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MR+A-7-Hardtack

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AEC 952/46 31

April 15, 1958

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ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

JOINT AEC-DOD OPERATION HARDTACK PUBLIC INFORMATION PLAN

Note by the Secretary

1. The attached report by the Director of Information Services is circulated for review by the Commission. The General Manager intends to approve the recommendations of the attached report subject, to comments by the Commissioners prior to the close of business on Thursday, April 17, 1958. Comments may be sent to the Secretary.

2. The Director of Information Services has advised that the brief approval time interval in this case has been necessitated by extensive coordination with the Department of Defense.

WITH ATTACHMENTS/ENCLOSURE

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW	
1ST REVIEW DATE: <u>5/26/95</u>	CLASSIFICATION (OR CODE NUMBER)
AUTHORITY: <u>DAAC (MDC) (MDD)</u>	1. CLASSIFICATION REASON
NAME: <u>CRW/ly/Am...</u>	2. CLASSIFICATION APPLIED TO:
2ND REVIEW DATE: <u>5/31/95</u>	3. CONTAINS NO INFO CLASSIFIED INFO
AUTHORITY: <u>ADD</u>	4. COORDINATE WITH:
NAME: <u>W.B.</u>	5. CLASSIFIED INFO CANCELLED
	6. CLASSIFIED INFO BRACKETED
	7. OTHER (SPECIFY):

W. B. McCool  
Secretary

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This material contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

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ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

JOINT AEC-DOD OPERATION HARDTACK  
PUBLIC INFORMATION PLAN

Report to the General Manager by the Director  
of the Division of Information Services

THE PROBLEM

1. To consider the joint AEC-DOD Operation HARDTACK Public Information Plan.

SUMMARY

2. At Meeting 1313 on November 6, 1957, the Commission considered AEC 952/19 which stated that, "A separate public information plan for Operation HARDTACK will be submitted to the Commission for consideration as early as possible." The Joint AEC-DOD Operation HARDTACK Public Information Plan, attached as Appendix "A", is submitted pursuant to the above notation.

STAFF JUDGMENTS

3. The Divisions of Military Application, Biology and Medicine, Security and Classification concur in the recommendation of this paper. The HARDTACK Information Plan also has been reviewed by the Commander, Joint Task Force Seven, and the Office of the Assistant Secretary (Public Affairs) of the Department of Defense and the attached draft reflects their comments and has their approval.

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This material contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

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RECOMMENDATION

4. The Director of Information Services recommends that the General Manager:

a. Approve the Joint AEC-DOD Operation HARDTACK Public InFormation Plan (Appendix "A");

b. Note that the Joint Office of Test Information authorized under the Plan will issue announcements of all HARDTACK test detonations having predicted yield of 200 kilotons or higher. (Specifications for announcements are given in Paragraph 6, Page 5, of Appendix "A" and rationale of the yield criterion is discussed in Annex "A" of Appendix "A");

c. Note that the projected News Media Observer activity at the Pacific Proving Ground in connection with the UN observers will be covered by a special program which will be submitted separately for Commission consideration;

d. Note that a letter will be transmitted notifying the JCAE of the Operation HARDTACK public Information Plan;

e. Note that an opportunity to comment upon the Plan, particularly with respect to b. above will be afforded the Operations Coordinating Board.

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APPENDIX "A"

JOINT AEC-DOD OPERATION HARDTACK

PUBLIC INFORMATION PLAN

A. PURPOSE

1. Consistent with national policy and security requirements of the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense, to establish policies and procedures for the compilation, control, review and issuance of public information related to Operation HARDTACK at the Commission's Pacific Proving Ground scheduled to begin about April 15, 1958.

2. These policies and procedures, based on experience gained in previous test series and public reaction which occurred during and after previous tests, are designed:

a. To provide the public promptly with such useful information regarding Operation HARDTACK as may be issued with due regard for security.

b. To provide for expedited issuance of official facts on emergency situations, should any arise, when such action is necessary to dispel rumor or speculation harmful to the success of the operation.

c. To establish in the AEC Division of Biology and Medicine a system for fast compilation in Washington for public release, if needed, of fallout data in the Pacific area and, in cooperation with the United States Public Health Service, in the United States.

