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OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

March 19, 1964

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STAFF STUDY

SUBJECT: Coordinating Information and Timing of Statements  
in Nuclear Energy and Related Fields

THE PROBLEM

1. To formulate recommendations with regard to overall coordination of public statements, information and timing of projects relating to the question of nuclear energy, particularly as to the extent of responsibility in these fields and as to which if any additional responsibilities the Board or other agencies might be charged with by the President.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. OGB Responsibilities under Executive Order 10483

Executive Order 10483 provides for two types of OGB actions:

- a. Subparagraph (1) which deals with actions that "the President, assigned to OGB by NSC, charges the Board with "advising, with the Government concerned" respecting "the execution of such security activities as it deems that it will make its full contribution to the attainment of the national security objectives and of the particular climate of opinion in the United States is seeking to achieve in the world." In recognition of this function, the NSC recently assigned two actions to the OGB in the international nuclear energy fields:

OGB File 38

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| Authority NLE 87-4854    |
| By DJH NLE Date 10/10/87 |

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- Urgent
- (1) NSC Action 104 charged the OCB with assisting the Council with respect to the timing of the release of the Ivy Film.
- (2) NSC Action 106 charged OCB with coordinating the timing of the public announcement of the nation-wide Civil Defense Exercise, as well as the general line to be taken by publicity about it.

b. A second responsibility of OCB stems from subparagraph (b) of Section 2 of Executive Order 11283 which provides that "the Council shall initiate new proposals for action within the framework of national security policies in response to opportunities and changes in the situation." To fulfillment of this function, the OCB, by action of December 1, 1963, authorized a program for the dissemination of information and education programs in support of the President's "One Speech." This group included representatives of the ADC and FCB.

c. Subparagraph (c) of Section 2, cited above, provides that "the OCB can make recommendations to the Council with regard to other related projects, which have not been specifically assigned to the Council, but which may affect vital aspects of the Council's functions, and have been assigned to OCB by the Council."

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d. OCB's interest regarding its role in clearing nuclear weapons recognised by the Atomic Energy Commission. Although still in existence, the Official Statements on Nuclear Weapons, charges officials of the Executive Branch with clearing nuclear weapons statements with the Chairman AEC, and charges the latter with clearing intelligence aspects with the Director of CIA, and foreign relation aspects with State. In two recent telegrams, the Chairman AEC has sought the advice of the OCB with respect to timing and content of official statements on nuclear weapons. In letter to the OCB Staff Representative of February 19, 1944, the At. Energy Com. member requested OCB approval of the timing of the announcement of the United States Force Seven, and by letter to C. B. Johnson on March 1, 1944, advised of public reporting of the Joint War Plan. In each case, the Chairman AEC stated:

"The ultimate decisions on whether to use atomic materials, how to adopt them, and what timing to choose in issuance, if it should be found desirable, or not, of course be made in the light of the judgments that would be assembled by the Interim Coordination Board."

3. Additional Major Actions in Presently Assigned to the Department.

- a. A number of major public statements will be given on the use and application of atomic energy, international machinery, scientific and technological, and exchange of weapons with UNR allies. These statements in connection with the forthcoming hearings on amendment of the Neutrality Act. These hearings are presently scheduled for May.

b. The FCDA has developed a plan consistent with major policy and planning assumptions for the fiscal year 1955 which will be released for use by state and local Civil Defense organizations. These assumptions include a considerable amount of significant data with respect to the effect of nuclear weapons, targets destruction, etc.

c. A number of additional actions and public statements will need to be developed with respect to (a) annual reporting (FCDA), exchange of Civil Defense information with friendly countries, and public information developed through the OIM with respect to non-military defense measures (industrial dispersion, dispersal of external agencies, etc.). These actions may have important aspects affecting the United States' position overseas, depending principally upon their content and timing, in relation to other significant overseas developments.

4. Major Responsibilities for Actions Cited Above

a. The FCDA under authority of the President and subject to Congressional dissemination appropriate Civil Defense information to all appropriate elements.

b. The ANC under the Administrator of Civil Defense, shall make available to Congress and the public pertinent information relating to atomic energy.

c. The OIM, under authority of the National Defense Commission Reorganization Plan No. 3, has been authorized to develop and propose non-military defense measures. It will provide information concerning such measures.

*Approved for publication  
by the Secretary of Defense*



d. The Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, or his/her  
coordinating programs for the disclosure of atomic energy information  
to friendly countries. In carrying out this responsibility he operates  
through various agency channels depending upon the purpose involved.

