project 3.4 has initiated action to have CNO (Op 36) preliminarily approve the raising of the radiation dosage limit for Project 3.4 personnel from 3.0 r to 5.0 r for any 13 week period during Operation HARDTACK. After that approval is obtained, it is anticipated that Commander, FC, AFSWP will subsequently forward an appropriate request, through established channels, pertinent to raising the radiation dosage limits for the specific personnel concerned of Project 3.4.

4. In view of the above, it is considered that no action on reference (a) is required.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

HARRY D. PICKETT
Captain, USN
Asst Deputy Chief of Staff
Weapons Effects Tests

Copies furnished:
COM JTF 7 (Advance cy)

[redacted]

[redacted]

COPY

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
BUREAU OF MEDICINE AND SURGERY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

BUMED-742:GCB:ces
Serial: 01116
13 DEC 1957

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Chief, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery
To: Commander, Norfolk Naval Shipyard
Portsmouth, Virginia

Subj: Operation HARDTACK - radiation dosage limits for personnel; comment concerning

Ref: (a) Norfolk NavShipYd ltr FS/S11(274A)(HARDTACK) Ser 0635 of 5 Dec 1957

1. The Bureau of Medicine and Surgery has no objection to the increase in radiation dose for personnel in Project 3.4, Operation HARDTACK, from 3r/13-week period to 4r/13-week period. This proposed increase is in accordance with a revision of National Bureau of Standards Handbook 59, entitled "Permissible Dose for External Sources of Ionizing Radiation." However, it must be emphasized that the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery desires that personnel exposure be kept as low as possible, even at the expense of an early entry into the target area.

2. It is requested that the Commander, Norfolk Naval Shipyard, direct this request to the Commander, TF-7, as a policy matter coming under that Commander's cognizance.

/s/ P. F. Dickens, Jr.
By direction

Enclosure (1)

[redacted]

RN1922 6
90 3 9 . 3

for PEACE
SAVINGS BONDS

NORFOLK NAVAL SHIPYARD
PORTSMOUTH, VA.

In reply refer to
FS/8570(271)
(HARDTACK)

[redacted]

029 JAN 17 1958

From: Commander
To: Commander, Task Force 7

Subj: Operation HARDTACK; request for change in radiation dosage limit

Ref: (a) NavShipYdNorVa conf ltr FS/S11(274A) HARDTACK of 5 Dec 1957 to Chief, BuMed, info copy to Hdqtrs FC AFSWP
(b) BuMed conf ltr BUMED-742:CCB:ces Ser 01116 of 13 Dec 1957 to NavShipYdNorVa

Encl: (1) Copy of reference (b)

1. It is understood that the radiation dosage limit for personnel while stationed at EPG during Operation HARDTACK will be established as 3r.

2. Underwater Explosions Research Division Project 3.4 plans for personnel to go aboard the target ships as soon as possible after WAHOO in order to effect repairs, recalibrate equipment and make preparations for UMBRELLA.

3. In anticipation of the relatively early re-entry needed by Project 3.4 after WAHOO and the extended work required aboard the target ships between WAHOO and UMBRELLA, it is most desirable that the radiation dosage limit for Project 3.4 personnel be raised to 4r.

4. It should be noted that no personnel involved in Project 3.4 has ever participated in an atomic test before and that the earliest possible participation after WAHOO and UMBRELLA tests will be in 1960. It should further be noted that every effort will be made to keep personnel exposure as low as possible.

5. The Bureau of Medicine and Surgery was approached by reference (a) with respect to this change in the radiation dosage limit and has no objection to this increase (reference (b)).

6. It is therefore requested that the radiation dosage limit for Project 3.4 personnel be raised to 4r.

T. J. Sullivan, Jr.

T. J. SULLIVAN, Jr.
By direction

Copies to:
HQ, FC, AFSWP (with copy of enclosure)
Dr. W. W. Murray, Project Officer, Project 3.4

[redacted]

J-3 24 JAN 195[illegible]

SUBJECT: Radiation Dosage Limit

TO: Commander
Norfolk Naval Shipyard
Portsmouth, Virginia

1. Reference NavShipYdNorVa conf ltr FB/all(274A) HARDTACK [illegible] Dec 1957 to Chief, BuMed, info copy to Hdqtrs FC AFSWP; BuMed conf [illegible] BUMED-742:OCB:ens Ser 01116 of 13 Dec 1957 to NavShipYdNorVa; Nav[illegible] NorVa conf ltr FB/8970(271) HARDTACK of 17 Jan 1958 to CJTF-7.

