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3. The attached letter has been prepared, which is a modification of the action earlier approved by the Commission, and which in summary would modify the series over that contemplated originally as follows:

a. The two contingent shots, the standard C and the additional shot for the development of the Polaris warhead would be fired.




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4. The modifications mentioned make no major change in the amount of offsite fallout to be expected using Dr. Libby's revised figures. The appropriate values are as follows:



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5. Weather delays to date have been greater than expected. It appears that we will not be able to complete the series at the EPG until about 20 August. Firing at Eniwetok Atoll should be over by late July but those at Bikini would extend into early August. We could fire the Finon UN observer shot at some fixed time in July at Eniwetok but the Task Force has indicated that it cannot retain a simultaneous firing capability at Johnston, Eniwetok and Bikini. I consider it most important that we fire the UN shot at such time as to avoid to the maximum interference therewith and hence the possibility of an undesirable result.

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I believe, therefore, it should be fired at a time after all other firings and when the important people can concentrate on the UR alone. To this end we would plan on firing immediately after the Johnston Island shots which would be on or about 20 August.

It is questionable as yet as to whether time will permit the substitution. However, if the substitution could be made we would be able to decrease materially the size of the danger area at the EPG as soon as the last other large shot was fired.

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6. Dr. Libby has suggested that he and the Weapons Subcommittee of the GAC review the program (members of the Weapons Subcommittee are Dr. Teller, Dr. Fisk, and Dr. Wilson). I shall attempt to arrange a suitable time for them to review the program with lab representatives and with Dr. Libby. However, if we are to get the series over as soon as possible we must go forward to the President immediately and preparations by the Laboratories and Task Force must go forward on a firm basis meeting Commission desires. I recommend, therefore, that the attached letter be approved immediately for the Chairman's taking to the President and that as soon as possible thereafter the review by the GAC subcommittee be accomplished. If they believe one of the shots being prepared need not be fired, we would, of course, bring the matter back to the Commission.

Signed - K. E. Fields

General Manager

Attachment:
Draft ltr to the President

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U.S. Atomic Energy Commission
Office of the General Manager

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DRAFT LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT

Dear Mr. President:

On January 29, 1958, I wrote informing you of our plans for nuclear testing in calendar year 1958 and requested authority to expend the nuclear materials involved. The major series contemplated at that time, and at present, was Operation HARDTACK to be conducted in the Pacific beginning in April. A secondary small series of relatively low yield underground shots called Operation MILLRACK was planned for conduct in the Nevada Test Site during the fall of 1958. Certain safety firings, from which no significant nuclear yield is expected, were to be fired underground at the Nevada Test Site as needed during the year. By indorsement dated January 31, 1958, you approved conduct of the HARDTACK program and the spring safety firings and the expenditure of nuclear materials required, but withheld approval of the MILLRACK operation pending further consideration. Also, on May 1, 1958, you approved HARDTACK-ARGUS, a project to be conducted by the Department of Defense as an adjunct to Operation HARDTACK.

The planned HARDTACK operation as already approved by you involved 20 scheduled laboratory diagnostic shots, 5 scheduled Department of Defense effects shots, the firing of a reduced fission device for U. S. observation, and the possible firing of two laboratory "contingent shots." Firing of these latter two would depend on the outcome of certain other shots in the series.

Since January 31, two safety shots have been conducted successfully in Nevada. Also, and as already reported orally to you, the Pacific series was initiated with a first nuclear firing on April 22. A total of 13 nuclear shots had been fired as of June 6th. Several of the devices have produced disappointing results and because of the importance of the weapon programs involved, it is highly desirable that follow-up tests be included in HARDTACK. Also, as a result of recent weapon research activity within the laboratories and in response to a special request from the Department of Defense as to the need for early development of specified systems, other

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Present to the President on 6-10-58 - Approved


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
selected shots should be added to the Pacific program. Therefore, we propose to:

- a. Fire two shots which were classified as contingent in our previous schedule.



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- b. Add to the RANSPACK series, subject to your approval:



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We request that you approve the addition to the series of the firings listed in (b) above. Considering the weather delays to date (and with the recommended added shots) the operation at the Eiwatoh Proving Ground as now planned should be completed in late August. Without the additional shots, completion might be some three weeks earlier. The two high altitude shots will be fired at Johnston Island in August. Therefore, danger areas will be in existence concurrently at the Eiwatoh Proving Ground and Johnston Island for a period of approximately three weeks during the time Johnston Island will be operational.

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The President

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In deciding which shots we would recommend for addition to Operation HARDTACK, we considered advancing certain shots now planned for Operation MILLBACE in the fall at the Nevada Test Site. In the interest of avoiding further lengthening of HARDTACK, we do not recommend that they be advanced.

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In preparation for Operation MILLBACE and the safety tests at the Nevada Test Site, it has been necessary to initiate extensive tunnel construction and to proceed with associated on-site construction as well as laboratory planning. The scale of preparation is, of course, increasing with each passing week. We request, therefore, your approval for the conduct of Operation MILLBACE at the Nevada Test Site as follows:

- a. A series of five small diagnostic shots all underground starting in late fall. One of the five tests would be the firing of a device to meet a military need for a nuclear warhead for medium artillery. It would have a yield of less than a kiloton.

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- b. One relatively deep underground shot of 20 to 40 KT in December to explore further the field of underground testing. As you will remember we fired underground at Nevada last September a 1.7 KT shot at such depth that the residual radioactivity was completely confined. In view of the importance that underground testing may ultimately have to our national defense, it is necessary that we progressively fire larger shots at greater depths to establish the practical limitations on such firings. In addition, of course, this firing will provide beneficial information relative to the peacetime use of atomic explosions, and it should improve our knowledge of the detectability of underground shots. It should be noted that all of the Operation MILLBACE shots, including the safety tests, are to be fired underground at the Nevada Test Site in such a manner as to contain the radioactive debris and, therefore, no fallout should result from the operation.

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