DISCUSSION

5. NSC Actions 1045 and 1061, and the ABC Letters of 19 February and  
1 March 1954, cited above, advise the USIA's interests in the nuclear energy  
field. As precedents they suggest that the USI should consult the CCR to  
advise with the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Director  
of the FCOM on the timing, and manner of presentation of publications which  
as may significantly affect the USIA's diplomatic position while the United  
States is seeking to maintain neutrality in the negotiations; and that those  
previously cited, logically would include:

- a. the timing of delivery, distribution or disclosure under paragraph 1  
in 102/1, "disclosure of classified information,  
classified communication";
- b. manner and timing of release of pertinent information to  
public officials, international organizations, and the media  
nuclear weapons;
- c. domestic nuclear press, ground publication;
- d. military applications aspects of ABC and related documents,  
and non-military applications aspects of the same, and Defense  
Defense unclassified reports.

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[REDACTED]

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6. In addition, since the same military defense programs are being carried out in the United States, coordinated by the Office of Defense Mobilization, there is a need for OCB's responsibilities in the area of foreign climate control projects. It is felt that OCB should make explicit the primary coordinating role of OCB, and the supervisory role of OCB with respect to the timing of projects and the dissemination of information of significance to foreign climate control.

#### CONCLUSIONS

7. In the discharge of its functions of coordinating the timing and execution of the programs affecting the national security, the permanent Coordinating Board has the clear responsibility of:

- a. Formulating the general research and development program which should be taken first, as well as by agreement of the various other Branches in the execution of appropriate R&D programs to solve this problem.
- b. Proposing particular operational designs or plans, specifying specific results of significance in foreign climate control, and an opinion which supports the public security; but such specific proposals should never be an illustration of what might be done to achieve a scientific and feasible project design, because and no definite program should be agreed to by the Coordinating Board by its member agencies, without the prior approval of the Council for exacting the operational requirements.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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8. Climate of opinion: It should be pointed out that the public all government actions in the sphere of nuclear energy and related projects which are capable of significant overseas impact. However, since there are many other significant factors which might militate against a program which seems desirable from a climate of opinion standpoint, the NSC must exercise judgments in balancing economic versus determinations of political objectives.

9. Review of the NSC programs assigned to DDCI, the programs assigned to the AEC, the Office of Defense Mobilization, and the various allegations imposed upon departments and agencies by the Atomic Energy Act, et al., (AEA) and Public Law 920 (FCDA) indicates that significant steps for coordinated operational control exist in the areas of information gathering and in timing of, nuclear energy projects & related matters. It is further evident that the CCB, as a principal operational control mechanism of the National Security Council, should, in the interests of the national security position world-wide, take action to insure that such programs do not go to the detriment of national policy.

RECOMMENDATION

10. It is recommended that the Interagency Coordinating Board:

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a. Inform the NSC which are post to CCB responsibility for the timing of projects and coordination of information in the field of nuclear energy and related projects, that:

"The OCB interest and concern is primarily to assure maximum foreign support of the US's international position with respect to national policies, programs and objectives. The OCB should therefore be in a position to express the views with respect to important statements and the timing of actions in the field of nuclear energy which it is believed have significant bearing on overseas programs.

"Inasmuch as the OCB interest is primarily in the foreign field as indicated above, it should not be the final authority for balancing domestic considerations against overseas considerations with respect to policies and statements in the field of nuclear energy. The OCB will notify the NSC whenever such conflict of interest appears to exist.

"The OCB will develop a statement of its own policies considerations involved in statements and actions with respect to nuclear energy and related matters. This statement would be designed to provide guidance with respect to consultative processes in the foreign and the opinion field as they relate to nuclear energy programs."

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


b. Request the NSC to issue the following executive order:

"In order to coordinate the manner and timing of  
the release of public information on the nuclear testing program  
which may affect the international security interests of  
the United States, the Interagency Coordinating Board shall  
advise with the several agencies concerned with respect to  
the advisability and timing of public releases of information,  
official statements and reports of Department of Defense  
information plans in the following categories:

- "A. Nuclear energy development of weapons  
category including announcement of first test  
Nevada Proving Ground tests and other tests,  
public information criteria concerning test site.
- "B. Guided missile development refresher course  
air offensive or defense offensive capabilities, including  
nuclear capability.
- "C. Announcement of nuclear civil defense  
defense or nuclear civil defense and its  
exercised.
- "D. Leadership of national defense in case of emergency  
interest in atomic bomb and power plant accidents.

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"Release of political prisoners during military operations.

military defense related to the following principles will be coordinated by the Office of Strategic Mobilization:


- "A. Reduction of urban combat vulnerability.
- "B. Civilian defense will be tiered other than those cited above.
- "C. Continuity of leadership.
- "D. Continuity of government.
- "E. Physical protection of civilians.