2. Subsequent to initiation of correspondence referenced a[illegible] as the result of concurrence of all concerned DOD, AEC and other [illegible] at a recent conference (16 Jan 1958), the MPE criteria for Opera[illegible] HARDTACK have been established, in part, as follows:

a. 3.75 roentgens (gamma only) per 13 week period or 5.[illegible] roentgens if the operation extends beyond 13 weeks.

b. In the event authorization for individual exposures [illegible] of the established MPE is indicated by the nature of the project, [illegible] authorization will be granted only by the Commander JTF-7 and on[illegible] specific cases for which operational requirements provide justif[illegible]

c. The operational period for radiation control purpo[illegible] defined as the first event minus fifteen (15) days through the la[illegible] plus fifteen (15) days.

3. In view of the above, it would appear that Project 3.4 [illegible] will be able to operate within the criteria as established withou[illegible] bias of results to be obtained from the Project. Should this no[illegible] case, request for exemption should be processed as under 2.b. ab[illegible]

FOR THE COMMANDER:

PERRY B. GRIFFITH
Brigadier General, USAF
Chief of Staff

[redacted]

COL LECHAUSSE/miller/J-3/2211/22 Jan 58

RN75260 903

8.3

U. S. NAVAL RADIOLOGICAL DEFESNE LABORATORY
SAN FRANCISCO 24, CALIFORNIA

906B
CEM:mle

NOV 2 4 1958

[redacted]

From: Commanding Officer and Director
To: Distribution List contained in Report USNRDL-TR-260

Subj: U.S. Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory CONFIDENTIAL Report USNRDL-TR-260; forwarding of

Ref: (a) CINCPACFLT OPNAV RPT 5600-3 (Conf) Ser 34/0906 of 22 May 58 to CNO

Encl: (1) Confidential Report USNRDL-TR-260 entitled "A Proposed Doctrine for Fleet Radiological Defense" by S. Baum, W.E. Strope and R.L. Harvey

1. Enclosure (1) presents, as a proposed replacement for Chapter 11 of NWIP-50-1, a revised doctrine for fleet atomic warfare defense and provides a documented basis for its major elements. This doctrine reflects the results of technical and operational evaluations of nuclear weapons effects, hazards, and countermeasures with respect to their implications on fleet operations.

2. The present Chapter 11 of NWIP 50-1, entitled "ABC Defense and Damage Control," treats the defense against atomic, biological and chemical warfare as a single system. Enclosure (1) points out that the apparent similarities between atomic warfare defense, on the one hand, and biological and chemical warfare defense, on the other, are not nearly as significant as their fundamental differences.

3. This report was reviewed in draft form by the Commanders in Chief, U.S. Atlantic and Pacific Fleets and was jointly recommended to the Chief of Naval Operations by reference (a). It is currently under review by CNO and thus at present represents a Laboratory recommendation rather than an approved doctrine.

J. H. McQUILKIN

Final Library 2-6-59

[redacted]

903
cond

UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OCT 1958

Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, USN
Chief of Naval Operations
Department of the Navy
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Admiral Burke:

You will recall that as a result of the March 1 detonation of the CASTLE test series conducted by JTF-7 in the Pacific in 1954, the natives of Rongelap and Utirik Atolls in the Marshall Islands were exposed to radioactive fallout. The Atomic Energy Commission, on behalf of the U. S. Government, has accepted responsibility for periodic medical examinations of these Marshallese. Since that time there have been five follow-up medical examinations conducted by the AEC in collaboration with the Naval Medical Research Institute, the Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory and the Brookhaven National Laboratory. These examinations were greatly facilitated by the assistance afforded the medical teams by CINCPACFLT and the Commanding Officer NAVSTA Kwaj.

The fifth follow-up examinations during February-April, 1958 for the first time employed the whole body counter, an electronic device for the measurement and identification of the total body burden of contaminating radioisotopes. It proved an unqualified success in that it provided direct data on the type and degree of internal contamination of a number of the islanders. It was also useful in establishing that there was residual radioactivity present in certain foods and other materials. Since it is likely that the current series of tests has added to the contamination level of these islands, it is more than ever imperative to continue these medical follow-up studies and to extend the survey to a detailed examination of the ecological aspects of these islands; special attention must be given to the locally obtained items of diet.

In order to accomplish this mission it is proposed that a team of medical and ecological specialists be sent to these islands with their required equipment, supplies and technical assistance. The experience of last year's expedition, for which you graciously provided the LST "Tioga County", prompts us to request that an LST again be assigned for transportation and housing beginning some time between the middle of February and the first of March, 1959, and requiring about one month overall for completion of mission. An LST proved to have many advantages over other craft, not the least of which was its ability to accept and secure the 21-ton shielded steelroom of the whole body counter on its tank deck.

An LST also has sufficient power supplies of the correct type to operate the whole body counter and the x-ray equipment.

The shielded steelroom presently is stored at Eniwetok. It can be on-loaded and returned within three to four days. Thus present operational plans would require that an LST be on Station at Eniwetok about a week before the planned departure to Rongelap. It would return to Eniwetok approximately 21 days later and off-load the steelroom.

If operational considerations warrant, the examination team could board the LST at any other designated point in this island system and similarly would disembark. At least two technicians, however, should assist in the on-loading of the steelroom and its associated delicate electronics and accompany this equipment while it is on board.

