

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

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R
to S/S
FAH 10/8/58

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH MR. GORDON GRAY
Tuesday, October 8, 1958 - 11 a. m.

He talked about the organization of the work on nuclear test suspension and surprise attack, pointing out that on the basis of the record there was a committee of Dulles, McElroy and Anderson on nuclear test suspension, and one of Dulles, McElroy and Killian on surprise attack. He doubted whether Anderson, particularly in view of his present absence, was necessary on either committee, and suggested that the two committees be combined as Dulles, McElroy and Killian. I said this was agreeable to me. He indicated that on nuclear test suspension there was considerable difference of opinion within the Administration on the question of permitting tests below the threshold of detection, permitting peaceful uses, and whether our agreement was contingent upon progress in other disarmament matters. I said I thought all these matters had been settled by the Presidential statement which had been earlier approved. Mr. Gray said this might be so, but many people in the Government did not take it that way and he thought the issue should be resolved.



detection of zones

We spoke of the complications of surprise attack as the result of the missile situation. I said I doubted we would really be prepared by the first of November but that probably ways could be found for postponement without a bad public relations reaction. I pointed out that our own position was not yet entirely firm, and much less had we reached agreement with the British and French, and perhaps others who might compose the Western delegation.

We spoke of the functioning of the NSC. He thought it was rather futile to go on beating over past papers. He said the President had suggested the possibility of limited meetings of the NSC confined to the statutory members to discuss informally urgent matters.

more frequent

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
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I said I felt that some useful studies could be conducted to bring out and apply the actual lessons learned from our recent experiences in Lebanon and Taiwan. In the first instance, there had been, for example, the dependence of the British upon us; then there had been the lack of mobility which developed when the Greeks, as now, are not consenting to our use of their airfields. In Taiwan we have had to face up to the problem of using nuclear weapons and perhaps not having adequate conventional weapons. I wondered whether this practical experience did not justify some study and perhaps conclusions.

A handwritten signature, possibly "D. Eisenhower", written in dark ink. The signature is stylized and somewhat illegible.

S:JFDilles:cjp

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