"OCB guidance as to the timing of political prisoner release, timing of release of information, and first consideration will be furnished by the Chairman, Committee for Strategic Mobilization, Office of Defense Mobilization.

"Memorandum for the Chairman, Committee for Strategic Mobilization, dated January 10, 1953, Subject: Office of Strategic Mobilization, Release of Political Prisoners, is hereby amended so as to provide:

"Following the course of the Korean Conflict, and in addition to the Chairman of the Committee for Strategic Mobilization, I request the guidance of the Operations Bureau, Department of Defense, on aspects affecting the performance of our diplomatic relations in the United States, and the conduct of the American Embassy in Seoul and the American Consulate.

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
(3)

Federal Civil Defense Activities Through COMINT  
the Operations Committee will be involved directly  
in the formulation of the Board's recommendations  
such other activities of the Board as may be consistent  
with this program."

- e. Contingent upon NSC approval of (a) above, circulate the following:  
attached as TAB "A" with enclosure, to members of DDCI, Chairman COMINT, Director  
PCIA, and the Director OIN.
- d. Establish working groups composed of other agencies, where appropriate:  
appropriate (1) to assist the Board in evaluating the security of information  
other agencies concerned with respect to NSC when so requested; (2) to evaluate  
proposed actions or statements pertaining to nuclear energy; (3) to  
initiate suggestions to the NSC or to other appropriate officials for more  
more effective exploitation of actions or statements in the field of nuclear  
energy. This group should have appropriate security clearance. It is limited  
to AEC restricted data and the latter part of paragraph (a) of the COMINT  
of the UCB at which nuclear energy matters are discussed.  
  
*should*

Attachment:

TAB "A" - Draft Statement by OIN with  
attached Check List, dated 10/10/64.



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Draft Statement by OCB to:

Members of Board  
Chairman, ABC  
Director, FCDA  
Director, CDM



The area of United States Government policy relating to the most important problems of international nuclear energy development, both for weapons and general peaceful uses. The urgency of bringing about such coordination has been heightened by the need to maintain and enhance the American leadership established by the President's message of December 8, 1953 to the UN General Assembly. Major actions taken and the subsequent public statements on nuclear armament and findings since October 1953 will be examined with an eye to making them fit the policies we have set in support of this Nation's objective throughout the world.

The Board stands ready to advise in the type of policy to be followed. It will give first priority of attention to coordination of the working groups to expediting it and to providing written guidance where appropriate. Our purpose is to be as fully informed as possible of timing and content of official war and statement of the wide range of judgments available in the field; to represent effectively our position and the working groups to make sure that no pertinent consideration will be overlooked; and that the general approach of the United States international position in nuclear energy matters may be clearly defined. The timing of actions taken and by officials will depend upon developments in this field.

To reduce the possibility of diplomatic conflicts, the Board

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consultation on matters of nuclear energy, either on new uses or old.  
the Board's staff and working groups have compiled the attached check  
list of items which in the judgment of the various agency representatives  
hold potentialities for harm or help to the advancement of the  
United States' interests.

It is suggested that agency heads advise their principal assistants  
dealing with these matters to bring them to the attention of the CEP  
for advisory comment on content or timing or operational significance  
as concerns national policy. The longer in advance notice can be  
provided, the more adequate and useful will be our advisory action.

The check list, of course, does not include all points that  
might merit attention. It will be revised periodically. We will  
welcome your comments on additions--or deletions--which concern you  
and your staff.

Attachment: Check List

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Check List of Actions of Interest to OCB Declassification  
in the Nuclear Energy and Related Fields

1. Actions in support of the President's proposals in his UN speech of December 8, 1953.
2. Major policy statements expressing or furthering U.S. proposals on international control of armaments.
3. Executive Branch proposals with respect to amendments to the Atomic Energy Act.
4. General content of information plans for and timing of public announcements on weapons test series at Pacific or Nevada Testing Grounds.
5. General content of information plans for and timing of public announcements, and official reporting materials including schedules of nation-wide civil defense exercises.
6. General content of information plans for and timing of public announcements and official reporting materials on military exercises, such as the proposed Strategic Air Command and Defense Command (SAC-ADC) exercises plan for July 1954.
7. General content of information plans for and timing of public announcements and reporting materials on major non-military industrial defense activities in the United States conducted by ODM.
8. Declassified information proposed for release to public and military and law enforcement agencies to assist them in detection of espionage and subversive activities.

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- clandestine delivery of nuclear weapons by submarine.
9. Timing of public announcements of forward deployment of military combat elements capable of employing nuclear weapons.
10. Official comment on guided missile developments reflecting an air offensive or air defensive capability involving nuclear characteristics.
11. Timing and content of public reporting enterprises on nuclear space warfare, either offensive or defensive.