Assistance from the U. S. Navy in the accomplishment of the above mission would be of immeasurable value. Accordingly, your approval of the use of an LST together with the following incidental items is respectfully requested.

1. Participation in the operation by certain naval personnel, both service and civilian. Approximately five such naval personnel should accompany the team, but as yet these men are undesignated. At least some of the five will come from those listed in Schedule A dependent on duties and commitments as of that time. Your general approval of such detached duties is respectfully requested.

2. Transportation via MATS for all other personnel (Schedule A) of the team and cargo from Hawaii to Kwajalein or other designated point of embarkation and return. In addition to the five members of the team listed in paragraph 1 above there are contemplated some five scientists and six technicians from the Brookhaven National Laboratory, and one scientist each from the National Institutes of Health, the Walter Reed Medical Center, and the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project. Five to seven civilian ecologist-scientists from the University of Washington complete the team. The total weight of all medical equipment and gear is estimated at four tons and the volume at 180 cubic feet.

3. Transportation and berthing of the above medical and ecological investigators on the trip to and from Rongelap and during the period of the examinations and collecting.

4. Assignment of a Class I priority for all MATS transportation required.

5. Air transportation between Kwajalein or other designated embarkation point and Majuro, and return, to transfer three Marshallese (one medical practitioner and two interpreters) and to transfer several members of the medical team to Majuro for the purpose of examining children which serve as controls for the Rongelap children.

6. Authorization to all Naval Commands enroute to provide assistance and support to this team of scientists as needed.

7. Authorization of the Commander of the LST to on-load the steelrom and other stored material at Eniwetok and subsequently return them if that island is not designated as the principal station of the vessel.

Your cooperation in bringing about this biomedical mission will be deeply appreciated. Moreover, in addition to satisfying the Government's responsibility for the health of the Marshallese, you will be assisting in studies which have proven to be of value to the Department of the Navy and to the AEC in advancing our understanding of the nature of radiation injury and the delayed effects of radiation.

Sincerely yours,

General Manager

Enclosure
Schedule A
Ltr to A.E. Lemmi

SCHEDULE "A"

Tentative listing of personnel. Additional personnel are being contacted. Those listed below have received informal approval of their respective Commanding Officers or Directors.

U. S. Navy

Naval Medical Research Institute, Bethesda, Maryland
Lt. Cdr. I.V. King (MSC) USN, Naval Liaison Officer (not to accompany team)
Lt. Earl J. Roth (MC) USNR, Surgeon
Mr. Maynard Kieber, Electrician Scientist

Naval Medical Research Unit, Cairo, Egypt
William S. Clutter, HMCI, USN. Serv. No. 653-39-71, Technician

Naval Air Station, Jacksonville, Florida
W. Jefferson Hamby, HMCI, USN. Serv. No. 605-94-99, Technician

Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory, San Francisco, California
Mr. Hyman Rechter, Statistician
Mr. William Murray, Photographer

14th Naval District, Preventive Medicine Unit, Pearl Harbor, T.H.
Lt. James P. Nolan (MC) USNR, Liaison Officer for COMAIRWESTFOR (not to accompany team)

U. S. Army

Walter Reed Medical Center
Colonel Austin Lowery, MC, USA, Ophthalmologist

Civilians

Brookhaven National Laboratory, Upton, L.I., New York
Dr. Robert A. Conard, Medical Department, Team Leader and internist
Dr. James S. Robertson, Medical Dept., Biophysicist
Dr. William Wolins, Medical Department, Internist
Mr. James J. Greenough, Medical Department, Technician

Others

Dr. Leo Meyer, South Nassau Communities Hospital, Rockville Center, L.I., New York, Hematologist
Dr. J. Edward Ball or Dr. Baruch S. Blumberg, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, Md., Internist
Undesignated Officer, Armed Forces Special Weapons Project
Mr. Clyde Sipe, Camdenton, Missouri, Chief technician
Mr. Irving Jones, South Nassau Communities Hospital, Rockville Center, L.I., New York, Technician

SCHEDULE "A" Cont'd.

Marshall Islands, Majuro
One medical practitioner
Two interpreters

University of Washington, Seattle, Washington
Dr. Edward B. Held, Laboratory of Radiation Biology
Dr. Allyn H. Seymour, Laboratory of Radiation Biology
Approximately four to six additional scientists and/or technicians from this laboratory

[redacted]

J-3/903 3rd 2nd 4 FEB 1958

SUBJECT: Decontamination of Army Sectionalized Barges (U)

Headquarters, Joint Task Force SEVEN, Arlington Hall Station, Arlington 12, Virginia

TO: Commander, Task Group 7.3, Washington 25, D. C.