3. A special public information plan for the news media observer program for Operation HARDTACK will be separately submitted for Commission consideration.

B. RESPONSIBILITY

4. The responsibility for the preparation and issuance of all public information materials on Operation HARDTACK rests with the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of

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Defense. The principal point of issuance will be Washington. All issuances will be joint AEC-DOD. It is not planned that JTF-7 will issue public announcements. However, any that might issue from the Task Force would require prior approval from the AEC and the DOD.

5. As necessary, the AEC and the DOD will consult with the Department of State, United States Information Agency and appropriate government coordinating bodies on the timing and issuance of official information concerning Operation HARDTACK.

6. Determining which HARDTACK detonations are to be publicly announced is the responsibility jointly of the AEC (Divisions of Military Application and Information Services) and the DOD, and announcements will issue from the AEC-DOD Joint Office of Test Information described in Paragraph 11 below. The criterion controlling whether a detonation is to be announced is the size of yield. Detonations of 200 kilotons yield or higher are to be announced by the JOTI as soon as the requisite facts for an announcement are available. Such statements will be limited to the fact of occurrence of a detonation; the time of detonation to the nearest minute; and a general statement as to the place of detonation, e.g., on Eniwetok Atoll or Bikini<sup>1</sup> Atoll. The announcements will make no reference to yield.\* The rationale underlying the announcement criterion is attached as Annex "A".

7. Statements approved by the AEC and the DOD may be issued by the Commander, JTF-7, simultaneously with release in Washington.

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\* An exception will be the detonation for the UN Observer event. It is expected that the predicted and actual yield of this shot, precise time of detonation and a full description of placement for detonation will be among the information approved for public issuance. A separate information plan will be submitted covering this event.

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8. The Commander, Joint Task Force Seven, is responsible for:

- a. The inclusion in operational reports of sufficient data and descriptive material to permit the compilation in Washington of fully adequate public announcements concerning Operation HARDTACK. (See Annex "B")
- b. The implementing within JTF-7 of public information policies consistent with this Information Plan.
- c. The support of any special information activities that may be authorized by the AEC and the DOD with respect to Operation HARDTACK and for recommending such other information activity as will assist him in carrying out his duties.

9. Within the Atomic Energy Commission, the Division of Information Services will be responsible for coordinating review of HARDTACK public information material. All public information material originating in or coming first to the AEC will be submitted to the DOD for review prior to issuance.

10. Within the Department of Defense, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Public Affairs, will be responsible for coordination and review of HARDTACK public information matters. All public information material originating in or coming first to the DOD will be submitted for AEC review prior to issuance.

C. ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURES

11. To carry out this Information Plan, there shall be set up in Washington, as soon as possible, a Joint Office of Test Information (JOTI) headed by a Director designated by the AEC and a Deputy Director designated by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Public Affairs.

- a. The JOTI shall be under the direct supervision of the General Manager of the AEC and all public information announcements, after coordination as provided in this Plan, shall be issued by this Office through AEC and DOD channels except as the Commission and the Department of Defense may direct.

b. The AEC Director of the Division of Information Services and the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Public Affairs, will assign such additional personnel to the JOTI in Washington as may be required.

12. In order to have available the material that may be needed for official issuance:

a. The Commander, JTF-7, will include in his operational reports the data detailed in Annex "B".

b. The Division of Biology and Medicine, AEC, will compile readings of fallout in the U.S. from reports received from 11 AEC installations and from about 40 U.S. Public Health Service stations which are cooperating in this project. These installations and stations will give, upon inquiry, fallout readings for their respective localities from day to day.

c. The New York Operations Office will compile data resulting from the information collected by its monitoring network.

d. The JOTI will evaluate the information arising from the actions under a, b, and c and recommend the character of public information action to be taken if any is indicated.

13. With the aim of countering, if necessary, adverse reaction abroad before and during Operation HARDTACK:

a. The United States Information Agency will be requested to prepare for AEC and DOD weekly surveys of foreign reaction relating to Operation HARDTACK.

b. The JOTI, the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Public Affairs, and the Public Information Service, AEC, will originate or accept from others and evaluate requests for issuance of information relating to Operation HARDTACK. The JOTI will coordinate preparation of such statements as are issued.

c. The JOTI will have under constant consideration whether any information action not scheduled in this Plan is warranted. Recommendations for such action will be made to the appropriate authorities.