The request in basic letter is considered appropriate and has been submitted through proper channels with the request for its inclusion in your operational planning. In event fulfilling this requirement is beyond your capability, request this headquarters be advised.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Copy furnished:
FC AFSWP
CTG 7.1
NCL

[redacted] B. GRIFFITH
Brigadier General, USAF
Chief of Staff

General Luedeke
General Griffith
General Dick
Admiral Dennett
Doctor Oglo
DC/S
SJS
J-1
J-2
J-3
J-4
J-5
Compt

M/R: Self-explanatory.

COL JEFFREY/tallmadge/J-3/2218/29 Jan 58

[redacted]

JTF-7 903
Bldg 221 JE3

HEADQUARTERS
TASK GROUP 7.1
Joint Task Force SEVEN
APO 437 Box #1
San Francisco, California

2937-JFE

15 July 1958

SUBJECT: Request for Support for Program 40 (Radiation Biology)

TO: Commander
Task Group 7.4
APO 187
San Francisco, California

1. Program 40 (Radiation Biology) has as its objective the radiological-ecological study of RONGELAP Atoll, to evaluate the extent of radiation contamination of an off site atoll from the present testing program and to further the available knowledge of the cycling of the "long lived" radioisotopes produced by the 1954 tests.

2. The support needed is transportation and living accommodations for twelve scientists from ENIWETOK to RONGELAP, movement about RONGELAP as requested by the party leader, Doctor Edward Held, and return to ENIWETOK, with the men and material at the end of the operation. Support is needed during the period 12 August to 24 August inclusive. The use of the MV ALOTO has been requested of CTG 7.5 for this purpose.

3. In addition, CTG 7.4 is requested to provide communication support by the Weather Station at RONGELAP, and normal SA-16 support for mail and supplies.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

J. H. Wendell

J. H. WENDELL
J-3
Plans & Operations

JHW/jfm
DISTRIBUTION:
2 - CTG 7.4
1 - CTG 7.1
1 - D/A
1 - J-3
1 - J-6
1 - Program 40 (Donaldson)
1 - CJTF 7 (Info)
2 - TG 7.5 (Info)
2 - I&R

RIN 39[redacted]

9-3
9C3

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

[redacted]

MAY 24 1956

AIR MAIL [redacted]

From: Chief of Naval Operations
To: Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Japanese Foreign Office request for survey vessel SHIKISHIMA MARU to receive certain assistance in Central Pacific; forwarding of information concerning

Ref: (a) CNO Conf msg 232247Z May 1956

Encl: (1) Copy of American Embassy Tokyo msg No. 2732 of 22 May 1956
(2) Copy of American Embassy Tokyo msg No. 2740 of 23 May 1956
(3) Copy of CNO ltr ser 024721 of 23 May 1956 to ASTSECDEF (IRA)

1. Enclosures (1), (2) and (3) are forwarded as amplifying information to reference (a).

J.N. McDonald
By direction

Copy to:
COMNAVMARIANAS (with encl (1), (2) and (3))
COMNAVFE (with encl (1), (2) and (3))
COMNAVPHILCOM (with encl (1), (2) and (3))
CTF 7 (with encl (1), (2) and (3))

AIRMAIL

[redacted]

INCOMING TELEGRAM DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[redacted]

FROM: TOKYO

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2732, May 22, 5 P.M.

SECURITY

FOREST HAS DELIVERED NOTE VERBALE OFFICIALLY INFORMING US RE DISPATCH SHIMKOTSU MARU TO SURVEY EFFECTS NUCLEAR TESTS. SHIP TO INVESTIGATE FISH, BIOLOGICAL, ATMOSPHERIC, METEOROLOGICAL AND OCEANOGRAPHIC CONDITIONS IN VICINITY TESTING GROUNDS. SHIP DEPARTING TOKYO MAY 26 AND RETURNING JUNE 30;
NOTE INCLUDES FULL ITINERARY, DETAILS CREW AND OTHER PERTINENT DATA (TEXT BEING POUCHED).

NOTE REQUESTS FOLLOWING ASSISTANCE TO SURVEY SHIP: 1) MAKE APPROPRIATE RE SIGNAL STATION, CALL SIGN, FREQUENCY OF CALL AND REPLY SIGNAL AND TIME EXCHANGE SIGNALS IN ORDER SURVEY SHIP COORDINATE DAILY NOON POSITION TO BE AUTHORITIES AT NUCLEAR TEST AREA; 2) INFORMATION ON PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES I.E. COORDINATION OF TIME AND DATE NOTIFICATION AND POSITION FOR SURVEY SHIP TAKE REFUGE; 3) PERMISSION STOP AT PONAPE AND SAIPAN ONCE EACH FOR SUPPLY 100 TONS FRESH WATER AND PERISHABLE FOODS AT COST NOT MORE $1.50 AT BOTH PLACES; 4) INFORMATION ON PORTS OF CALL—A. METHODS OF WIRELESS COMMUNICATION; B. AVAILABILITY OF PILOTAGE AND PORT CHARTS; C. AVAILABILITY OF BARGES; AND D. AVAILABILITY OF PIERAGE; 5) SERVICES US MILITARY AIRCRAFT FOR TRANSPORTATION OF INVESTIGATION DATA, INSTRUMENTS ETC. BETWEEN PORTS OF CALL AND TOKYO.

IN VIEW EARLIEST DEPARTURE SHIMKOTSU MARU REQUEST EMBLY REPLY EMBASSY RECOMMENDS FULLEST COOPERATION POSSIBLE WITH SURVEY SHIP. AT REQUEST NAME FOR INFO ON SHIMKOTSU MARU, THIS MESSAGE AND COPY DESPATCH BEING SENT HIM DIRECTLY.

ALLISON

COPY

Enclosure (1)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

[redacted]

FROM: TOKYO

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2918, May 23, NOON

PRIORITY

REFERENCE DEPTEL 2963.

1. ITINERARY SHUNKOTSU MARU MAINLY WEST DANGER AREA: FROM TOKYO SOUTHEAST TO POINT 20 DEGREES NORTH LONGITUDE, 157 DEGREES EAST LATITUDE; DUE SOUTH TO POINT 9 DEGREES LONGITUDE; DUE EAST TO POINT 161 DEGREES LATITUDE; TO PONAPE ARRIVING JUNE 10; NORTHWEST TO SAIPAN ARRIVING JUNE 22; AND NORTH TO TOKYO ARRIVING JUNE 30. OBSERVATIONS TO BE CONDUCTED AT 37 POINTS ON ITINERARY.

2. RE PERISHABLE FOODS, JAPANESE DESIRE PURCHASE MAINLY VEGETABLES AND OTHER FRESH FOODS IN RELATIVELY LIMITED QUANTITIES AT COST ESTIMATED AT NO MORE THAN $150 AT BOTH SAIPAN AND PONAPE. JAPANESE UNCERTAIN EXACT QUANTITIES DESIRED.

3. RE SERVICES US MILITARY AIRCRAFT, JAPANESE DESIRE TRANSPORT FROM TOKYO TO SAIPAN AND PONAPE INVESTIGATION INSTRUMENTS, DRUGS AND OTHER INCIDENTALS FOUND NECESSARY AFTER SHUNKOTSU MARU DEPARTS TOKYO IN ADDITION, DESIRE SEND BACK FROM BOTH PLACES TO TOKYO UNDEVELOPED FILMS FOR INVESTIGATION AND RESEARCH, TAPE RECORDINGS, INVESTIGATION REPORTS AND LETTERS FROM RESEARCH STAFF AND CREW. FONOFF BELIEVES SHIPMENTS WILL BE SMALL AND HOPES THEY CAN BE CARRIED BY MILITARY AIRCRAFT MAKING REGULAR RUNS TO SAIPAN AND PONAPE ON NON-REIMBURSABLE BASIS.

ALLISON

Enclosure (2)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO
[redacted]

23 MAY 1956

[redacted]

From: Chief of Naval Operations
To: Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

Subj: Japanese Foreign Office request for survey vessel SHINKOKU MARU to receive certain assistance in Central Pacific

Ref: (a) American Embassy Tokyo msg No. 2732 of 22 May 1956

1. Reference (a), which outlines the desire of the Japanese Foreign Office to have the survey ship, SHINKOKU MARU, depart Tokyo 26 May to investigate fish and oceanographic conditions in the vicinity of the nuclear test area, has been referred to the Chief of Naval Operations for reply.

2. In answer to the specific requests contained in reference (a), the Chief of Naval Operations recommends the following action be taken:

a. Name appropriate U.S. signal station, call sign, frequency of call and reply signal and time exchange signals in order survey ship communicate daily noon position to U.S. authorities at nuclear test area.

Daily position reports may be addressed to Commander, Joint Task Force 7. The call sign for this command, at the proving grounds, is JEKI. The message may be transmitted to the Naval Communications Station, Guam, M.I., for relay to CTF 7. The call sign for Naval Communications Station, Guam, is NPG. The frequency to use in the initial call up to Naval Communications Station, Guam, is 500 KC. The frequencies to be employed for exchange of traffic after initial contact are:

SHINKOKU MARU transmits on 466 KC

SHINKOKU MARU receives on 470 KC

Daily noon position should be transmitted about one-half hour after local apparent noon.

b. Information on precautionary measures, i.e., communication of time and date of detention and position for survey ship take refuge.

A danger area has been described in accordance with the recommendations of both Commander Joint Task Force 7 and the Atomic Energy Commission.