14. In the interest of accomplishing as complete official reporting as may be practicable for meeting expected requests from news media, and to aid in combating possible unfavorable reaction in the U.S and elsewhere, the JOTI will prepare for Joint AEC-DOD issuance, such textual informational material as:

a. Background information on previous overseas and continental test series; JTF firing criteria, controls and operation procedures; discussion of radiation effects; material on monitoring and fallout reporting; details of improved weather forecasting; weapons with reduced fallout; methods of dissemination of radiation warnings, etc. (Where possible, material for visual media would be prepared along with that for other media.)

15. Operational information in the expedited report made by the Commander, JTF-7, subsequent to each detonation, will be the basis for consideration whether special circumstances indicate the need for any public information issuance. Such information might include, for example, the type of burst (air or ground), generalized description of explosive force as "megaton" or "kiloton" range, area of detonation (Eniwetok or Bikini) and statement on safety or casualties. Any such special statement would be subject to pre-issuance approval by the AEC and the DOD.

16. Prior to release of public information issuances, other than detonation announcements in accordance with the criterion of this Plan, the AEC and the DOD will, unless there is overriding urgency, notify the Commander, JTF-7, of the time and date of issuance and the text of the material.

D. SECURITY OF INFORMATION

17. Unless variances are specifically approved by the Commission and the Department of Defense, material publicly issued shall conform to the appropriate Classification Guides.

18. The Joint Task Force may disseminate to all individuals in the Joint Task Force the publicly issued official statements relating to the test series for guidance with the caution that NO information beyond the content of the official statements is to be made public by statement, letter, interview or conversation

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except those topics listed under Paragraph 12 b, JTF-7 Security Memorandum Number 205-2, dated October 1955 (Annex "C"), or superseding memoranda.

E. ISSUANCE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION AT CONCLUSION OF TEST AND IN POST-OPERATIONAL PERIOD

19. The Joint Office of Test Information will prepare an announcement of the conclusion of the HARDTACK series for AEC-DOD approval and issuance in Washington and Honolulu.

20. Following Operation HARDTACK, the AEC and the DOD will consult with the appropriate coordinating bodies of the Government to determine whether further public reporting on the operation is in the national interest. The AEC and the DOD will jointly approve whatever public reporting program is agreed upon.

21. Information proposed for public issuance by individuals or organizations after completion of the operational period for Operation HARDTACK will be submitted for review and coordination by AEC and DOD as follows:

a. All AEC units, contractors and official observers will submit any proposed informational material to the Division of Information Services through normal administrative channels.

b. Military and civilian units, organizations and individuals responsible to the military services will submit their material through their normal organizational channels to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Public Affairs, for review by AEC and DOD, Washington.

F. POSSIBLE EMERGENCY ANNOUNCEMENTS

22. The Commander, JTF-7, will recommend to the AEC and the DOD announcements he deems necessary to serve the public interest and operating requirements of JTF-7 in the event of emergencies such as dangerous fallout on a populated area;

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evacuation of personnel or natives or unusual or severe accidents to JTF-7 personnel.

a. Casualties to military personnel may be reported by the Service concerned in accordance with Department of Defense Directive No. 5410.1, dated 22 October 1952, and may be announced only after approval by the Office of Public Information, DOD

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ANNEX "A" TO APPENDIX "A"

RATIONALE OF DETONATION ANNOUNCEMENT CRITERION

1. According to experts, it is possible that all detonations of the HARDTACK series might be detected outside of the Pacific Proving Ground. Therefore, the first reaction of those considering what our policy should be with respect to public announcement of detonations was to favor announcement of all. This course, announced at the start of the series, would add to whatever credit might accrue to the U.S. for candor in conduct of its tests. It would eliminate the necessity for measures to keep secure the total number of detonations in the series, a task of considerable dimensions in view of the large number of persons having knowledge of the number (around 10,000 in the task force). Also, it would eliminate the possibility that any U.S. detonations would be announced first by other nations, such as Japan.