[redacted]

Enclosure (3)

[redacted]

Op-316/gmk
Ser [illegible]

23 MAY 1956

This area warning has been disseminated through diplomatic channels as well as by Notices to Mariners, Notices to Airmen, and International Notices to Airmen. Grave hazards will at times exist in this area and all mariners and airmen are warned to remain clear. It is not anticipated that there will be any such hazards outside the danger area. In the unlikely event that test activities create a hazard, appropriate warnings will be given via existing systems. The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, has established with Commander Naval Forces Far East and United States Naval Attache Tokyo additional precautions relative to the positioning of any Japanese vessel. Communication of times and dates of detonations to Japan is not considered to be necessary. The ship should not be authorized to enter the prescribed danger area.

c. Permission to stop at Ponape and Saipan once each for supply 100 tons fresh water and perishable foods at cost of not more than $150.00 at both places.

If the Japanese Government is determined to send a ship on such an expedition it does not appear unreasonable to point out to the Japanese that with the resources available to that government it should be possible to select one with sufficient sea-keeping characteristics to permit a thirty day cruise without logistic support in this area. The Chief of Naval Operations recommends that this be done. If no such ship is available the Chief of Naval Operations will grant entry clearance for the SHUNKOTSU MARU to enter the Naval Defensive Sea Area of Guam for a period of one day, en route to and from the vicinity of the testing area. One hundred fifty dollars worth of perishable foods and 100 tons of fresh water can be furnished the ship during both visits on a reimbursable basis. Necessary arrangements for this support can be made by the ship's master with Commander Naval Forces Marianas. The reason Guam has been selected in lieu of Ponape and Saipan is because it is the only port in the area where required logistic support can be made available to the ship and for other reasons outlined below. No authority should be given to enter any port other than Guam.

d. Information on ports of call. (1) Methods of wireless communication. Guam has adequate communication facilities. (2) Availability of pilotage and port charts. Commander Naval Forces Marianas will arrange to pilot the SHUNKOTSU MARU in and out of Apra Harbor. (3) Availability of Sampans. None available at Guam. If required, the boats should be brought from Japan. (4) Availability of pierage. Adequate in Apra Harbor.

e. Services U.S. military aircraft for transportation of investigation data, instruments, etc., between ports of call and Tokyo.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Op-21S/[illegible]
Ser [illegible]

23 MAY 1956

Scheduled military flights from Guam to Japan. Necessary arrangements for the handling of investigation data and a limited amount of air freight can be made at Guam with Commander Naval Forces Marianas. No other services of this type can be made available.

/s/ G. L. [illegible]
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
(Administration)

[redacted]

[illegible]

TO: Director
Division of Biology and Medicine
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington 25, D. C.
ATTENTION: Dr. Gordon M. Dunning

Forwarded herewith are graphs of radiation intensity readings at Rongelap Atoll. These data supplement previous communications to you from this command.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
1-4, Graphs

JOHN M. LEONARD
Captain AGC
Asst Adj Gen

Copy furnished [illegible]

J-3/Dr Element/Kylten/9 July 1958

General Luedecke
General Griffing
General Dick
Admiral Tyree
Doctor Ogle
[illegible]
J-2
J-3
[illegible]

[redacted]

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

[redacted]

1063

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
WEATHER BUREAU

Pacific Supervisory Office
P. O. Box 3650
Honolulu 11, Hawaii

April 21, 1958

Commander
Joint Task Force SEVEN
APO 437
San Francisco, Calif.
(Attn: Major Frank Ritchie, RADSAFE)

Dear Sir:

In response to a telephone request from a Captain Matt of your organization, may we inform you that the Weather Bureau has no monitoring capabilities for radioactive fallout in the Hawaiian Islands.

We have at three stations in Hawaii; namely, Honolulu, Hilo and Lihue, the "fly paper" type of collection which the Weather Bureau performs for the AEC. The Weather Bureau, in this instance, merely exposes the paper. All analyses and measurements are made by AEC and, therefore, any data which you require from these "fly paper" exposures would have to be obtained from the AEC, not the Weather Bureau.

Very truly yours,

H. Dean Parry
Meteorologist Acting in Charge

HDP:smc

Keith Boyer, P-15 Group Leader

March 13, 1958

Wm. Ogle, Deputy Commander for Scientific Matters-FTF ?

YOUR PROPOSED VISIT TO EPG

J-20

During the forthcoming Hardtack Operation at the Eniwetok Proving Ground, I would appreciate discussion with a few informed and dependable people in deciding whether the conditions with respect to radioactive fallout are such as to allow the safe firing of nuclear devices.

Therefore, I would like to invite you to assist me in the above considerations preferably during the period April 21 to May 15. If you find it possible to stay slightly longer this would be most satisfactory. If the suggested period is not satisfactory to you, I would appreciate further advice from you on this subject.

Original Signed by
WM. OGLE

Wm. Ogle

WO:el

CC: Gen. A. R. Luedecke
J. M. B. Kellogg

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
LOS ALAMOS SCIENTIFIC LABORATORY
(CONTRACT W-7405-ENG-36)
P. O. Box 1663
LOS ALAMOS, NEW MEXICO

IN REPLY
REFER TO J-DO

March 13, 1958

Dr. Roger Batzel
University of California Radiation Laboratory
P. O. Box 808
Livermore, California

Dear Roger:

During the forthcoming Hardtack Operation at the Eniwetok Proving Ground, I would appreciate discussion with a few informed and dependable people in deciding whether the conditions with respect to radioactive fallout are such as to allow the safe firing of nuclear devices.

I would therefore like to invite you and Ken Street to assist me during Hardtack on the above considerations. It would be most helpful to me if between you you could cover the period of June 7 to July 15 assuming the operation extends that late. I am sending a similar letter to Ken and would like to request that you discuss this with him and let me know what period of time you could come out if you find it possible at all.

I would greatly appreciate any assistance you can give me on this subject.

Sincerely,

Original Signed by
WM. OGLE

Wm. Ogle
DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR
SCIENTIFIC MATTERS-JTF 7

WO:al

CC: H. F. York
D. Sewell
A. R. Luedecke ←
H + R (2)
File

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

LOS ALAMOS SCIENTIFIC LABORATORY
(CONTRACT W-7405-ENG-36)
P. O. BOX 1663
LOS ALAMOS, NEW MEXICO

IN REPLY
REFER TO J-DO

March 13, 1958

Dr. K. I. Street
University of California Radiation Laboratory
P. O. Box 808
Livermore, California

Dear Ken:

During the forthcoming Hardtack Operation at the Eniwetok Proving Ground, I would appreciate discussion with a few informed and dependable people in deciding whether the conditions with respect to radioactive fallout are such as to allow the safe firing of nuclear devices.

I would therefore like to invite you and Roger Batzel to assist me during Hardtack on the above considerations. It would be most helpful to me if between you you could cover the period of June 7 to July 15 assuming the operation extends that late. I am sending a similar letter to Roger and would like to request that you discuss this with him and let me know what period of time you could come out if you find it possible at all.

I would greatly appreciate any assistance you can give me on this subject.

Sincerely,

Original Signed by
WM. OGLE
Wm. Ogle
DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR
SCIENTIFIC MATTERS—JTF 7

WO:el

CC: H. F. York
D. Sewell
A. R. Luedecke ←
M + R (2)
File

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
LOS ALAMOS SCIENTIFIC LABORATORY
(CONTRACT W-7405-ENG-36)
P. O. Box 1663
LOS ALAMOS, NEW MEXICO

IN REPLY
REFER TO: J-30

March 13, 1958

Dr. Lester Machta
U. S. Weather Bureau
Department of Commerce
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Les:

During the forthcoming Hardtack Operation at the Eniwetok Proving Ground, I would appreciate discussion with a few informed and dependable people in deciding whether the conditions with respect to radioactive fallout are such as to allow the safe firing of nuclear devices.

During our phone conversation the other day you stated you would be interested in assisting in the above considerations but were not sure what period of time would be most convenient. I have arranged a possible schedule for the people I am asking out and would like to ask you to consider the period of May 31 to June 15. If this does not meet your convenience please let me know.

I would greatly appreciate your assistance during Hardtack if you find you can accept this invitation.

Sincerely,

Original Signed by
WM. OGLE

Wm. Ogle
DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR
SCIENTIFIC MATTERS-JTF 7

WO:el

CC: Gen. A. R. Luedecke
H & R (2)
File

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
LOS ALAMOS SCIENTIFIC LABORATORY
(CONTRACT W-7405-ENG-36)
P. O. Box 1663
LOS ALAMOS, NEW MEXICO

IN REPLY
REFER TO: J-30

March 13, 1958

Dr. Gordon Dunning
Division of Biology and Medicine
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Gordon:

During the forthcoming Hardtack Operation at the Eniwetok Proving Ground, I would appreciate discussion with a few informed and dependable people in deciding whether the conditions with respect to radioactive fallout are such as to allow the safe firing of nuclear devices.

Therefore, I would greatly appreciate your coming to the Eniwetok Proving Ground to assist in the above considerations if you can find it possible. Since I do not want to ask anyone to stay very long, I have arranged a tentative schedule which involves your being overseas from April 15 to May 7. If this time is not convenient for you please advise me of any preferable period of time. If you would care to stay longer than the above mentioned period of time that would be quite satisfactory.

Sincerely,

Original Signed by
WM. OGLE

Wm. Ogle
DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR
SCIENTIFIC MATTERS-JTF 7

WO:el

CC: Dr. S. Dunham
Gen. A. R. Luedecke
N • R (2)
File

G. A. Gowan, Associate J Division Leader — March 13, 1958

Wm. Ogle, Deputy Commander for Scientific Matters - JTF 7

YOUR PROPOSED VISIT TO EPG

J-80

During the forthcoming Hardtack Operation at the Eniwetok Proving Ground, I would appreciate discussion with a few informed and dependable people in deciding whether the conditions with respect to radioactive fallout are such as to allow the safe firing of nuclear devices.

I would therefore like to invite you to assist in the above considerations preferably during the period May 7 to June 1. If you find this period inconvenient with your own schedule, I would appreciate an alternate suggestion.