2. On the other hand counter-propaganda considerations suggested that in view of the probable considerable number of HARDTACK detonations, announcement of only about half of the total would prevent two important developments - (a) the effect on world public opinion of the U.S. methodically ticking off announcements of the detonations as frequently as they occurred, sometimes possible two, or even three, per day, and (b) the exploitation by Russian propaganda of the fact of issuance of U.S. official announcements of the detonations. In the absence of the official U.S. announcements, Russian propaganda would be forced, if it wished to attempt to capitalize upon the number, or approximate number of detonations, to speculate rather than to rely upon the official U.S. reports. This difference, in terms of effective propaganda, is considerable.

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3. It was concluded, therefore, that a desirable policy for Hardtack detonation announcements would require that not all detonations be announced and, in fact, only about one-half be announced. Accordingly, it was determined that for this purpose, announcement should be made of detonations having yield higher than 200 kilotons. On the basis of predicted yield for individual detonations in the series, this would result in announcement of about 15 of the projected 28.

4. It is of interest to note that there is possibly a small factor favoring counter-intelligence of a desirable character in a policy resulting in announcement of only about half the detonations. If any of the detonations were not detected outside the proving ground the intelligence of unfriendly nations would be, to that extent left guessing as to the total number of detonations, a problem they would not have if we stated we would announce all detonations and then did so.

5. In reaching the conclusions in 3. above, a wide range of formulae was examined. Among these were (a) announcement of no shots other than the UN Observer detonation and (b) announcement of the UN Observer shot and of the detonations from which there might be flash hazard to personnel outside the danger area. It was felt that any advantage gained by paucity to the extreme of either of these alternatives would be heavily offset by the fact that they would be contrary to the implicit posture of the U.S. with respect to nuclear test information, i.e. fullest possible disclosure consonant with security. The principal advantage of either would be that it would give the Soviet no official U.S. statements upon which to base propaganda regarding this series, thus forcing reliance on their own detections. The principal

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specific disadvantage would be that at least the Japanese, and perhaps other nations, could be expected to announce a considerable number of the HARDTACK series, as Japan did during the REDWING series.

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Annex "A" to  
Appendix "A"

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ANNEX "B" TO APPENDIX "A"

UNDERSTANDINGS AND SPECIFICATIONS RE DATA IN  
CJTF-7 OPERATIONAL REPORTS FOR PUBLIC REPORTING

1. To carry out the purposes of the Joint AEC-DOD Public Information Plan for Operation HARDTACK and specify the data required, the Commander, JTF-7 has been requested to provide in his operational reports the following information:

a. Details of any search report other than "all clear" should be transmitted at once and should include the facts on whether a vessel or plane was found in or outside the danger area; time; location with reference to the danger area; size and type of vessel or plane with estimated number of persons aboard; probable nationality; action taken by JTF.

b. If for any reason, all monitor stations are not activated on any given shot, reasons therefor should be transmitted.

c. If for any reason, all scheduled monitoring and cloud tracking flights are not carried out, reasons therefor should be transmitted.

d. To the extent that operational sources permit, projected path of cloud should be transmitted and subsequent reports should give details of any significant deviation from the predicted path.

e. Any unexpected development requiring any safety action -- whether or not fallout proves to be significant -- should be reported fully, giving numbers of persons involved, fallout readings, and stating what action -- whether precautionary or remedial -- was taken.

f. Principal data on the amount and distribution of significant fallout other than reported under e. above, including readings from the aerial surveys and from the ground monitoring stations.

2. The Joint Office of Test Information in Washington, in the absence of any specific mention to the contrary in the operations reports, WILL PROCEED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT:

(a) air and sea search was made prior to each shot and the danger area reported officially "all clear"; (b) all monitor stations -- manned and automatic -- were activated, and (c) all scheduled monitoring and cloud tracking flights were carried out as planned.

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ANNEX "C" TO APPENDIX "A"

HEADQUARTERS  
JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN  
Washington 25, D.C.

STANDING OPERATIONS PROCEDURE }  
NUMBER 205-2 }

3 October 1955

12. PERSONAL CORRESPONDENCE.

b. Here are some examples of what you may write in your personal letters as long as there is no reference to the preceding prohibited topics:

Your health and welfare

Recreation and sports activities

General remarks about the weather

Food and billets

Where you are located (Eniwetok or Bikini Atoll, Marshall Islands)

Associates and friends

Club or church activities

Other matters of a personal nature

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