Original Signed by
WM. OGLE

Wm. Ogle

WO: Gen. A. R. Luedecke
Mr. A. G. Graves
File

903
J-3 J-3

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

FF1-1
A1
Ser: FF/ 913
4 MAR 1958

From: Commander in Chief U. S. Pacific Fleet
To: Commander Hawaiian Sea Frontier

Subj: Radiation Monitoring Program

Encl: (1) Copy of Hdqtrs JTF 7 ltr J-3/903 of 24 Feb 1958

1. Enclosure (1) is forwarded herewith for your compliance. The subject program is placed under the cognizance of your command.

2. You are authorized to deal directly with Headquarters Joint Task Force SEVEN in connection with this monitoring program. Send information copies of your communications to CINCPACFLT.

GEORGE F. KOSCO,
Fleet Aerologist

Copy to:
Hdqtrs JTF 7 (Arlington Hall Station, Arlington 12, Va.)
CO NAS KWAJALEIN (with encl (1))
CO NAS MIDWAY (with encl (1))
CO FLEWEACEN PEARL (with encl (1))



28

Chief
U. S. Weather Bureau
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Sir:

Joint Task Force SEVEN is planning to operate a radiation [illegible] program in the Central Pacific during Operation HARDTACK. In connection with this program, the Task Force desires to place radiation monitoring equipment at the U. S. Weather Bureau operated stations at TRUK, [illegible] PONAPE and MAJURO.

Assistance from the weather station personnel, as well as [illegible] to install equipment described below is requested.

The equipment for each station consists of a Radiation [illegible] a [illegible] Automatic Monitor, which requires 115-volts, 60 cycle [illegible] power supply and a station log book. Should this request be [illegible] this equipment will be transported from Eniwetok directly to the [illegible] stations about 1 April 1958.

The assistance requested of the station personnel, consisting mostly of recording [illegible] readings twice daily, will be spelled out in [illegible] which will accompany the equipment. No [illegible] [illegible]. Replacement units will be furnished the stations [illegible], at which time the previously used [illegible] will be returned to Eniwetok.

Sincerely yours,

PERRY B. GRIFFITH
Brigadier General, [illegible]
Chief of Staff

Copy furnished:
[illegible]
[illegible] Fox
FPO
P.O. Box [illegible]
Honolulu, T.H.

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Major RICHIE/miller/J-3/28 Feb 58/2210

484

[redacted]

[redacted] Monitoring Installations

[redacted]

[redacted]

Air Weather Service
Andrews Air Force Base
Washington 25, D. C.

1. Joint Task Force SEVEN is planning to operate a radiation monitoring program in the Central Pacific during Operation HARDTACK. In connection with this program the task force desires to place radiation monitoring equipment at the Air Weather Service Station on Guam.

2. Assistance from the weather detachment personnel on will [redacted] provision to install equipment consisting of a radiation survey meter, an automatic monitor and a station log book is requested.

3. Should this request be approved, this equipment will be transported from Hickam direct to the detachment about 1 April [redacted]. The requested assistance, consisting primarily of recording instrument reading twice daily, will be spelled out in instructions which will accompany the equipment. No maintenance support will be required [redacted] detachment personnel. Replacement units will be delivered to the [redacted] at which time the previously used instruments will be returned to Hickam.

[redacted]

PERRY B. GRIFFITH
Brigadier General, USAF
Chief of Staff

MAJOR FRANK G. RICHIE/Rew/J-3/19 Feb 58
3211

[redacted]

[redacted]

J-3/903 21 FEB 1958

SUBJECT: Radiation Dosage Limit

TO: Commander
Field Command
Armed Forces Special Weapons Project
Sandia Base
Albuquerque, New Mexico

1. Reference is made to:

a. Letter from Commander, Norfolk Naval Ship Yard, FE/C[redacted] HARDTACK, 17 January 1958.

b. Letter from CJTF SEVEN to Commander, Norfolk Naval Shipyard, J-3/903, subject: Radiation Dosage Limit, 24 January 1958.

c. Letter from COMFLOCK AFSWP, FCNT1 960.4 AE, subject: [redacted] of HARDTACK Project 3.4 for Change in Radiation Dosage Limit (U), [redacted] February 1958.

2. Reference 1b is attached for your information, which is a [redacted] to reference 1a.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

JOHN M. LEONARD
Captain AGC
Asst Adj Gen

1 Encl
CJTF-7 ltr dated 24 Jan 58

General [redacted]
General Griffith
General Dick
[redacted]
Deputy
Doctor Ogle
[redacted]
SGS
J-1
J-2
J-3
J-4
J-5
Compt

COL LEONARD/Hallmadge/J-3/2218/28Feb58

[redacted]



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N/A Since Arsine Gas is [illegible] USAF TO 00-85-13 authorizing airlift [illegible] is being requested to provide such auth[illegible]